U.S. v. State of New York
| Citation | 3 F.Supp.2d 298 |
| Decision Date | 07 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-CV-5562 FB.,No. 96-CV-5864 FB.,96-CV-5562 FB.,96-CV-5864 FB. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, George E. Pataki, Governor of the State of New York, Brian J. Wing, Acting New York State Commissioner of Social Services, Barbara A. DeBuono, New York State Commissioner of Public Health, James L. Stone, New York State Commissioner of Mental Health, Thomas A. Maul, New York State Commissioner of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Richard P. Mills, New York State Commissioner of Education, John L. Behan, Director of the New York State Division of Veterans Affairs, Walter G. Hoefer, Director of the New York State Office for the Aging, Jean Somers Miller, New York State Commissioner of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, Alexander F. Treadwell, New York State Secretary of State, Robert R. Snashall, Chairman of the New York State Workers' Compensation Board, Marva L. Hammons, Commissioner of Human Resources of the City of New York, and Thomas R. Wilkey, Executive Director of the New York State Board of Elections, in their official capacities, Defendants. DISABLED IN ACTION OF METROPOLITAN NEW YORK; Jovita Acosta; Tisheca Luckey, Plaintiffs, v. Marva L. HAMMONS, Administrator, New York City Human Resources Administration, in her official capacity; Barbara A. DeBuono, Commissioner, New York State Department of Health, in her official capacity; Brian J. Wing, Acting Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, by Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, New York and Judybeth Greene, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff United States of America.
Community Service Society, by Jonathan Feldman, New York City, for the plaintiffs Disabled in Action of Metropolitan New York, Inc., Jovita Acosta and Tisheca Luckey.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York by Paul Marks, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York City, for defendant Marva L. Hammons.
Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York by Vincent Leong, Assistant Attorney General, New York City, for defendants State of New York, George E. Pataki, Brian. J. Wing, Barbara A. DeBuono, James L. Stone, Thomas A. Maul, Richard P. Mills, John L. Behan, Walter G. Hoefer, Jean Sommers Miller, Alexander F. Treadwell, and Robert R. Snashall.
Peter S. Kosinski, Patricia Murray, Special Counsel, Albany, NY, for defendant Thomas R. Wilkey.
The two above-captioned actions challenge the "agency-based" voter registration system that was implemented by the City and State of New York in response to the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq. The discrete legal issue posed by the motions which are the subject of this decision is whether the State is required to designate the approximately 1,600 public and private hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, and other community-based organizations that process Medicaid applications in the City (the "subject facilities" or "facilities") as mandatory voter registration sites pursuant to this Congressional act. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that these facilities need not be so designated.
In case number 96-CV-5562, the plaintiff is the United States of America ("the Government") and the defendants are the State of New York ("State"), eleven State officials, including Governor George E. Pataki (collectively "the State defendants"), and Marva L. Hammons in her capacity as Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration ("HRA") of the City of New York ("City").1 In case number 96-CV-5864, the plaintiffs are Disabled in Action of Metropolitan New York, Inc. ("DIA"), a New York-based not-for-profit organization that advocates on behalf of the disabled, and two individuals, Jovita Acosta and Tisheca Luckey (collectively "the DIA plaintiffs"). The defendants are the Commissioner of HRA, the State Health Commissioner, and the Acting State Commissioner of Social Services.
There are three motions pending before the Court. The Government and the DIA plaintiffs each move for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a declaratory judgment that HRA and the State defendants are required to designate the subject facilities as voter registration sites, thus ensuring that the facilities offer all Medicaid applicants the full range of voter registration services mandated by the NVRA. The Government contends that the subject facilities are so critical to the administration of the City's Medicaid system that they constitute de facto arms of the HRA that must therefore provide voter registration assistance to all applicants. HRA has also moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, as a matter of law, the subject facilities need not be designated as voter registration sites. Because of the considerable overlap between the two cases, the three motions are consolidated for disposition.
In order to evaluate plaintiffs' argument that the NVRA requires voter registration at the subject facilities, the Court will first discuss the NVRA, and then turn to a general discussion of the manner in which Medicaid applications are processed within the City.
The NVRA, also known as the "motor-voter" law, was designed to "establish procedures ... [to] increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office" and "to enhance[] the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(1), (2); see also Association of Community Organizations For Reform Now (ACORN) v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 834-835 (6th Cir.1997); Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 792-793 (7th Cir.1995). To that end, the NVRA requires that states, in addition to any other method of voter registration allowed by state law, establish procedures for three separate methods of voter registration: (1) by application made simultaneously with an application for a driver's license; (2) by mail application; and (3) by application at certain designated federal, state, and non-governmental office sites, also known as "agency-based" registration. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2(a).
Section 1973gg-5 of the NVRA implements a two-tiered approach to agency-based voter registration. First, each state is required to designate as voter registration agencies "all offices in the State that provide public assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(a)(2)(A), (B). In the conference report that accompanied the final version of the NVRA, Congress indicated that "[by] public assistance agencies, we intend to include those State agencies in each State that administer or provide services under the food stamp, medicaid, the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) and the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) programs." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 103-66, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1993) ("Conf.Rep."), at 19. The legislative history further indicates that the purpose of the mandatory agency-based registration program was "to supplement the motor-voter provisions of the bill by reaching out to those citizens who are likely not to benefit from the State motor-voter registration application provisions." H.R.Rep. No. 103-9, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. (February 2, 1993) ("House Rep."), at 12. Thus, "[a]gency-based voter registration provides a useful supplement to motor-voter registration systems, [and] enables more low income and minority citizens to become registered...." Sen.Rep. 103-6, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (February 25, 1993) ("Sen.Rep."), at 14.
In addition to these mandatory voter registration sites, each state must select an unspecified number of other offices within the state to serve as voter registration sites. These alternative sites are sometimes referred to as "discretionary" voter registration sites, although this is something of a misnomer in that each state is required to designate other offices as voter registration sites and may exercise discretion only in deciding precisely which sites to designate. "Discretionary" sites may include state or local government offices, such as public libraries, public schools, offices of city and county clerks, fishing and hunting license bureaus, government revenue offices, and unemployment insurance offices. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(a)(3)(B)(i). Notably, discretionary sites may also include "Federal and non-governmental offices, with the agreement of such offices." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(a)(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Moreover, while the statute provides that all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the federal government are required, "to the greatest extent practicable," to cooperate with the states in implementing agency-based voter registration, non-governmental entities are merely "encouraged" to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(b). Thus, the NVRA clearly provides that non-governmental offices must consent before they can be designated as discretionary voter registration sites. However, the Senate Report on the NVRA states that "[a] comprehensive agency-based program should include private locations and offices, as well as public agencies," and that "[a]n agency program that includes private places at which persons may register to vote may be organized through cooperative arrangements and agreements between the sponsoring agency and appropriate local or State election officials." Sen. Rep. at 15.
The statute provides that at each designated voter registration site, whether mandatory or discretionary, the following services must be made available: (1) distribution of mail voter applications; (2) assistance to applicants in completing voter registration forms; and (3) acceptance of completed voter registration...
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