U.S. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 08 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-60581.,08-60581.
• Citation: 582 F.3d 558
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

582 F.3d 558

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-60581.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

September 8, 2009.

Gaines H. Cleveland, Asst. U.S. Atty., Gulfport, MS, Jason Scott Gilbert (argued), Jackson, MS, for U.S.

John William Weber, III (argued), Fed. Pub. Def., Gulfport, MS, for Taylor.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lee Taylor appeals his thirty-month sentence, imposed following a jury conviction for fraud in obtaining disaster relief assistance. Taylor also appeals the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over count six, and its entry of an order of restitution and an order of forfeiture.

I.

Taylor owned two properties on Howze Street in Moss Point, Mississippi. 3734 Howze Street was Taylor's primary residence until it was subject to foreclosure proceedings in June or July 2005. Taylor also owned 3718 Howze Street, which he stated he occupied after the foreclosure of 3734 Howze Street. 3718 Howze Street had no power, water, or sewage services. Taylor asserts that he moved some of his personal belongings into 3718 Howze Street approximately three weeks before Hurricane Katrina hit on August 25, 2005. Taylor stated that he stayed at the property two to three nights per week. Mary Nettles, Taylor's girlfriend, testified that Taylor actually moved into her apartment after the foreclosure of 3734 Howze Street. Nettles testified that she helped Taylor move his furniture into a neighbor's house and his personal belongings into her apartment. Nettles stated that from date of the foreclosure at 3734 Howze Street until the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, Taylor stayed at her home five to seven nights per week and did not pay rent. Taylor asserts that Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to 3718 Howze Street, rendering it uninhabitable.

On September 5, 2005, Taylor applied for disaster relief benefits from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for damages sustained at 3718 Howze Street. On his FEMA application, Taylor listed 3718 Howze Street as his primary residence. A FEMA inspector initially determined that 3718 Howze Street was not Taylor's primary residence. Taylor repeatedly contacted FEMA, asserting that 3718 Howze Street was his primary residence, and that he had moved his belongings into the home but was forced to move them back out in preparation for the storm; had not yet had an opportunity to turn the utilities on, or, alternatively, did not have the funds to do so; and that he was subject to eviction from Nettles's apartment for nonpayment of rent. Following a second inspection, Taylor was granted $2,000 of expedited assistance, $2,358 for rental assistance, $9,477.06 for a personal property award, $10,500 for home repair, and a FEMA trailer. FEMA awarded Taylor assistance based on "hardship and intent to live [at 3718 Howze]", giving Taylor the "benefit of the doubt" that he "was, in fact, residing there but under a hardship of his own because he did not have utilities."

On June 26, 2006, Taylor applied for assistance from the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA). Taylor applied for the Homeowners Assistance Program Phase II Grant (Phase II Grant), which required that Taylor own and occupy 3718 Howze Street as a primary residence on the day Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Taylor signed a document in connection with his application, acknowledging that the information he provided was accurate and that he also consented to the MDA verifying the information with FEMA. Taylor also filed an affidavit stating that 3718 Howze Street was his primary residence. Taylor was initially approved for the Phase II Grant in the amount of $92,400. Prior to a final determination of his eligibility, Nettles filed a complaint with FEMA, stating that 3718 Howze Street was not Taylor's primary residence and that the property was not habitable prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina. The MDA became aware of FEMA's investigation and Taylor did not actually receive the funding from the Phase II Grant.

On December 19, 2007, a seven count indictment was filed, charging Taylor with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (count one); wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (counts two through four); that Taylor stole, purloined, and converted disaster assistance benefits to which he was not entitled in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (count five); and making a materially false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (count six). The indictment also sought an order of forfeiture as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (count seven). On March 12, 2008, the jury found Taylor guilty of counts two through six and not guilty of count one.

Taylor's conviction was published in the local newspaper, which prompted Carla Poole, an employee of Rebuild Jackson County, to contact the government. Poole was permitted to testify at Taylor's sentencing hearing. Poole testified that Rebuild Jackson County was a nonprofit established to provide disaster relief assistance to homeowners who could not meet their own recovery needs. Rebuild Jackson County required that the assistance be used to repay damages to an individual's primary residence. Rebuild Jackson County had spent $66,764.21 to aid Taylor in rebuilding 3718 Howze Street.

On June 25, 2008, Taylor was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court held Taylor responsible for $30,241.07 in actual loss to FEMA, $66,764.21 in actual loss to Rebuild Jackson County, $10,000 in intended loss to the Small Business Association (SBA) to which he had applied for a loan, and $91,922 in intended loss to the MDA. In total, Taylor was held responsible for $198,927.28 in losses. The district court also entered a Final Order of Forfeiture in the amount of $23,841.06, ordered Taylor to pay $97,005.28 in restitution to FEMA and Rebuild Jackson County, and imposed a $500 special assessment.

II.

A. Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)

Taylor argues that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over count six, making a materially false statement in his application to the MDA in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The MDA was given $5.3 billion by Congress through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to provide individuals with disaster relief assistance in the form of a community development grant (Phase II Grant). The MDA required that an individual own and occupy the residence for which assistance was requested. The district court held that because the MDA funds were supplied by HUD and because HUD had oversight authority over the general administration of the funds, Taylor's false statement was made to an agency within federal jurisdiction. Taylor argues that the MDA is a state agency with limited federal oversight, and consequently that the district court has no federal agency jurisdiction.

Section 1001(a)(2) prohibits "knowingly and willfully ... mak[ing] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" in "any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). This section requires the government to prove that Taylor: 1) knowingly and willfully; 2) made a statement; 3) to a federal agency; 4) that was false; and 5) material. § 1001(a)(2); see also United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir.1980). Section 1001 "is designed to protect federal funds and functions from fraudulent interference. In furthering these purposes, it is irrelevant whether defendant knew that his intentionally false statements might eventually influence a federal agency." Baker, 626 F.2d at 516.

Although framed as a challenge to the court's jurisdiction, Taylor's argument effectively constitutes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing a nexus between his statements to the MDA and the administration of the grant by HUD. See United States v. Reynolds, 152 Fed.Appx. 416, 417 (5th Cir. Nov.2, 2005) (unpublished) (reviewing "whether the false statements were made `in any matter within the jurisdiction' of [HUD]" for sufficiency of the evidence) (quoting § 1001(a)(2)). "This court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo." United States v. Nguyen, 504 F.3d 561, 567 (5th Cir.2007). The evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the government to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could find the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). Whether a false statement is made in a "matter within the jurisdiction" of a federal agency is an issue of fact. United States v. Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 108 (5th Cir.1983).

The jury heard evidence that HUD funded and provided administrative oversight of the MDA for its Phase II Grants. The MDA was required to submit to HUD a detailed plan on how the money was to be used and to obtain HUD's approval of the plan in order to receive the funding. HUD had the authority to cease funding the program and require the MDA to refund the money if HUD determined that the MDA was administering the money in violation of HUD guidelines. The MDA was also required to provide quarterly reports to HUD and was regularly audited by HUD.

In Montemayor, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction, asserting that obtaining a birth certificate from a state agency was not a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal immigration service. Id. at 106. Because the acquisition of the birth certificate was done for a "federally connected purpose," namely, to obtain United States citizenship for the defendant's children, the court found...