U.S. v. Teffera

Decision Date19 February 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-3223,91-3223
Citation985 F.2d 1082,300 U.S.App.D.C. 23
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Yonatan TEFFERA, a/k/a Tony Johnson, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Diane Lepley (appointed by this Court), for appellant Yonatan Teffera.

James H. Dinan, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WALD, RUTH BADER GINSBURG and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge:

Yonatan Teffera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial to support his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). More specifically, Teffera contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that he either constructively possessed the drugs in question or aided and abetted their possession. We agree and, accordingly, reverse his conviction. 1

I. FACTS

At approximately 11:15 p.m. on November 4, 1990, Special Agent Gerald Crispino observed appellant Teffera get off the # 1645 bus from New York at the Greyhound/Trailways bus terminal in Washington. Teffera was accompanied by another individual, later identified as Thomas Cobb. Agent Crispino, suspecting that the two men might be carrying drugs, alerted his partner, Detective Vance Beard, to their presence. Detective Beard's attention, however, focused initially on a woman who arrived on the same bus. After interviewing her, Detective Beard saw Teffera standing alone near the taxi stand on First Street just outside the station. Detective Beard approached Teffera, identified himself, and asked if he could speak to him. Teffera agreed to talk, and, in response to Beard's inquiries, identified himself as Tony Johnson and said that he lived in Washington but had been in New York for several days. Teffera also told Beard that he was travelling alone and that he was going to visit an uncle who lived on Columbia Road in Washington. Detective Beard then asked for and received consent to search Teffera's person. That search revealed no drugs, so Beard thanked Teffera for his cooperation and walked back into the bus terminal.

While interviewing Teffera, Beard noticed Cobb exit the terminal, glance over at Beard and Teffera talking, and make a U-turn into the station again. This conduct aroused Beard's suspicions. So, when Beard returned to the station after talking to Teffera and spotted Cobb waiting in line at a fast food counter, he decided to follow him. Beard, now joined by Crispino, saw Cobb walk out of the station, join up with Teffera and Derrick Johnson--a man whom Beard knew to be a gypsy cab driver--and head down the street toward Johnson's cab. When the officers caught up with Cobb, he was seated in the right rear seat of the cab. Beard approached the cab and tapped on the window next to Cobb. After Cobb opened the door, Beard identified himself and asked for permission to speak with him. Beard then asked Cobb if he had come to Washington on a bus; Cobb said "no" and explained that he had come to the terminal to pick up his "buddy" Teffera, whom he was now taking back to Cobb's home in Marlow Heights, Maryland. After more questioning, Cobb consented to a search of his person.

Beard's search of Cobb was more fruitful than his previous search of Teffera. Beard discovered a large plastic bag containing Both Cobb and Teffera were indicted and tried for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. At trial, the government presented the officers' testimony as to the events recounted above. Additionally, in an effort to connect Teffera with the drugs found concealed on Cobb, the government presented the expert testimony of Detective David Stroud. Stroud opined that drug couriers sometimes work in teams. In those cases, according to Stroud, the person not carrying the drugs is there (1) to protect the "mule"--the person actually carrying the drugs--from being robbed; (2) to insure that the mule does not abscond with the drugs; and (3) to divert the police's attention from the mule. Detective Stroud further testified that in the case of two couriers, they often split up after reaching a bus or train terminal and later meet at a prearranged location.

                [300 U.S.App.D.C. 26] chunks of rock cocaine hidden inside the crotch area of Cobb's pants.   Cobb was then arrested.   After Cobb was handcuffed, Teffera exclaimed, "I don't know him.   I don't know him."   He too was then arrested, and a subsequent search of his body produced $130 in cash, a photograph of Teffera and Cobb together, and a New York to Washington bus ticket.   On the back seat of the cab, the officers found another New York to Washington bus ticket and a second photo of Cobb and Teffera.   The two bus tickets were subsequently found to be consecutively numbered and to have been paid for in cash by one person at 5:09 p.m. on November 4
                

At the end of the government's case-in-chief, Teffera moved, unsuccessfully, for a judgment of acquittal. Teffera presented no defense evidence, and the jury returned a guilty verdict as to both Cobb and Teffera on April 15, 1991.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Teffera contends that the government's evidence was insufficient for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession with intent to distribute the cocaine found in Cobb's pants. The standard for overturning a jury verdict for insufficient evidence is, from a defendant's viewpoint, daunting. To recite the familiar litany: We review the record only to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). To be sufficient, the government's evidence need not exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence or lead inexorably to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty. See United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 302 (D.C.Cir.1991). Finally, in evaluating the government's proof, we make no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. See id. at 303. Our review is not entirely toothless, however: "We do not ... fulfill our duty through rote incantation of the[ ] principles [outlined above] followed by summary affirmance. We must ensure that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law. A jury is entitled to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from evidence, but may not base a verdict on mere speculation." United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 365, 112 L.Ed.2d 328 (1990).

Here, the government alleges that there are two analytical paths that a reasonable juror might have followed to the conclusion that Teffera was guilty of possession of the drugs found concealed inside Cobb's trousers; the hypothetical juror could have determined that Teffera committed the substantive crime of possession by aiding and abetting Cobb's possession or by constructively possessing the drugs himself. We assess those arguments in turn.

A. Aiding and Abetting

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), a person who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures" a crime is punishable According to the government, the evidence shows that Teffera knowingly sought to facilitate Cobb's possession of the drugs by acting either as a lookout or as a diversion so that Cobb could escape detection as he passed through the bus station. To support this theory, the government highlights the following evidence: (1) the bus tickets, photos and testimony that demonstrate that Cobb and Teffera were travelling together; (2) Teffera's use of a false name and his false statements that he was travelling alone and was going to Columbia Road in Washington; (3) the expert testimony of Detective Stroud that a drug courier is often accompanied by a second person who acts as a diversion or lookout; and (4) the testimony that Cobb and Teffera got off the bus together, split up, and then reunited before leaving the bus terminal. We find, however, that based on this evidence alone, a reasonable juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Teffera knowingly traveled with someone who was carrying drugs, much less that he actively assisted in the drug's transport.

                [300 U.S.App.D.C. 27] as a principal for that crime. 2  To prove that a defendant aided and abetted the possession of illegal narcotics, the government need not show that a defendant ever physically possessed or otherwise controlled the movement of the drugs;  rather, it must demonstrate "sufficient knowledge and participation to indicate that [the alleged aider and abettor] knowingly and wilfully participated in the offense in a manner that indicated he intended to make it succeed."  United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C.Cir.1982);  see also United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938) (L. Hand, J.)  (aider and abettor must "associate himself with the venture, ... participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, ... seek by his action to make it succeed"). 3
                

The government's aiding and abetting theory runs into rough sledding from the outset. The most basic prerequisite for an aiding and abetting conviction is proof that the alleged accomplice knew of the criminal venture's existence. See, e.g., Raper, 676 F.2d at 849. Here, the government produced no direct evidence that Teffera knew that Cobb possessed the cocaine hidden under his clothes. The government asserts, however, that a reasonable juror could infer from Teffera's behavior that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • U.S. v. Watson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 9 d5 Abril d5 1999
    ...could neither undo the error nor mitigate its prejudicial effects under these egregious circumstances. See United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1993); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); United States v. Williams-......
  • U.S. v. Wilson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 20 d5 Novembro d5 1998
    ...a jury's verdict when "the government's web of inference is too weak to meet the legal standard of sufficiency." United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C.Cir.1993). The validity of Judd's convictions turns on whether the government presented sufficient evidence to show that Judd w......
  • United States v. Slatten
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 30 d2 Julho d2 2019
    ...of AcquittalSlatten starts with the "daunting" task of "overturning a jury verdict for insufficient evidence." United States v. Teffera , 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But his attempt misses the mark, since the record establishes Slatten committed each element of first-degree murder......
  • United States v. McGill
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 1 d2 Março d2 2016
    ...that Ronald wanted to have Thomas killed, let alone that James intended to help bring about the murder. As we said in United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C.Cir.1993), "general knowledge of criminality afoot" is not enough. Id. at 1086–87. But viewed in the light most favorable to the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT