U.S. v. Taylor, No. 02-16210. Non-Argument Calendar.

CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
Writing for the CourtPer Curiam
Citation338 F.3d 1280
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Finley TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. 02-16210. Non-Argument Calendar.
Decision Date25 July 2003
338 F.3d 1280
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James Finley TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-16210. Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 25, 2003.

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James H. Burke, Jr. and R. Fletcher Peacock, Fed. Pub. Defenders, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Susan Hollis Rothstein-Youakim, Tamra Phipps, Tampa, FL, Peggy Morris Ronca, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:


James Finley Taylor appeals the special conditions of supervised release imposed on him pursuant to his conviction for use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a minor "with the intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to engage in [criminal] sexual activity" with the minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2425, and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A woman hired Taylor to remodel kitchen.1 About a month into the project, the woman informed Taylor that she was not happy with his work, would no longer require his services, and may choose not to pay him any more.

Taylor responded by engaging in a series of harassing and threatening activities, including posting a message on an internet bulletin board encouraging men to call the woman's 12-year-old daughter in order to engage in sexual activities. The woman and her daughter reported receiving fifteen to thirty calls and that these calls emotionally traumatized the child.

Authorities searched Taylor's house, finding the computer that he used to post the message as well as seven firearms. They seized the firearms because Taylor's 1986 guilty plea to a sexual battery charge involving his toddler daughter made him a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.

Taylor pleaded guilty to use of interstate facilities, here, the internet, to transmit information about a minor "with the intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to engage in [criminal] sexual activity" with the minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2425, and to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a). He was sentenced to 63 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Taylor challenges the following special conditions of supervised release: (1) submission to polygraph testing, (2) restrictions on internet access, (3) registration as a sex offender, and (4) a restriction on visiting places where children congregate.

II. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

In fashioning a sentence, the district court must consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These include: "(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant" and "(2) the need for the sentence imposed ... (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense ...; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct...; (C) to protect the public from further

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crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed ... correctional treatment in the most effective manner...." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). "The district court may impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in § 3553(a)." United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir.2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). "Similarly, the federal Sentencing Guidelines permit the sentencing court to impose any conditions of supervised release that are `reasonably related' to the § 3553(a) factors, so long as the conditions `involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a) and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.'" Id. (citing United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 5D1.3(b)). "We have observed it is not necessary for a special condition to be supported by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a). Rather, each is an independent consideration to be weighed." Id. (citing United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2000)). "Moreover, while the Sentencing Guidelines recognize that a condition of supervised release should not unduly restrict a defendant's liberty, a condition is not invalid simply because it affects a probationer's ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's imposition of a special condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion, so long as the objection was preserved for appeal. See United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2000). We will reverse only if we have a "definite and firm conviction that the [district] court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached." Davenport Recycling Assoc. v. Com'r, 220 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2000).

A. SUBMISSION TO POLYGRAPH TESTING

As a special condition on Taylor's supervised release, the district court ordered Taylor to "participate in a mental health program specializing in sexual offender treatment approved by the probation officer, and abide by the rules, requirements and conditions of the treatment program, including submitting to polygraph testing to aid in the treatment and supervision process." Taylor makes five challenges to the polygraph testing.

First, Taylor contends that the polygraph testing is not reasonably related to his conviction under the standards listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), quoted in Section II above. Given his record, we disagree. The district court required polygraph testing to help insure Taylor's compliance with the supervised release terms imposed on him.2 Following his 1986 conviction, Taylor failed to comply with the terms of his supervised release and that release was revoked. The district court also required the polygraph testing to help insure that Taylor receives the mental health/sexual offender treatment he requires. Taylor's 1986 conviction was for sexual battery of his toddler daughter. Taylor's current conviction is based on his extreme reaction to a contractual dispute which ultimately resulted in his placing a 12-year-old-child in harm's way by presenting her as a willing victim for pedophiles. Under these circumstances, the district court did not

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abuse its discretion in determining that the polygraph testing is reasonably related to the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Compare United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (11th Cir.2003). Further, the polygraph testing does not, as Taylor suggests, result in an "excessive deprivation of [his] liberty interests."

Second, Taylor contends that the polygraph testing condition is so vague that it "delegat[es] ... judicial responsibility to the probation office and deprives Taylor [of] notice of what is required of him." We rejected this argument in Zinn, although the review was only for plain error because the objection had not...

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56 practice notes
  • United States v. Evans, Nos. 16-10310
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • February 28, 2018
    ...that the condition was "undeniably related" to the appellant's offenses. Id. at 1307 (quoting United States v. Taylor , 338 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003) ). Our case law keeps these inquiries separate, see, e.g. , Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1090–91, and so the relevance of Nash t......
  • Kasischke v. State, No. SC07-128.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 10, 2008
    ...Bell, J., dissenting op. at 832 note 34 (citing United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692 (8th Cir.2003), United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.2003), State v. Ehli, 681 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.2004), and People v. Harrisson, 134 Cal.App.4th 637, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 (2005)). However, the cas......
  • Doe v. Cooper, 1:13CV711
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Middle District of North Carolina
    • December 7, 2015
    ...those restrictions included examples to clarify which locations were restricted. See, e.g. , 148 F.Supp.3d 495 United States v. Taylor , 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (supervised release condition prohibiting “entering into any area where children frequently congregate, including scho......
  • State v. Wallmuller, NO. 96313-4
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • September 26, 2019
    ...parks, unless prior approval has been obtained from the probation office’ " (alterations in original)); United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting vagueness challenge to a provision that prohibited appellant from " ‘entering into any area where childr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
56 cases
  • United States v. Evans, Nos. 16-10310
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • February 28, 2018
    ...that the condition was "undeniably related" to the appellant's offenses. Id. at 1307 (quoting United States v. Taylor , 338 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003) ). Our case law keeps these inquiries separate, see, e.g. , Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1090–91, and so the relevance of Nash t......
  • Kasischke v. State, No. SC07-128.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 10, 2008
    ...Bell, J., dissenting op. at 832 note 34 (citing United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692 (8th Cir.2003), United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.2003), State v. Ehli, 681 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.2004), and People v. Harrisson, 134 Cal.App.4th 637, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 (2005)). However, the cas......
  • Doe v. Cooper, 1:13CV711
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Middle District of North Carolina
    • December 7, 2015
    ...those restrictions included examples to clarify which locations were restricted. See, e.g. , 148 F.Supp.3d 495 United States v. Taylor , 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (supervised release condition prohibiting “entering into any area where children frequently congregate, including scho......
  • State v. Wallmuller, NO. 96313-4
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • September 26, 2019
    ...parks, unless prior approval has been obtained from the probation office’ " (alterations in original)); United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting vagueness challenge to a provision that prohibited appellant from " ‘entering into any area where childr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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