U.S. v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 19 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 96-339-A. |
| Citation | 948 F.Supp. 549 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Robert H. SULLIVAN, Defendant. |
David B. Smith, English & Smith, Alexandria, VA, for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to suppress his confession to a police officer that a firearm was in his vehicle and also to suppress the firearm and ammunition themselves. For the reasons expressed below, the motion is hereby GRANTED.
In his motion, the defendant made a series of factual allegations regarding the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop during which the firearm and ammunition were discovered in his vehicle. At the oral hearing, the Court made a series of factual findings and reserved a single, discrete legal question for consideration. Thus, the facts presented below reflect the Court's factual findings. The defendant's contrary allegations are noted where appropriate.
On January 23, 1996, at noontime, the defendant was stopped by Park Police Officer Ferstl while the defendant was driving on the George Washington Parkway, because the officer observed that defendant was driving without a front tag. After the defendant pulled over to the side of the highway and the officer approached the defendant's vehicle, the officer observed that the front tag was in fact displayed on the dashboard. During a brief conversation between the defendant and the officer, the defendant informed the officer that he had an unpaid traffic ticket. Because of computer difficulties, the officer called the Metropolitan Airport Police for assistance in running a computer check on both the defendant's driver's license and the unpaid ticket. Between five and ten minutes later, Metropolitan Airport Police Officer Evans arrived. The computer check took 5 minutes to complete. Officer Evans left. Officer Ferstl then returned to the defendant's car, returned the driver's license to him, and advised him to take care of the ticket and the tag.
Everyone agrees that Officer Ferstl then began to question the defendant regarding any contraband the defendant may have had in the vehicle, a matter wholly unrelated to the reasons for the traffic stop. The parties greatly differ, however, on the precise nature and circumstances of the interrogation. The defendant alleges first that Officer Ferstl did not return his driver's license to him before beginning the interrogation. He alleges a second police officer — presumably Officer Evans — remained present during the entire encounter, that Officer Ferstl said he would "burn" the defendant if he had contraband in the vehicle but did not admit it, and that both officers had his hand on the pistol grip of his weapon while Officer Ferstl interrogated the defendant.
Having listened to both the defendant's testimony and the officers' testimony, this Court rejects all of these allegations. Instead, as the Court stated at the conclusion of the oral hearing, the only matter under consideration is whether Officer Ferstl's repeated questioning regarding matters outside the scope of the circumstances leading to the traffic stop amounted to custodial interrogation. In addition, the Court finds that Officer Ferstl did return the defendant's driver's license to him before questioning him. Thus, the factual background continued below reflects the facts exactly as this Court found them.
After Officer Evans left and the computer check was done, Officer Ferstl returned the defendant's driver's license to the defendant and warned the defendant to remedy both the misplaced front tag and the unpaid traffic ticket. Officer Ferstl then began to interrogate the defendant regarding the possible presence of contraband in his vehicle, Officer Ferstl testified, because the defendant "appeared nervous." The officer asked the defendant if he had anything illegal in the vehicle. The defendant replied "illegal!" but said nothing else. The officer repeated the question, but the defendant remained silent. The officer repeated the question a third time, but defendant again did not reply. The officer then told the defendant that if he had anything illegal in the vehicle, it would be better to tell the officer immediately. Defendant still remained silent. The officer persisted, and he asked "what do you have in the vehicle?" For a fifth time, the defendant still would not respond. The officer then told the defendant that if Sullivan confessed, the officer "would be cool with him." Finally, after the officer's sixth effort, the defendant answered, "I have a gun."
After this confession, the officer handcuffed the defendant, searched the defendant's vehicle, and found a Browning nine-millimeter pistol loaded with fourteen rounds of ammunition under the driver's seat. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), because the defendant had previously been convicted in Maryland state court in 1985 of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The defendant had been convicted, incidentally, of robbery with a deadly weapon.
Everyone agrees that at no time during the interrogation did Officer Ferstl inform the defendant of his Miranda rights. Thus, the only question remaining for the Court to decide is this: whether the manner and circumstances surrounding Officer Ferstl's repeated questioning of the defendant was a "consensual interrogation" or a "custodial interrogation." If the former, then the officer had no duty inform the defendant of his Miranda rights. If the latter, then the officer was bound by law to inform the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the failure to do so would require this Court to suppress both the confession and the fruits of that confession.
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings must be provided to suspects held "in custody" before law enforcement officers may interrogate the suspect in a manner likely to result in incriminating answers. A significant body of occasionally conflicting precedent defining "in custody" has developed in the past two decades. The Fourth Amendment has spawned a separate body of precedent defining when a suspect is "seized" for purposes of defining the constitutional limits of so-called Terry stops. Because of the apparent similarity between the two concepts, courts occasionally merge the two bodies of law, and the Supreme Court has yet to define precisely the relationship between them. Therefore, while the case before this Court appears to present solely a Fifth Amendment question, the Court reviews in some detail both bodies of law.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court commanded law enforcement officers to inform potential defendants that they have certain rights prior to beginning any "custodial interrogation." Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Specifically, before any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," the defendant must be informed about his right to remain silent, that statements he does make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of a retained or appointed attorney. Id. To insure compliance with its mandate, the Supreme Court further commanded that statements stemming from the custodial interrogation of a defendant may not be introduced into evidence to establish the defendant's guilt, unless the defendant was informed of these now familiar Miranda rights prior to the custodial interrogation.
Eighteen years later, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed the applicability of Miranda to the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop, which the Court deemed analogous to a so-called Terry stop. In Berkemer, the Court acknowledged that a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver. In doing so, the Court explained, Id. at 436, 104 S.Ct. at 3148 (citation and footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court refused to create an inflexible rule that motorists detained pursuant to routine traffic stops constitutes "custodial interrogation," to which Miranda rights apply. In doing so, the Court noted that the detention of a motorist pursuant to a simple traffic stop is ordinarily brief and in the presence of other passing motorists. This, the Court explained, mitigated the danger that an interrogating officer would induce the motorist to speak when the motorist would otherwise not do so freely. Id. at 437-38, 104 S.Ct. at 3149.
The Court cautioned law enforcement officers, however, that a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop who is thereafter "subjected to treatment that renders him `in custody' for practical purposes ... will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150. The Court freely admitted,
our adherence to the doctrine just recounted will mean that the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody. Either a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Sullivan
...of Miranda and that his confession had been voluntarily made. The district court granted Sullivan's motion to suppress. 948 F.Supp. 549, 558 (E.D.Va.1996). It pointed out that Officer Ferstl's questions concerned "a matter wholly unrelated to the reasons for the traffic stop." Id. at 550. T......