U.S. v. Stewart

• Citation: 779 F.2d 538
• Decision Date: 27 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 85-1070,85-1070
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 538

779 F.2d 538

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-1070.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 15, 1985.

Decided Dec. 27, 1985.

Brian C. Leighton, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fresno, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

John F. Garland, Asst. Fed. Defender, Fresno, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before SNEED, KENNEDY, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Richard Stewart was convicted by a federal jury on fourteen counts of an indictment arising from the operation of an illegal drug manufacturing and distribution network in Fresno, California. There are but two issues on appeal. The first pertains to the jury instructions given on a single count for carrying firearms during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2) (1982), as to which we reverse. The second issue is whether a life sentence without possibility of parole was properly imposed under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. The government concedes error. We agree and vacate the sentence, remanding for further sentencing proceedings.

Federal agents executed a search warrant at Stewart's business premises and discovered an operating methamphetamine laboratory. On the same day, a search warrant was executed at Stewart's residence. When agents arrived, Stewart was sitting in his automobile in front of the residence. He was arrested on the drug charges, and officers searched the car. An illegal sawed-off "UZI" rifle was in the trunk. Appellant argues that his conviction for carrying the firearm unlawfully during the commission of a felony must be reversed because the government failed to prove that his possession of the rifle was in any way related to the underlying felony of possession of controlled substances with intent to manufacture.

Under the evidence adduced at trial, the government might have made a case sufficient to sustain the firearms conviction, if the jury had been properly instructed. While Stewart was in front of his residence with a rifle under his control in the trunk of his car, five individuals were in the residence, some with documents that related to the drug manufacturing and sale operation. Search of the residence yielded containers of methamphetamine and its precursors, various other chemicals, glassware and laboratory equipment, and instructions for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Given the use of firearms in some drug transactions, see United States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1985) (in prosecution under Sec. 924(c)(1), recognizing "the utility of firearms in advancing criminal adventures in narcotics"); United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1313 (2d Cir.1976) (judicial notice of use of firearms by narcotics dealers), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977), and the known risks of conducting an illegal drug business, the jury could infer from all of the evidence that Stewart's possession of the UZI outside his residence was intended to facilitate the drug operations or secure the premises where contraband and other evidence were located. See United States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d at 321 (Sec. 924(c)(1); weapons found in apartment along with cash and cocaine); United States v. Chase, 692 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Sec. 924(c)(2); pistol and cocaine found in defendant's house); United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d at 1312-13 (Sec. 924(c)(1); loaded guns found on premises where cocaine was stored). The government, however, did not attempt to link possession of the firearm with the underlying felony, and the district judge did not instruct the jury that a relation between the two is required.

The statute as written when Stewart committed the offense provided in pertinent part that it was a crime to "carr[y] a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony...." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2) (1982). In 1984, Congress revised section 924(c), combining former subsections 924(c)(1) and 924(c)(2). The 1984 amendment substituted for the word "during" the phrase "during and in relation to." 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 924(c) (West Supp.1985) (emphasis added). Our study of the legislative history of the amendment, S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3182, 3490-92 [hereinafter "Senate Report"], indicates the "in relation to" language was not intended to create an element of the crime that did not previously exist, but rather was intended to make clear a condition already implicit in the statute. The legislative history reveals that because the amendment eliminated the requirement that the firearm be carried unlawfully, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 924(c) (West Supp.1985), the "in relation to" language was added to allay explicitly the concern that a person could be prosecuted under section 924(c) for committing an entirely unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm. Senate Report at 314 n. 10. Though the legislative history does not say so expressly, it strongly implies that the "in relation to" language did not alter the scope of the statute, explaining that "the [original] section was directed at persons who chose to carry a firearm as an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act." Id. Moreover, where the legislative history discusses changes in the coverage of the statute effected by the amendment, it does so expressly. Id. at 313 n. 9 (establishing as the predicate offense any "crime of violence" instead of any "felony"; expressly recognizing that this change both expands and restricts the scope of the statute); id. at 314 n. 10 (noting the broader coverage of the statute because of the elimination of the "unlawfully" requirement).

Although the legislative history surrounding the addition of the "in relation to" language is not entirely free of ambiguity, we interpret it as revealing an understanding on the part of the amending Congress that the earlier Congress intended to require a relation between the firearm and the underlying crime. See Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 637 F.2d 1255, 1258 n. 5 (9th Cir.1980) (using revised Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Act to resolve ambiguities in old act where "the revised language simply clarifies the original legislative intent"). While a later Congress' understanding of the legislative intent of an earlier Congress is not binding on the courts, it is entitled to deference. Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914, 924-25 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 1976, 68 L.Ed.2d 296 (1981); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 730-31 (9th Cir.1979). See generally N. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 49.11, at 414-15 (rev. 4th ed. 1984). We accord such deference here.

Although the legislative history of the original version of section 924(c) is sparse, Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), the evident purpose of the statute was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the commission of a felony. See United States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d at 321; United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir.1981). That purpose necessarily implies some relation or connection between the underlying criminal act and the use or possession of the firearm. See United States v. Robertson, 706 F.2d...