U.S. v. Taubman, Docket No. 02-1253.
Decision Date | 25 July 2002 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 02-1253. |
Citation | 297 F.3d 161 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. A. Alfred TAUBMAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Scott W. Muller, James P. Rouhandeh (Jacob W. Buchdahl, Neal A. Potischman, of counsel), Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York, NY; Seth P. Waxman, Paul A. Englemayer, Edward C. DuMont, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.
John P. Fonte, John J. Powers, III, Robert B. Nicholson, Steven J. Mintz (Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC; Ralph T. Giordano, Philip F. Cody, John J. Greene, Patricia L. Jannaco, Debra C. Brookes, Kevin B. Hart, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, New York, NY, for Appellee.
Before: CABRANES and STRAUB, Circuit Judges, and GLEESON, District Judge.*
A. Alfred Taubman appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial and from a judgment of conviction entered by United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge) following a jury trial. Taubman was convicted of conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, while he was chairman of the board of Sotheby's Holdings, Inc. Taubman has also moved for release pending appeal.
On appeal, Taubman argues that the District Court, through certain evidentiary and other rulings, "critically impaired" his ability to present his defense, Appellant's Br. at 1, which was that his numerous meetings with Anthony J. Tennant, the chairman of Sotheby's chief competitor, Christie's International plc, were about matters other than price fixing and that the chief executives of the two companies — Diana D. Brooks of Sotheby's and Christopher Davidge of Christie's, the Government's principal witnesses at trial — were primarily responsible for the price fixing between the two companies, of which Taubman had no knowledge. Specifically, Taubman contends that the District Court erred:
• in denying his request for letters rogatory seeking the testimony of Lord Peter Carrington, Tennant's predecessor at Christie's, regarding a history of legitimate communications between the chairmen of the two firms;
• in excluding as hearsay testimony by Taubman's administrative assistant repeating statements Taubman purportedly made following a meeting that allegedly related to the charged conspiracy;
• in excluding notes in Tennant's handwriting which, Taubman argued, showed that Tennant was conspiring in April 1995 — months after Taubman's alleged initiation of the conspiracy — with Lord Thomas Camoys, former Lord Chamberlain to the Queen of England and a senior official of Sotheby's, and not with Taubman;
• in refusing Taubman's request that the jury be explicitly charged that meetings between competitors for the purpose of exchanging information on independently derived prices or for the purpose of discussing other matters of common concern are not unlawful; and
• in permitting the prosecutor to include in his summation the following quotation, attributed to the eighteenth century economist Adam Smith: "People in the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment or diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public and in some contrivance to raise prices."*
The Government's evidence at trial is described in United States v. Taubman, No. 01 Cr. 429, 2002 WL 548733 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.11, 2002), familiarity with which is presumed. We understood Taubman's counsel to concede at oral argument that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), this evidence was sufficient to support Taubman's conviction for the charged crime. Taubman argues, however, that the District Court's errors deprived him of a fair trial.
We turn first to the District Court's evidentiary rulings, which we review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 216 (2d Cir.2002). In doing so, we bear in mind that "a judge has not abused [his] discretion simply because [he] has made a different decision than we would have made in the first instance." United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001).
With respect to the letters rogatory, the District Court held that Taubman failed to demonstrate the materiality of Carrington's testimony at trial. Carrington had previously testified in a December 2000 deposition in a related civil action — a deposition taken by one of Taubman's attorneys — that he had met Taubman once, and then only to "shake [Taubman's] hand," and otherwise had never spoken with Taubman.
With respect to Taubman's statement to his administrative assistant, the District Court excluded it as hearsay. The District Court held that Taubman did not establish that the testimony was admissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) to show Taubman's state of mind when he went to the relevant meeting, because it was not made contemporaneously with that meeting. See Trial Tr. at 290-92 ( ). Rather, it was a statement about a meeting that had already happened. See United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 488 (2d Cir.1991) ().
With respect to the notes of the alleged April 1995 meeting between Tennant and Camoys, the District Court also excluded them as hearsay. The District Court held that (1) the notes were not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) as business records because Tennant was under no obligation to make them and because Taubman had not established that the document was created under circumstances indicative of trustworthiness; (2) the notes were not a statement against interest within the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3); (3) Taubman had not met his burden of establishing the notes' "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as a predicate to their admissibility pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 807; and (4) that the notes were inadmissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403 because their probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.
We have carefully examined each of these rulings and all of Taubman's arguments regarding them and hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Cf. Szur, 289 F.3d at 216 ( )." (quoting United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1995)). With respect to the notes, we observe that district courts have "broad latitude" in excluding evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403, "even where the exclusion of evidence affects the defense case." Id.
In any event, any error in the District Court's evidentiary rulings was, in the particular circumstances presented, harmless. Taubman's knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy to fix prices was not established by circumstantial evidence, it was established by direct evidence — the testimony of Brooks and Davidge that Taubman and Tennant...
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