U.S. v. Stanley, 93-8049
| Decision Date | 30 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-8049,93-8049 |
| Citation | 24 F.3d 1314 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tiffany Sherrell STANLEY, Charles Reynaldo Cameron, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
G.F. Peterman, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Macon, GA, for appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, RONEY and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judges.
Defendants-appellants Charles Reynaldo Cameron and Tiffany Sherrell Stanley were convicted along with Ronald Calvin Powers of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846. Powers' convictions and sentence were affirmed by another panel of this court. 1 This appeal involves only Cameron and Stanley. We affirm Cameron's convictions and sentence, but we vacate Stanley's convictions, as we find that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions.
On December 12, 1991, police arrested Timothy Wayne Murray in Columbus, Georgia, on cocaine trafficking charges. Murray agreed to cooperate with police by assisting them in arresting his suppliers in Atlanta, Georgia. 2 At the direction of the police, Murray made a telephone call from the police department in Columbus to defendant Cameron in Atlanta. Murray telephoned Cameron's pager number and left the telephone number of the telephone line used by the police to set up undercover drug deals. 3 At approximately 8:40 p.m. on December 12th, Cameron returned Murray's telephone call, and the police tape-recorded the ensuing conversation between Cameron and Murray. 4 During the course of this conversation, Cameron and Murray arranged a drug deal: Cameron agreed to drive down to Columbus that evening with three and one-half ounces of cocaine base, for which Murray agreed to pay $3,600.00. Cameron agreed to telephone Murray when he arrived at the Hardee's Restaurant in Columbus. 5
Several hours later, Cameron telephoned Murray from the Hardee's Restaurant in Columbus. 6 An undercover police officer drove Murray to the Hardee's Restaurant in an old pick-up truck. When they arrived at the Hardee's, Murray saw Cameron across the street at the gas station, standing beside his car pumping gas. As he approached Cameron's car, Murray saw two passengers in the car, a black female in the front passenger's seat and a black male, identified as Powers, in the back seat. 7 Murray asked Cameron, "where the dope was," and Powers responded, "You need to talk to me." 8 Powers then got out of the car and he and Murray walked across the street to the Hardee's Restaurant, discussing the drug deal as they walked. Powers and Murray then walked back across the street to the gas station and got into the back seat of Cameron's car. Cameron sat in the driver's seat. The woman was still in the front passenger's seat. 9
DISCUSSION
Cameron contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because the government failed to prove that the substance found in his car on the night of his arrest was cocaine base. On the night of Cameron's arrest, the police officers weighed the substance found under the dashboard of Cameron's car on scales in the police department; the substance weighed 105.6 grams. 17 The state crime laboratory subsequently determined that the substance was cocaine base and that it weighed 88 grams. 18 Cameron relies on this discrepancy in weight to support his argument that the government failed to establish that the cocaine base identified at trial was the same substance discovered in his car on the night of his arrest. Having carefully reviewed the record, we determine that this argument is without merit. First, the government's witnesses established a chain of custody between the substance seized on the night of Cameron's arrest and the cocaine base identified at trial. 19 Second, the government's witnesses provided a plausible explanation for the weight discrepancy: the scales in the police department had been confiscated during a drug deal and were not properly maintained, and the police officers did not remove the plastic bags in which the cocaine base was packaged before weighing it, as the state crime lab did. 20 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Cameron's convictions.
Cameron also contends that the district court made three allegedly improper comments on the evidence during the charges to the jury. First, Cameron argues that, in instructing the jury that Cameron's incriminating statement should not be considered as evidence against the other defendants, the district court judge improperly stated his own recollection of the evidence regarding this statement. We have carefully reviewed the district court's instructions on this point, 21 and we find that the district court was careful to avoid either expressing or intimating any opinion on the evidence regarding Cameron's statement; rather, the district court simply reminded the jury that there was evidence of such a statement so that the instruction would make sense to the jury. Second, Cameron argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury, over defendants' objections, that the jury should not draw any adverse inferences from defendants' failure to testify. 22 It is well established that the giving of such an instruction over the defendant's objection does not violate the Constitution. 23 Finally, Cameron argues that the district court improperly charged the jury that the government was under no obligation to prove that defendants possessed any specific amount of cocaine. 24
The indictment in this case did not charge any specific amount of cocaine. Thus, the government was not required to prove the exact quantity of drugs involved. 25 We find no error in the district court's charge. Accordingly, Cameron's challenges to his convictions are without merit
Stanley argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions because there is absolutely no evidence that she either willingly participated in or had any knowledge of the illegal drug activity. The government offered very little testimony regarding Stanley. Two police officers who were present at the time of defendants' arrests testified that Stanley was in the front passenger's seat of Cameron's car and that she was wearing a blue jean jacket. 26 One of the officers testified that he recovered some one dollar bills from Stanley but that these bills were not part of the payoff money that the police had provided to Murray. 27 Finally, Murray testified that he knew nothing about Stanley:
The government did not offer any evidence of Stanley's demeanor on the night of her arrest. The testimony related above is the totality of the evidence directly related to Stanley.
The government relies on several pieces of circumstantial evidence to support Stanley's convictions. First, the government relies on a conversation between Cameron and "an unidentified female, whose voice may be heard, though not understood, on the tape" of the telephone conversation between Cameron and Murray. 29 The government did not offer any testimony at trial regarding this "unidentified female" voice. The tape recording of the telephone conversation between Murray and Cameron, which commenced at approximately 8:40 p.m. on December 12th, was played to the jury, 30 and a transcript of this conversation was admitted as an exhibit. 31 Two lines of this 17-page transcript read: "UF: '(Inaudible).' " 32 This is apparently the "unidentified female" voice to which the government refers. The conversation in which this unidentified voice is heard occurred more than five hours before Stanley was arrested in the front seat of Cameron's car. The government did not offer any evidence, other than Stanley's gender, to connect her with the unidentified, inaudible, female voice on the tape.
Second, the government relies on Murray's testimony regarding his initial encounter with Cameron and Powers at the gas station. Murray testified, in pertinent part:
. . . . .
. . . . .
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