U.S. v. Tedford

Decision Date03 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-7079.,04-7079.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Misty Lee TEDFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

J. Lance Hopkins, Tahlequah, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.

Sheldon J. Sperling, United States Attorney, and Linda A. Epperley, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Muskogee, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

On April 25, 2001, Defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months' incarceration with the Bureau of Prisons to be followed by sixty months' supervised release for her involvement in a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. After completing her term of imprisonment, Defendant began her term of supervised release. On April 7, 2003, the Probation Office filed a Petition to revoke Defendant's supervised release based on four alleged violations of the conditions of her supervised release: (1) commission of a state crime, (2) failure to notify her probation officer within seventy-two hours of her arrest, (3) failure to pass seven drug tests, and (4) continuation of a relationship with a known convicted felon. Defendant admitted to all four allegations.

Based on a combination of Defendant's criminal history and the nature of the violations, the recommended sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines was between five and eleven months of incarceration. The district court imposed a sentence of forty-eight months. Defendant appealed. After consideration of the issues presented, we remanded with directions for the district court to more adequately explain the reasons for imposing its sentence. United States v. Tedford, 92 Fed. Appx. 738, 740 (10th Cir.2004).

On July 16, 2004, the district court held an evidentiary hearing relating to Defendant's resentencing. During that hearing, both Defendant and her fiance testified. After receiving the testimony, the district court again imposed a forty-eight month sentence of incarceration. In so doing, the district court considered

the violation policy statements in Chapter 7 of the United States Sentencing Guideline Manual in effect and view[ed] those policies as advisory in nature for the purposes of the[] proceedings. [The district court] considered the nature and circumstances of the violation of conduct, which included that [Defendant was] convicted of a state crime while on supervised release; ... that [Defendant] failed to notify [her] probation officer within seventy-two hours of [her] arrest on the state charge; that [Defendant] failed seven drug tests; and that [she] continued a relationship with a convicted [felon]. All of these violations convinced the Court that [Defendant had] no regard or respect for the rules and conditions of supervised release, and that it would, therefore, be a waste of the limited resources of the probation office to have to continue supervision over a defendant who has repeatedly violated the terms of her supervised release. Additionally, at the time of [Defendant's] original sentencing, this Court considered the fact that [she was] pregnant, and the impact that continued drug use would have upon [Defendant's] unborn child. A sentence outside of the range called for by the application of the guidelines provides just punishment for [her] non-compliance [and] is an adequate deterrent to future criminal conduct and perhaps will instill some respect for the law in [Defendant].

Rec., Vol. III, at 28-29.

Although the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker altered our standard of review for most sentencing cases, the standard of review for cases where the defendant challenges the revocation of her supervised release remains the same.1 See United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 766, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (citing United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2004), as an example of an application of the reasonableness standard of review). Hence, in this case, we will follow the law as articulated by Tsosie, wherein we stated that imposition of a sentence in excess of that recommended by the Chapter 7 policy statements of the Sentencing Guidelines will be upheld "if it can be determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable." Tsosie, 376 F.3d at 1218 (internal quotation omitted).

Defendant's first contention is that her sentence was unreasonable because the district court did not "adequately consider[ ] the Chapter 7 policy statements." Aplt's Br. at 7-9. In imposing sentences after revocation of supervised release, district courts are obligated to consider Chapter 7's policy statements. United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Magic words, however, are not required to demonstrate fulfillment of this requirement. See id.

Prior to imposing a sentence in the present case, the district court stated that it considered the Chapter 7 policy statements, viewed them as advisory, and then articulated the reasons warranting a sentence outside the recommended Guideline range. Rec., Vol. III, at 28-29. In so doing, the district court fulfilled its responsibility to adequately consider the Chapter 7 policy statements. See United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 775 (10th Cir.1992) and United States v. Brooks, 976 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir.1992) cited in Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305. To be clear, we do not hold that Defendant's sentence, which is more than four times the...

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24 cases
  • U.S. v. Bolds
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • December 20, 2007
    ...the same as under the Booker-created standard — sentences will be upheld if they are "reasoned and reasonable." United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.2004)). The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, in con......
  • United States v. Charley
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    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
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    ...required to demonstrate fulfillment of this requirement." United States v. Vigil, 696 F.3d at 1002 (quoting United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2005)(McKay, J.)(citations omitted)). "Rather, it is enough if the district court considers § 3553(a) en masse and states its ......
  • In re Solomon
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • October 2, 2006
    ...unreasonable" standard still viable after Booker for sentences with no applicable sentencing guideline) with United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir.2005); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2005) (hol......
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
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    ...of supervised release, a district court is required to consider both Chapter 7's policy statements, see United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2005), as well as a number of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3584(b); see also United Stat......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...unreasonable” standard in § 3742(a)(4) and 3742(b)(4)); U.S. v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); U.S. v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2005) (same); U.S. v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (same). 2791. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b......

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