U.S. v. Stanford

Decision Date26 January 2011
Docket NumberCriminal Action No. H–09–342.
PartiesUNITED STATES of Americav.Robert Allen STANFORD, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

769 F.Supp.2d 1083

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Robert Allen STANFORD, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. H–09–342.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Jan. 26, 2011.


[769 F.Supp.2d 1084]

Gregg Jeffrey Costa, James L. Turner, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Financial Litigation, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, Jackie B. Patrick, Matthew A. Klecka, Paul E. Pelletier, Andrew Howard Warren, William Stellmach, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

[769 F.Supp.2d 1085]

ORDER FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION

DAVID HITTNER, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Relief and Medical Treatment (Document No. 397). Having considered the motion, testimony and oral argument presented during a hearing held on January 6, 2011, and the applicable law, the Court determines the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2009, a federal grand jury for the Southern District of Texas returned a twenty-one count indictment charging Defendant Robert Allen Stanford (“Stanford”) and others with, inter alia, conspiring to commit securities fraud and money laundering, and conspiring to obstruct and obstructing an investigation of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

On June 30, 2009, the Court granted the Government's motion for revocation of release and committed Stanford to pretrial detention. After carefully considering the evidence presented during a hearing, reviewing the full transcript of the magistrate judge's detention hearing, hearing argument from counsel, and applying the factors enumerated in the Bond Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq., the Court concluded that Stanford is a serious flight risk and no condition or combinations of conditions would reasonably assure his appearance at trial.1

In September 2009, Stanford sustained a head injury during a confrontation with another inmate at the Joe Corley Detention Facility in Conroe, Texas. He underwent surgery to repair facial fractures. Thereafter, Stanford was relocated to the Federal Detention Center (“FDC”) in Houston, Texas.

After the incident, and upon request of defense counsel, Victor Scarano, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Stanford. Dr. Scarano met with Stanford on October 19, 2009 and again on October 30, 2009. Dr. Scarano then reevaluated Stanford in April of 2010 and on November 27, 2010.

On December 9, 2010, counsel for Stanford moved the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Stanford's competency after Dr. Scarano opined that Stanford is not competent to stand trial.2 The Government then moved to appoint Steven Rosenblatt, M.D., a forensic and clinical psychiatrist, to evaluate Stanford's mental capacity and provide a second opinion of his mental state. The Court granted the Government's motion. In addition, defense counsel requested David Axelrad, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist and neuro-psychiatrist, to interview Stanford and offer a third opinion. Dr. Scarano prepared a report of his findings and filed it under seal with the Court. Dr. Rosenblatt submitted a letter to the Government, reporting his findings, which was also filed under seal with the Court. After the hearing, Drs. Scarano and Axelrad submitted letters to Stanford's defense counsel, summarizing their recommendations, which were also filed with this Court.

On January 6, 2011, the Court held a hearing pursuant to Stanford's motion to determine competency under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,

[769 F.Supp.2d 1086]

18 U.S.C. § 4241, et seq. All three psychiatrists testified at the hearing. Dr. Scarano concluded that, based on the psychological testing he performed during his evaluations on Stanford,3 Stanford's mental state renders him unable to effectively and rationally assist his attorneys in developing a defense for the charges against him. Dr. Scarano testified that this is a result of over-medication, which has led to an addiction,4 or the injury Stanford sustained in September 2009. Dr. Rosenblatt, the Government's expert, also testified that Stanford is not competent to stand trial. He testified that Stanford is suffering from delirium, an organic brain syndrome, which prevents him from adequately assisting his attorneys to prepare his defense. He was uncertain whether the medications Stanford is currently taking are the root of that mental condition, or whether the condition stems from the head injury Stanford sustained in September 2009. Dr. Axelrad's testimony corroborated Dr. Rosenblatt's testimony that Stanford has some form of delirium caused by either Stanford's addiction to the medications he is currently taking or perhaps soft tissue damage, a result of the September 2009 head injury.

Although the three psychiatrists could not identify the exact cause of Stanford's diminished mental capacity, they opined it could be one or a combination of the following: (1) over-medication, which has led to an addiction; (2) brain damage caused by the head injury he sustained in September 2009; and/or (3) Major Depressive Disorder. All three agreed Stanford should be withdrawn from his medications. Dr. Scarano testified this process could take between three months and six months. Dr. Rosenblatt testified it could take between two weeks and two months. Dr. Axelrad testified the withdrawal could take between four weeks and three months. All of the psychiatrists explained withdrawal symptoms could cause adverse side effects if performed improperly. Accordingly, the psychiatrists recommended Stanford be placed in an in-patient psychiatric facility with full-time medical supervision while he is being withdrawn from the medication. They agreed that once Stanford's medication is reduced or discontinued, the cause of Stanford's impaired mental capacity will be more easily discernable. Dr. Rosenblatt and Dr. Axelrad also testified, and Dr. Scarano agreed in a letter to defense counsel filed with this Court, that Stanford would benefit from undergoing neuropsychological examinations to determine the residual effects, if any, of the injury he sustained in September 2009.

In addition to the psychiatrists' testimony, the Government called Daniel Fox, Ph.D., a psychologist at the FDC, as well as Captain Scott Fauver, the chief security officer at the FDC, to testify. Both testified to their observations of and interactions with Stanford at the FDC. Dr. Fox testified he has had several interactions with Stanford, though most were brief.

[769 F.Supp.2d 1087]

He testified Stanford, for the most part, seemed to be aware of his surroundings and was able to engage in short conversations. Captain Fauver testified that e-mails and telephone conversations between Stanford and his family and friends during his pretrial detention at the FDC demonstrate Stanford is able to think clearly and communicate rationally about a variety of issues, including issues regarding his case.

Following the competency hearing, the Government and Stanford's defense counsel submitted motions based on the testimony and evidence presented. The Government contends that Stanford is not legally incompetent, but moves the Court to nevertheless commit Stanford to a “suitable facility,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(2), for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). Stanford's defense counsel, on the other hand, contend that Stanford is legally incompetent to proceed to trial at this time and moves the Court to make a specific judicial determination to that extent. Further, they argue that Stanford should be released on bond so that he can commit himself into a private medical facility and remain on bond until the trial commences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial. Cooper v. Okla., 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 394, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. When making a competency determination, the court looks not to the mental condition of the accused at the time of the alleged offense, but rather is concerned with “whether the defendant is able to confer intelligently with counsel and to competently participate in the trial of his case.” United States v. Collins, 491 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir.1974). The standard for determining competency is whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (adopting the Dusky standard for a judicial finding of incompetency and requiring a defendant to be able to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense”).

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, et seq., guides the court in situations where an accused is presumed to be or is deemed legally incompetent. Once a court makes a judicial finding that the defendant is legally incompetent, section 4241(d) instructs that the court “shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Competency to Stand Trial

It is uncontested that Stanford understands the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Stanford is able to adequately assist his attorneys to prepare his defense. At the hearing, all three psychiatrists testified that, after independently examining Stanford and reviewing his relevant medical...

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