U.S. v. Taylor

Decision Date28 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-10648.,05-10648.
Citation458 F.3d 1201
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Warren J. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Neil L. Weinreb (Court-Appointed), Roland Falcon (Court-Appointed), Law Office of Roland Falcon, Jacksonville, FL, for Taylor.

Linda Julin McNamara, Tampa, FL, Peggy Morris Ronca, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jacksonville, FL, for U.S.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and HILL, Circuit Judges.

HILL, Circuit Judge:

Warren J. Taylor was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Prior to trial, the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun and his statements upon arrest to the law enforcement officers. Taylor appeals his conviction, asserting as error the denial of his motion to suppress.

I.

Shortly after midnight on June 14, 2004, the St. Johns County Sheriff received a 911 call, but the caller hung up without saying anything. The emergency dispatcher twice returned the call, but the person who answered at that number immediately hung up again. Deputy Sheriff James Robinson, drove to the address corresponding to the phone number, 2130 Ryan Road, to "check on the welfare" of the occupants of that address. Deputy Robinson was in uniform and driving a marked patrol car. Sergeant Theresa Meares arrived a few minutes later as back-up for Deputy Robinson.

The Ryan Road address was located in a rural part of the county on about five acres and it included a house, barn, and pond. The property was fenced at the perimeter with an open field/livestock fence.

Deputy Robinson drove onto the property from the public road, passing through an unlocked gate. The house sat approximately 150 yards from the gate. Deputy Robinson parked in front of the house, walked up to the front door, and knocked several times. Taylor walked out from behind the barn, a substantial distance from the house, and approached the house. Taylor was preceded by his dog, which ran up to Deputy Robinson and Sergeant Meares (who had by now arrived on the scene). Taylor yelled to the officers, "Don't shoot my dog, he's all right, he won't hurt you."

Deputy Robinson explained to Taylor that he was there because of a 911 hang-up. Taylor said he had made the call because he and his girlfriend had gotten into an argument. According to Taylor, the girlfriend had become violent, so he had called 911 "to get her off of him," at which point she left. The deputy attempted to ascertain the location of the girlfriend but, as Taylor concedes in his brief, he responded with only a vague answer that "she could be a couple of different places."

Deputy Robinson then asked Taylor where he was when the deputy arrived. Taylor said there was a room in the barn where he liked to "chill out." The deputy noted that no one was in the house and asked why Taylor had gone to the barn. Taylor responded that it was his "hangout spot."

Officer Robinson testified that he was concerned that Taylor's girlfriend might have been hurt in the argument, so he asked for permission to "make sure nobody is back there and everything is okay." Taylor consented, saying "Sure, go ahead."

The officer testified that Taylor was "nonchalant, very cooperative, had no problem with it." Taylor did not testify at the suppression hearing.

While Sergeant Meares stayed with Taylor, Deputy Robinson walked around the corner of the barn and saw a camper trailer nearby. It was drizzling and fresh footprints appeared in the sand that led from the camper to the pond. Deputy Robinson followed the footprints and saw a green military-style pack in the grass line of the pond water, within reach of the edge of the pond. The deputy retrieved it. A knife was visible from outside the pack. Deputy Robinson opened the pack and discovered shotgun shells inside one of the pouches.

Given the absence of the girlfriend and the fact that the pack, containing a knife and shotgun shells, had been thrown into the pond, Deputy Robinson returned to Taylor and explained that he was instituting a criminal investigation. Although he did not arrest Taylor at this time, he informed him of his Miranda rights. Taylor was placed in the back of a patrol car, but he was not handcuffed. During this time, the deputies requested by radio that other officers attempt to locate Taylor's girlfriend.

Deputy Robinson went back to the pond to search more fully, and discovered a shotgun lying in about a foot of water. He returned to Taylor and asked him about the shotgun and the pack. Taylor stated that he was a convicted felon and that he did not want to get caught with a prohibited gun. Taylor admitted that he had thrown the gun and pack into the pond when he saw the police cars drive onto the property. He was arrested and subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a gun, tried and convicted by a jury. We review the district court's denial of his motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2002).

II.

Taylor contends that the gun and his statements to the officers upon its discovery must be suppressed because the officers' warrantless entry by "affirmatively opening a closed gate at the property here" violated the Fourth Amendment. We do not agree.

The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, is not implicated by entry upon private land to knock on a citizen's door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (no warrant necessary for officers to approach house to question the occupants). "Absent express orders from the person in possession," an officer may "walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's `castle,' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof." Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964). Thus, "[o]fficers are allowed to knock on a residence's door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just an any private citizen may." Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir.2003).

The initial entry onto Taylor's property in this case was for just such a "knock and talk." The 911 hangup call received by the police was routinely followed up with a call-back to ensure that no action was necessary. When the person answering this call also abruptly hung up, another call was made. This call too was answered, but followed by an immediate hang up. In view of the possibility that someone was in serious trouble and being prevented from communicating with the police, officers were dispatched to the address. This dispatch was legitimate police business. We would consider the police derelict in their duty if they did anything less.

Upon arriving at the address, the officer entered the property, proceeded down the driveway that provided access to the house, went to the front door and knocked on it in order to investigate the suspicious and troubling 911 calls. This conduct is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511; Marasco, 318 F.3d at 519.

Furthermore, to the extent that the officers moved away from the front door and toward Taylor when they heard him and his dog approaching (Taylor testified he shouted out, "Don't shoot my dog!"), this small departure from the front door also does not trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The officers heard Taylor shout to them, and simply moved toward him to ask him their questions about the 911 call. Such a minor departure from the front door under these circumstances does not remove the initial entry from the "knock and talk" exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2001) ("[A police] officer may, in good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to contact the occupants of a residence."); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001) (recognizing "that law enforcement officers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact the occupants of a residence"); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir.1990) (officer may move away from the front door as part of a legitimate attempt to interview a person); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir.1977) (officer's movement to rear of house after receiving no answer at front door was lawful). Thus, contrary to Taylor's assertion that "the government must demonstrate probable cause and exigent circumstances" in order to justify the "initial intrusion onto the property," the government need not do either. The officers' initial entry and encounter with Taylor were both covered by the "knock and talk" exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement for a warrant.1

Somewhat more problematic is the subsequent search of the pond by Deputy Robinson. Despite his contention to the contrary, there is little doubt that Taylor freely consented to a search of the area around the barn. United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir.1999) (failure to inform of right to refuse consent to search does not invalidate otherwise valid consent); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir.2001) (voluntariness of consent measured by totality of circumstances). There is, however, a genuine issue concerning the extent of the search consented to.

Deputy Robinson testified that because he remained concerned about Taylor's "missing" girlfriend, and since he had observed Taylor coming from behind the barn, he asked Taylor if he could "look around to see why he was coming from around the barn." Taylor responded "Sure, go ahead." When Robinson went behind the barn, however, he observed fresh...

To continue reading

Request your trial
113 cases
  • U.S. v. Conrad, Case No. 05 CR 931.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 24, 2008
    ...("[O]fficers may encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants."); United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir.2006) ("[C]ontrary to [defendant's] assertion that the government must demonstrate probable cause and exigent circumstances ......
  • French v. Merrill
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • October 1, 2021
    ...believe the house's occupant was sitting in the car parked inside." Id. at 1364 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2006) ). The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the argument that in all circumstances "going to someone's house before sunri......
  • Abella v. Simon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • November 28, 2011
    ...on the front door of any man's “castle,” with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof.’ ” United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964)). “Thus, ‘[o]fficers are allowed to knock on a resid......
  • United States v. Ratcliff
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • August 16, 2016
    ...land to knock on a citizen's door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises." United States v. Taylor , 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ; United States v. Tobin , 9......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles
  • Searches of the home
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Suppressing Criminal Evidence Fourth amendment searches and seizures
    • April 1, 2022
    ...this doctrine; police are permitted to knock on one’s door for any permissible, legitimate police purpose. United States v. Taylor , 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir, 2006). This was found permissible even when police originally entered to obtain information about a criminal case; smelled marijuana;......
  • Searches of the home
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2020 Contents
    • July 31, 2020
    ...this doctrine; police are permitted to knock on one’s door for any permissible, legitimate police purpose. United States v. Taylor , 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir, 2006). This was found permissible even when police originally entered to obtain information about a criminal case; smelled marijuana;......
  • Searches of the Home
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2016 Contents
    • August 4, 2016
    ...this doctrine; police are permitted to knock on one’s door for any permissible, legitimate police purpose. United States v. Taylor , 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir, 2006). Entry through an unlocked, but closed, gate for this purpose has been found permissible. United States v. Weston , 443 F.3d 66......
  • Searches of the Home
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2017 Contents
    • August 4, 2017
    ...this doctrine; police are permitted to knock on one’s door for any permissible, legitimate police purpose. United States v. Taylor , 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir, 2006). Entry through an unlocked, but closed, gate for this purpose has been found permissible. United States v. Weston , 443 F.3d 66......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT