U.S. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 11 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-CR-20010-BC.,96-CR-20010-BC.
• Citation: 955 F.Supp. 763
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Shawn C. TAYLOR, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Page 763

955 F.Supp. 763

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Shawn C. TAYLOR, Defendant.

No. 96-CR-20010-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

February 11, 1997.

Michael J. Hluchaniuk, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Bay City, MI, for Plaintiff.

Wallace Capel, Jr., Federal Defender, Flint, MI, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE AND REJECTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CLELAND, District Judge.

I. Background

The preliminary organization of this matter, including motions to suppress evidence, was referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules, to United States Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder. The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") suggesting that defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence should be granted. The government filed timely objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), to which the defendant has responded. In this opinion, the court rejects the recommendation of the magistrate and denies the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

On February 28, 1996, defendant Shawn Taylor was traveling on the Ohio Turnpike through Toledo, Ohio, in a 1986 Chevrolet Suburban of which he was the lawful owner. Inside the Suburban were three passengers (although they were difficult to discern since the windows of the vehicle were darkened by tinting material to an extent that was illegal under Ohio law).

At approximately 11:05 a.m. Ohio Highway Patrol Trooper Richard Unger stopped the vehicle after seeing it changing lanes without using a signal. (Transcript of the September 18, 1996, Hearing Before Magistrate Judge Binder ["Tr."], 8). Officer Unger testified the circumstances of the stop were "making him nervous" because (among other things) the front seat passenger was not looking at him as he stood at the passenger-side door but was alternately peering at the floor-boards and then out the front window; also the Trooper could not tell exactly how many other people were inside the Suburban, or what they were doing, because the windows were heavily tinted. (Tr. 11). After a brief encounter at the side of the Suburban, Taylor was placed in the back seat of the patrol car (from which a person may not emerge until the door is opened from the outside), for review of his paper work (license, registration, etc.).

Within minutes of the stop, a second officer arrived at the scene, Trooper Robert Stevens. While Unger was still engaged with Taylor inside the police car checking his operator's permit, Stevens first walked up to the Suburban, and then brought out and used his trained German Shepherd dog to sniff for drugs around the outside perimeter of the vehicle. Stevens at that point knew nothing about Unger's nervousness or observations of the front-seat passenger. (Tr. 39). Stevens was, however, aware that there were three passengers in the vehicle. (Tr. 63). The dog quickly "alerted," indicating the presence of drugs inside the Suburban at 11:09 a.m.; by this time, only four minutes had elapsed from when the vehicle had been pulled over, and Unger was engaged in a computer "records check" of Taylor. The officers then ordered the passengers out of the vehicle, frisked them, placed them in patrol cars and searched Taylor's vehicle. The Troopers testified that this was a "sweep" — a cursory search — intended to see if there were any weapons within reach. Neither weapons nor drugs were found during this "sweep." Officers then drove the Suburban about a mile down the highway to a maintenance building where a more thorough search was conducted. According to the magistrate judge:

... a search was conducted of the vehicle and among other things, a safe was found, and on more than one occasion, the Defendant was apparently asked to open the safe, and he declined. The search also revealed a marijuana pipe with residue, which was found in a nylon bag located within the Suburban; transcript page 19.

There was a marijuana joint, or marijuana cigarette found underneath the seat, which had been occupied by a female subject; transcript at page 20. A — a long brown box that was wrapped in paper was found, and it was found to contain a rifle case; transcript page 21.

After opening the rifle case, a semiautomatic rifle was found, along with a loaded clip, although the clip was not attached to the magazine of the gun; transcript at page 21.

(Tr., 120-21). Also found during the search of the vehicle were receipts from a storage shed, and information about Taylor's residence. Ultimately, without Taylor's consent, the safe was forced open revealing the drugs that are the principal focus of this motion to suppress.

On August 16, 1996, Taylor filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his vehicle. Oral argument was heard on September 4, 1996, and again on September 18, 1996, before the magistrate judge. He recommended that the motion to suppress the search of the vehicle be granted, suggesting that once the officers, at the side of the road, had discovered no illegal activity "over and above the traffic matter" itself, the continued detention of the defendant and his vehicle became improper and therefore the search of the vehicle had violated Taylor's constitutional rights. The magistrate judge relied principally on United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir.1995), also a case involving a drug-sniffing dog.

On January 9, 1996, this court held oral argument on the government's objections. For the reasons which follow, the magistrate judge's recommendation is REJECTED and Taylor's motion to suppress the search of his vehicle DENIED.

II. Standard

The filing of timely objections requires the court to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981). This de novo review, in turn, requires this court to re-examine all the relevant evidence previously reviewed by the magistrate to determine whether the recommendation should be accepted, rejected or modified in whole or in part. 28 USC § 636(b)(1). The court may "receive further evidence" if desired. Id.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by an oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court established the "vehicle exception" to the warrant requirement. The Court in Carroll held that, in light of the exigency arising out of the possible disappearance of a vehicle, a warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of crime, did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 158-59, 45 S.Ct. at 286-87.

In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court found that where police have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, they may search the entire vehicle and containers located within it. Under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-82, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1975), if the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle the search may be either immediate or delayed.

III. Discussion

1. The Traffic Stop Was Legitimate

Taylor does not contest that the police had probable cause to stop his vehicle. Indeed, in United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993), the court ruled that "so long as the officer has probable cause to believe the traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment." See also, Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (expressly adopting the same test for determining reasonableness of an automobile stop). Accordingly Unger's observation that Taylor did not signal when he made a lane change provided clear probable cause to determine a traffic violation had occurred and a proper justification for stopping the vehicle.¹

2. The Detention of the Defendant and Passengers was Lawful

In analyzing the reasonableness of detention a court will consider "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the inference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A temporary detention is proper if it is supported by a specific fact which gives rise to a reasonable inference of criminal activity. Id. Here, Unger determined to detain Taylor (and, necessarily, the vehicle he was driving along with its passengers and contents) to check his criminal and driving record, and to decide whether to issue a violation notice. (Tr. 12-13). This kind of detention is normal in traffic stops, and is considered proper so long as the detention is reasonable in duration. United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995) (a motorist can be lawfully detained in a police car until the purpose of the initial traffic stop is completed); United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 211 (6th Cir.1996) ("[d]etention in a police car does not automatically constitute an arrest"); United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir.1987) (detention in police car for several minutes is merely a normal part of police procedure and does not constitute custodial arrest).

3. The Use of a Dog During a Routine Traffic Stop is Not a "Search"

Both sides agree...