U.S. v. Tarantino

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY and WILLIAMS; PER CURIAM; We commend Judge Hogan on his conduct of this long and difficult trial. Apart from a few errors that we conclude did not deprive appellants of their right to a fair trial
• Citation: U.S. v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 269 U.S.App.D.C. 398 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
• Decision Date: 12 April 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 85-5808,s. 85-5808
• Parties: , 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 164 UNITED STATES of America v. John C. TARANTINO, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America v. Robert H. BURNS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America v. Fred B. BLACK, Jr., Appellant. UNITED STATES of America v. Wilfred Samuel BELL, a/k/a Sam Bell, Appellant. to 85-5810, 85-5846.

Page 1384

846 F.2d 1384

269 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 164

UNITED STATES of America v. John C. TARANTINO, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America v. Robert H. BURNS, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America v. Fred B. BLACK, Jr., Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America v. Wilfred Samuel BELL, a/k/a Sam Bell, Appellant.

Nos. 85-5808 to 85-5810, 85-5846.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 19, 1987.

Decided April 12, 1988.

As Amended April 12, 1988.

Howard F. Cerny, New York City, for appellant Tarantino.

Robert H. Burns, pro se.

L. Barrett Boss (appointed by this court), with whom Henry W. Asbill, Washington, D.C., (also appointed by this court) was on brief, for appellant Bell.

Loren Kieve (appointed by this court), with whom Jo Anne Swindler, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellant Black. Thomas R. Dyson, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellant Black.

Charles E. Ambrose, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell, Paul L. Knight and Roger M. Adelman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.

                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                      Page
                    I  VARIANCE: SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE               1391
                       CONSPIRACIES
                       A.  Permissible Variance.....................  1392
                       B.  Establishing a Single Conspiracy.........  1392
                       C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of a.........  1393
                           Single Conspiracy
                           1. Burns.................................  1394
                           2. Black.................................  1395
                           3. Tarantino.............................  1397
                           4. Bell..................................  1398
                  II.  SEVERANCE....................................  1398
                       A.  Disparity in Evidence....................  1398
                       B.  Conflicting Defense Theories.............  1399
                 III.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS............................  1400
                       A.  Single Versus Multiple Conspiracies......  1400
                       B.  The Travel Act...........................  1401
                       C.  The Cash Transaction Reports.............  1403
                           Instruction
                       D.  The Missing Witness Instruction..........  1404
                       E.  Strickland's Guilty Plea.................  1404
                  IV.  RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION............  1405
                       A.  Strickland's Plan to Murder Kupits.......  1405
                       B.  Strickland's Benefits from the...........  1407
                           Witness Protection Program
                       C.  Strickland's Payment of Attorneys'.......  1407
                           Fees for Nicholls
                       D.  Miscellaneous Restrictions on............  1408
                           Cross- Examination
                   V.  EVIDENTIARY RULINGS..........................  1408
                       A.  Admission of Cocaine.....................  1408
                       B.  Limitations on Collateral Impeachment....  1409
                       C.  Prior consistent Statements..............  1411
                       D.  Co-conspirators' Statements                1411
                  VI.  THE REFERENCE TO BLACK'S BEING...............  1413
                       NAMED IN ANOTHER INDICTMENT
                 VII.  DISCLOSURE OF WITNESS STATEMENTS.............  1414
                       A.  Jencks Act...............................  1414
                       B.  Sixth Amendment..........................  1415
                       C.  Brady....................................  1416
                       D.  Statments by Co-conspirators.............  1417
                VIII.  CONTINGENT PLEA ARRANGEMENTS.................  1418
                  IX.  BURNS' DESIRE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF...........  1419
                   X.  THE ERROR IN SENTENCING BELL.................  1422
                  XI.  CONCLUSION...................................  1422
                

Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from criminal convictions following a complex, two-month trial before U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan.

All appellants were convicted on count one of the twenty-five count indictment: conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846 (1982). In addition, John C. Tarantino was convicted as a principal, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1982), of four counts of violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952 (1982). Fred B. Black, Jr. was also convicted of violating the Travel Act, and Wilfred Samuel Bell of distribution of cocaine.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), these appellants and others conspired to import, possess, and distribute large quantities of cocaine in various locales, and to launder the proceeds of this illegal activity. Lawrence ("Lonnie") Strickland, the main player in the conspiracy, testified for the government in exchange for a favorable recommendation to the sentencing judge who would consider Strickland's guilty plea. The government's evidence essentially established that (1) Black assisted Strickland in launching his drug operation and in laundering the resulting profits; (2) Robert H. Burns was instrumental in introducing Strickland to major drug importers (for which Burns received commissions) and laundering his illicit profits; (3) Tarantino participated heavily in distributing Strickland's cocaine and laundering his profits; and (4) Bell was Strickland's main distributor in the Washington, D.C. area.

Following guilty pleas by various defendants not now before us, a trial of the charges against Tarantino, Black, and Burns began on May 14, 1984. Judge Hogan declared a mistrial on June 13, 1984, and a new trial, in which Bell was joined, began on January 11, 1985. The jury returned the convictions on March 8, 1985.

We commend Judge Hogan on his conduct of this long and difficult trial. Apart from a few errors that we conclude did not deprive appellants of their right to a fair trial, Judge Hogan's management of the proceedings was admirable. We affirm in all respects, except that we remand Bell's sentence for compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D).

I. VARIANCE: SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES

Each appellant argues that the evidence at trial varied impermissibly from the allegations of the indictment, and that the resultant prejudice deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

A. Permissible Variance

A variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial constitutes grounds for reversal only if the appellant proves (1) that the evidence at trial established facts materially variant from those alleged in the indictment, and (2) that the variance caused substantial prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987). In a conspiracy prosecution, for example, the appellant may prove (1) that the evidence established the existence of multiple conspiracies, rather than the one conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and (2) that because of the multiplicity of defendants and conspiracies, the jury was substantially likely to transfer evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant involved in another. Id.

The existence of a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is primarily a question of fact for the jury. E.g., United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 662 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 589, 93 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986); United States v. Molt, 772 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 1458, 89 L.Ed.2d 715 (1986); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S.Ct. 332, 83 L.Ed.2d 269 (1984). The verdict must be upheld if the evidence adequately supports a finding that a single conspiracy existed. Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 788; United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1457-58 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3543, 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (verdict upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found elements of offense beyond reasonable doubt).

B. Establishing a Single Conspiracy

Appellants Bell and Burns urge us to follow the analysis of conspiracies used in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Kotteakos involved multiple conspiracies to defraud the Federal Housing Administration. The key figure, Brown, arranged with various defendants to submit false loan applications. None of the applicants had any connection with the others, although each had a relationship with Brown. Nevertheless, the government charged all the applicants with participation in a single conspiracy. On appeal, the government acknowledged that the proof established multiple conspiracies. Brown was the hub of a wheel, and the various applicants were the spokes. Without a rim to enclose the spokes, however, the evidence made out multiple conspiracies, not the single one alleged. 328 U.S. at 755, 66 S.Ct. at 1243. The government granted this much, but merely argued that the variance was harmless, a position that the Supreme Court rejected.

The wheel metaphor has not been strictly applied as the method of analysis for all conspiracies, and particularly not for drug conspiracies. Rather, courts have utilized a chain metaphor.

An example is United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831 (D.C.Cir.1980). The evidence established that the appellants had travelled from Washington, D.C. to Los Angeles to purchase narcotics. Other evidence established that the narcotics were later sold in D.C. The defendants claimed that these transactions were entirely distinct, establishing two conspiracies. The court disagreed. Certain defendants went to California to purchase narcotics, others prepared the drugs for sale in D.C., others distributed the drugs, and still others actually sold them. "The activities of each member and group in the organization meshed with those of the other members and groups. In short, the...