U.S. v. Somers

Decision Date12 December 1991
Docket NumberNos. 90-1318,90-1669,s. 90-1318
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy S. SOMERS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Andrew B. Baker, Jr. (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Dyer, Ind., Rick L. Jancha, and William T. Grimmer, Asst. U.S. Attys., Office of the U.S. Atty., South Bend, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.

Chris Averkiou (argued), Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, WOOD, Jr., and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Timothy S. Somers was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and ten counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Somers was also charged along with five others in a separate twenty-one count indictment which attributed to him an additional violation of § 846 and three violations of § 841(a)(1). At the trial on the first indictment, Somers was convicted on nine counts--including one count of conspiracy under § 846--for which he was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Thereafter, the government told Somers that it would dismiss the second indictment if Somers pleaded guilty to one count of violating § 841(a)(1). He agreed and was subsequently sentenced to 109 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently with his earlier conviction, and followed by a three year term of supervised release. Somers now challenges both convictions. We affirm.

I.

The first indictment against Somers focused on his narcotics trafficking during the fall of 1988. Through various undercover informants, a special police operation unit in South Bend, Indiana, learned that Somers was selling cocaine from his residence. The police were also told that Somers typically completed cocaine transactions through street dealers, including his next-door neighbor Patricia Norman. On the basis of this information, an undercover officer met with Norman on October 6, 1988, to negotiate a purchase of an "eightball" (one-eighth ounce) of cocaine. He gave Norman $300.00. Surveillance units then watched her enter the rear-door of Somers' home and later re-emerge with an "eightball" of cocaine which she handed to the officer.

The undercover officer arranged another cocaine purchase with Norman on the night of October 8, 1988. Norman again went into Somers home, but when she returned she explained that her source had to replenish his cocaine supply to fill the order. Surveillance units then observed Somers leave his home, drive to another location, and then drive back to his home. Intelligence information later revealed that the location Somers had driven to was the residence of Edward Landaw, believed to be a major cocaine trafficker in the South Bend area. After Somers returned, Norman went back inside Somers' home and brought out a quarter ounce of cocaine for the undercover officer.

Shortly thereafter, police learned that Somers would occasionally sell cocaine from an Eagle Paint store in South Bend. On October 10, 1988, another undercover officer sought out James Weesner for a cocaine purchase. When the officer asked to buy cocaine, Weesner phoned "Tim" in his presence and indicated that "Tim" was at a paint shop. While the officer waited in his car, surveillance units followed Weesner to the Eagle Paint store. At that time, Eagle Paint had been rented by Landaw and Somers was frequently seen there. Weesner entered the store and, after a short time, left and returned with the cocaine. Somers' pickup truck was parked at the store during the time Weesner was inside.

By mid-October, one of the undercover officers had been invited to enter Somers' home. There on October 14 and 18, 1988, he purchased cocaine from Rick and Janie Radtke, who worked with Somers in distributing cocaine. However, the officer never had any direct contact or communication with Somers himself during either of these visits. Norman and the Radtkes would communicate with Somers through an intercom system. Somers always remained downstairs.

On October 20, 1988, the officer returned to Somers' home to purchase two ounces of cocaine. After discussing the price with Norman, the Radtkes indicated that $3,200.00 would be agreeable to "Tim," but informed the officer that he would have to pick the cocaine up in an hour since their source did not have two ounces of cocaine on hand. Later that day, surveillance units observed Somers leave his home on a motorcycle and followed him to Landaw's residence. When Somers' left Landaw's residence, he was again followed. Surveillance units however, soon lost sight of Somers and by radio they requested that a marked car stop him. The radio request included a description of Somers' motorcycle and warned that Somers might be in possession of narcotics and was to be considered armed and dangerous.

A patrol officer who was assigned to make the arrest saw Somers drive by his location at a high rate of speed and run a red light. The officer made the stop and advised Somers that he wanted to pat him down for weapons. Somers consented. After performing a routine pat-down search, the officer felt lumps in each of Somers' breast pockets and thereupon removed two ounces of crack cocaine. He also uncovered $1,840.00 in cash and a hypodermic needle.

Prior to trial, Somers filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person and other items obtained during a search of his house. After receiving briefs from both parties, the court denied his motion in a written order issued on August 31, 1989. Somers was subsequently convicted by jury on November 3, 1989.

The second indictment against Somers concerned his narcotics trafficking with a separate supplier known as Jesus Rivera of Chicago, Illinois. Somers regularly purchased cocaine from Rivera between April, 1988 and June, 1989. Typically, Rivera or one of his "mules" would take the cocaine to South Bend and deliver it to Somers, who would in turn distribute to Lisa Jerzak, Michael Zedley, and others in the South Bend area. On one occasion in June, 1988, Somers received a delivery from Rivera of four ounces of cocaine.

Shortly after being convicted on nine counts charged in the first indictment, Somers reached a plea agreement with the government. The agreement provided that the government would dismiss the balance of the charges in the second indictment if Somers pleaded guilty to one § 841(a)(1) violation; the government also indicated that it would make a non-binding recommendation for a sentence in the middle of the applicable guideline range and also recommend that the sentence be imposed to run concurrently with his sentence under the first indictment. Somers agreed and accordingly pled guilty to one count of violating § 841(a)(1).

Nearly two months after entering the plea of guilty, Somers moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that it was not knowing and intentional. The court denied his motion and proceeded with sentencing.

II.

Somers' first argument on appeal is that the prosecution of the § 841(a)(1) count to which he pled guilty is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), and Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), he contends that the § 841(a)(1) charge was a lessor-included offense of the conspiracy offense for which he was previously prosecuted in the first indictment--thereby violating the double jeopardy prohibition against "prov[ing] conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." In support of this argument, he points out the conduct alleged in the § 841(a)(1) count of the second indictment took place during the time period of the first conspiracy. We find this contention unpersuasive.

Although the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual from a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1880), the § 841(a)(1) count to which Somers pled guilty cannot be fairly regarded as part of the first conspiracy. While we recognize that the two conspiracies charged against Somers overlapped for a five-month period, each involved different criminal actors and chains of distribution, with Somers being the sole common participant. The conspiracy charge for which Somers was convicted in the first indictment alleged that Edward Landaw and Linette Moss supplied cocaine to Somers, who in turn distributed it to customers and street dealers such as Norman, Weesner and the Radtkes. No reference was made to any of the events or persons relevant to the allegations of the second charge to which he pled guilty. By contrast, the second indictment charged Somers with forming a separate and distinct conspiracy with Jesus Rivera to distribute cocaine to Lisa Jerzak, Michael Zedley and several other unknown persons.

Even if the conspiracy offense charged in the second indictment were a part of the conspiracy for which Somers was earlier convicted, double jeopardy does not bar the prosecution of the underlying substantive offense to which he pled guilty. The law is well-settled that the commission of a substantive offense and the conspiracy to commit that offense are two separate crimes. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975); United States v. Soteras, 770 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir.1985). Hence, Somers' guilty plea to the § 841(a)(1) count would be subject to a double jeopardy challenge as a lesser included offense within the meaning of Blockburger if, and only if, the overt acts alleging this offense were previously charged in the first indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108 (2nd Cir.1990) (...

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