U.S. v. Taveras
| Citation | 424 F.Supp.2d 446 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-CR-156 (JBW).,04-CR-156 (JBW). |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Humberto Pepin TAVERAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Roslynn Mauskopf, United States Attorney, by: Morris Fodeman, Lee Freedman, Brooklyn, NY, for the United States of America.
Freeman, Nooter & Ginsberg, by: Louis Freeman, Lewis & Fiore, by: David Lewis, New York, NY, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER PENALTY PHASE: EXCLUSION OF PREJDICIAL EVIDENCE
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .....................................................448
II. Facts ............................................................448
III. Law ..............................................................449
A. Constitutional Requirements at Capital Sentencing .............449
B. Anti-Drug Abuse Act ...........................................451
C. Exclusion of Evidence at ADAA Sentencing ......................453
IV. Future Dangerousness .............................................454
A. Generally .....................................................454
B. Rationales for Punishment .....................................455
C. Williams v. New York and ADAA .................................457
D. Judge and Jury ................................................461
V. Application of Law to Facts ......................................462
A. Generally .....................................................462
B. Sexual Abuse of Minor .........................................463
C. Domestic Abuse of Common Law Wife .............................464
D. Domestic Abuse of Former Girlfriend ...........................465
VI. Conclusion ....................................................465
In this capital prosecution, defendant has moved to exclude from any sentencing proceeding evidence of his past sexual abuse of a minor and of brutal physical attacks on adult women with whom he was cohabitating. Balancing probative force against prejudice leads to exclusion of evidence of the former, but not the latter conduct. This result comports with the extreme protections in our Constitution, statutes, and case law against unwarranted imposition of a death sentence.
Defendant has been indicted for two murders in the course of a drug trafficking conspiracy. The government seeks the death penalty.
Count One of the Third Superseding Indictment charges:
On or about September 17, 1992, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant HUBERTO PEPIN TAVERAS, also known as "Tony" and "Luis Rosario," while engaged in an offense punishable under Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code, to wit: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more controlled substances, which offense involved (a) five kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and (b) one kilogram or more of a substance containing heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, did knowingly and intentionally kill and cause the intentional killing of another person, to wit: Jose Rosario, also known as "Barrigita,"
Count Three of the indictment charges the same conduct in connection with the killing of Carlos Madrid in 1995. Count Two of the indictment has been stricken as violative of the ex post facto clause. See United States v. Pepin Taveras, 401 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y.2005). Count Four charges obstruction of justice between 1995 and 2002, when defendant assaulted and threatened his common law wife to prevent her from informing law enforcement personnel of the Madrid murder.
Listed as aggravating factors warranting the death penalty in the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty ("Notice") are: defendant's previous narcotics convictions; substantial planning and premeditation of the murders; future dangerousness; contemporaneous criminal charges; obstruction of justice; and impact on the victims' families and friends. Defendant's motion to strike some of these statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances has been denied. See United States v. Pepin Taveras, No. 04-CR-156 (JBW), 2006 WL 473773, at *6-9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.28, 2006).
Future dangerousness is to be supported by three categories of evidence: lack of remorse; institutional misconduct; and a continuing pattern of violence. The continuing pattern of violence includes evidence of the crimes alleged in the indictment; crimes for which defendant was previously convicted; child abuse; domestic abuse; and threatening and attempting to kill a prospective unnamed witness. Notice 4-5.
The government proposes to support its allegations of child abuse with proof that defendant sexually and physically abused his stepdaughter, a minor. Domestic abuse is evidenced by defendant's beating and stabbing of two women. Gov't Supp. Br. 4-13. Defendant objects to the introduction of this evidence, arguing that its probative value on the issue of future dangerousness is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and the likelihood that it would confuse the jury.
As construed, the United States Constitution places substantive and procedural limitations on imposition of the death penalty. Substantively, death cannot be imposed where 1) it would be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), or 2) where imposition would "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion). Procedurally, legislatively defined practice that "suitably direct[s] and limit[s]" the discretion of the sentencing body "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," id. at 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, must be followed.
The capital punishment scheme must comprise both an eligibility phase and a selection phase. At the eligibility phase, procedures must ensure that a sentencing body may only impose the death penalty if it has found—either through the categorical narrowing of death-eligible crimes, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2955, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (plurality opinion); or by an explicit finding at sentencing, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909—the existence of at least one aggravating factor. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.6(3) ().
At the selection phase, sentencing discretion must be "channeled," Gregg at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909, by requiring the sentencing body to consider "relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense," Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) which provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909. The trier may consider delimiting aggravating factors, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); it must consider any relevant mitigating factors. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978.
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not treated identically. With possible exceptions not relevant here, the type of mitigating factors presented may not be limited. The sentencing body must "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (applying Lockett.)
By contrast, the use of statutory aggravating factors is strictly bounded. First, aggravating circumstances that serve as predicates for eligibility for the death penalty "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). See also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) . Second, statutory aggravating circumstances may not be unduly vague. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2635, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) ().
A statute may make use of additional aggravating circumstances to be considered when "selecting, from among [the] class [of death-eligible defendants], those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death." Id. at 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733. The function of these factors is to provide for "an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Id. at 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (emphasis in original). Cf. id. at 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (). See also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (...
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