U.S. v. Spinelli, 1125

• Decision Date: 25 May 1988
• Docket Number: D,No. 1125,1125
• Citation: 848 F.2d 26
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Frank Anthony SPINELLI, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 88-1031.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 26

848 F.2d 26

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Frank Anthony SPINELLI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1125, Docket 88-1031.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued May 5, 1988.

Decided May 25, 1988.

Richard A. Stanley, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., for the S.D. of New York, Linda Imes, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, on the brief), for appellee.

Loren I. Glassman, White Plains, N.Y., for defendant-appellant.

Before LUMBARD, OAKES, and KEARSE, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Frank Anthony Spinelli appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered after a bench trial on a stipulated record in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Chief Judge, convicting him on one count of conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 (1982), and one count of the underlying substantive offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1982). On this appeal, Spinelli contends that the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized from his home and truck by law enforcement agents who failed to announce their authority and purpose before entering as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3109 (1982). For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 27, 1987, federal agents associated with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") Task Force ("Task Force") obtained a search warrant for Spinelli's home and adjacent grounds in Valhalla, New York. Section 3109 of 18 U.S.C. (called the "knock-and-announce" statute) provides, in essence, that an officer seeking to execute such a warrant should give notice of his authority and purpose before entering a house forcibly; an exception has generally been recognized where unannounced entry is required by exigent circumstances.

In executing the search warrant on March 27, the law enforcement agents did not knock at Spinelli's door or announce their authority or purpose. Rather, two Task Force members drove onto Spinelli's front lawn, then went to the front door and kicked it in. These agents, who were local police detectives at least one of whom had been deputized as a federal marshal, had never executed a federal warrant before and were unaware of the knock-and-announce statute. Once inside the house, they arrested Spinelli and a codefendant. They and other agents searched the house, finding a methamphetamine laboratory in an upstairs bedroom, and searched a U-Haul truck parked in the driveway, finding 362 grams of methamphetamine.

Spinelli moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and the truck on the ground, inter alia, that the entry and seizures violated the knock-and-announce statute. The government urged that the motion be denied because the unannounced entry was justified by exigent circumstances. Spinelli argued that noncompliance with the statute could not be so justified because the entering officers were not even aware of the statute.

Following an evidentiary hearing, described in greater detail in Part II.B. below, the district court denied the motion to suppress, stating that the standard for determining whether exigent circumstances warranted noncompliance is "objective[ ] rather than subjective[ ], and that the subjective thinking of the arresting officer of [sic ] is of no moment." (Transcript of Hearing, October 6, 1987, at 61.) The court elaborated as follows:

I think the proper standard of whether there are exigent circumstances is not (Id. at 60-61.) Applying the objective standard, the court found that "a reasonable officer ... could have reached the conclusion that it would not be necessary to knock and announce...." (Id. at 61.) Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress.

what the officers knew or what they decided. If timid officers violated the knock-and-announce requirement, because they thought exigent circumstances existed, and the Court, in fact, made a determination that that exigent circumstances [sic ] did not exist, based on the reasonable-person test, then that decision, no matter how hard they thought about it, would be a nullity. And I suppose where people recklessly enter without regard to the statute because they simply do not know any better and nobody told them, if, in fact, exigent circumstances did exist, would be entirely lawful and justifiable.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Spinelli argues that the district court erred in applying only an objective standard and should have applied a subjective standard as well, and that application of the latter standard should have led the court to suppress the evidence seized. We agree that the proper standard for determining whether exigent circumstances warranted noncompliance with the knock-and-announce statute comprises both subjective and objective components. Nonetheless, though the district court erred by applying only the objective component, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrated that both parts of the standard were satisfied.

A. The Standard

Section 3109 of Title 18 provides as follows:

The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3109 (1982). Property seized in violation of Sec. 3109 may be excluded from evidence. United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 n. 13 (2d Cir.1975).

Notwithstanding a failure to comply with Sec. 3109, the evidence seized need not be suppressed if the noncompliance was excused by exigent circumstances. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 & n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1759 & n. 8, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968) ("there is little reason" to doubt that exceptions to constitutional strictures on entering a dwelling also apply to the requirements of Sec. 3109, citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1636, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting)). Thus, this Court has recognized that noncompliance with Sec. 3109's knock-and-announce requirement may be excused

"(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and purpose, or

(2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or

(3) where those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted."

United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 1001 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47, 83 S.Ct. at 1636 (opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440, 444 (2d Cir.) (applying Sec. 3109 standards to warrantless entry, in accordance with Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958)), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3076, 41 L.Ed.2d 670 (1974).

In determining whether exigent circumstances warranted unannounced entry, we have applied both a subjective and an objective test. In Artieri, for example, we noted that "the agents making the entry had Section 3109 reflects " 'the reverence of the law for the individual's right of privacy in his house,' " a reverence that is " 'deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application.' " Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 589, 88 S.Ct. at 1758 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. at 313, 78 S.Ct. at 1198). Accordingly, we adhere to the principle implicit in our prior cases that exigent circumstances may excuse noncompliance with the knock-and-announce requirement only where (1) the officers believe there is an emergency situation and (2) their belief is objectively reasonable. To excuse noncompliance either when the officers had no thoughts of emergency or when there was no reasonable basis for such thoughts would inappropriately compromise the privacy interest to be protected.

                reasonable grounds to believe and did believe" that the target of their investigation was likely to be armed.  491 F.2d at 444.  In Manning, we noted that the entering agents, after knocking at the

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