U.S. v. Taylor, 96-2909

Decision Date18 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-2909,96-2909
Citation106 F.3d 801
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven C. TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Mary H. Buckley, Omaha, NE, argued (David R. Stickman, on the brief), for appellant.

William W. Mickle II, Omaha, NE, argued (Thomas J. Monaghan and Nancy A. Svoboda, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BEAM, ROSS, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Steven C. Taylor appeals the district court's 1 denial of his motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to Taylor's warrantless arrest. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Omaha police arrested a drug dealer in April 1995, who agreed to cooperate with authorities. The newly acquired informant knew his source of methamphetamine only as "Steve," but provided police with "Steve's" telephone number, address, and a description of his vehicle. Officers checked out this information and identified Steven Taylor as the supplier. Under the officers' supervision, the informant then called Steve and arranged for delivery of methamphetamine to room 103 of the Savannah Suites Motel. The informant warned that "Steve" was "famous for being late" but that he always arrived with drugs as promised. The final phone call was placed at 6:00 in the evening, and a tape recording of the conversation reveals "Steve" promising that he was on his way. At 7:00 p.m. Taylor arrived at room 103 of the Savannah Suites and found police waiting. Taylor was arrested and searched. He was carrying an ounce and a half of methamphetamine, a scale, a loaded .38-caliber revolver, and a set of nunchakus. Taylor was informed of his rights, agreed to be interviewed and quickly confessed.

After he was indicted, Taylor moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his arrest, including the items recovered from his person and his incriminating statements. He argued that the arrest was unsupported by probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a recommendation that the motion be denied, which recommendation the district court adopted. Taylor then entered a conditional plea of guilty to charges that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and that, as a felon, he violated 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm. He appeals the suppression ruling.

II. DISCUSSION

We will only overturn a district court's finding of probable cause to make a warrantless arrest if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Morgan, 997 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir.1993). Determining probable cause to arrest requires the court to focus on the moment the arrest was made and to ask whether "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). This calculation "does not depend upon individual facts; rather it depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir.1995).

Taylor relies on United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403 (8th Cir.1983) to argue that his mere presence in a location known to be the site of criminal activity was insufficient to establish probable cause for his arrest. This is a correct statement of the law, but it has very little relevance to these facts. Taylor was not arrested merely because of his physical location. The Omaha police believed Taylor was committing a crime because of intelligence provided by a previously unknown informant. The pertinent inquiry, then, is whether the informant was sufficiently trustworthy to support the officers' belief that Taylor was engaged in criminal activity.

"Where a previously unknown informant provides information, the informant's lack of a track record requires 'some independent verification' to establish the reliability of the information." United States v. Amaya, 52 F.3d 172, 174 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Brown, 49 F.3d at 1349). This confirmation can consist of verifying details that would not, standing alone, lead police to suspect a crime. United States v. Wilson, 964 F.2d 807, 809-10 (8th Cir.1992).

Here, the informant correctly identified Taylor's address, phone number, vehicle and first name. He also correctly predicted that Taylor would arrive at room 103 of the Omaha Savannah Suites on a certain date, even including a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • U.S. v. May
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • July 10, 2006
    ...sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.'" United States v. Taylor, 106 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1997), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); see also, Kiser v. Huron, 219 F.3d 814, 81......
  • Armstrong v. Mille Lacs County Sheriffs Dept.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • August 23, 2002
    ...sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.' "United States v. Taylor, 106 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1997), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); see also, Kiser v. Huron, 219 F.3d 814, 81......
  • United States v. Clark, CR15-3030-MWB
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • October 27, 2015
    ..."sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the defendant] had committed or was committing an offense," United States v. Taylor, 106 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)), and "have substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inference......
  • Johnson v. Scott, Case No: 2:13-cv-500-FtM-38UAM
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • November 1, 2013
    ...2001) (affirming probable cause existed when officers knew suspect's full name, physical description, and more); United States v. Taylor, 106 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1997) (probable cause existedwhen informant provided suspect's first name, address, phone number, and vehicle information). T......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT