U.S. v. Tempelman, Civ. 98-697-B.

Decision Date21 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. Civ. 98-697-B.,Civ. 98-697-B.
Citation111 F.Supp.2d 85
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Andrew D. TEMPELMAN, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

David L. Broerick, U.S. Attorney's Office, Concord, NH, John V. Cardone, U.S. Dept. of Justice Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Andrew Tempelman, Milford, NH, Pro se.

Priscilla Tempelman, Milford, NH, Pro se.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BARBADORO, Chief Judge.

The United States brings this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403 to reduce to judgment federal tax assessments against Andrew D. Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman and to foreclose federal tax liens upon certain real property presently or formerly owned by the Tempelmans.1 The assessments and liens in question arise from the Tempelmans' unpaid federal income tax liabilities for tax years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1990.2 Also named as defendants are the Fellowship of Perfect Liberty and Citizens Bank of New Hampshire, both of which purportedly have an interest in the property encumbered by the liens. Before this court is the government's motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 22) and the Tempelmans' objection (Doc. # 24). For the reasons that follow, I grant the government's motion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Tempelmans and the Maple Street Property

Andrew and Priscilla Tempelman are husband and wife. On or about December 28, 1976, the Tempelmans acquired as joint tenants with rights of survivorship the property that is the subject of this action, which is located at 24 Maple Street in Milford, New Hampshire.3 Since 1977, the Tempelmans have operated the Maple Street property as a restaurant and inn known as "The Ram in the Thicket."

B. Deficiencies and Assessments for Tax Years 1983, 1984, and 1985

On June 29, 1990, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") sent the Tempelmans a notice of deficiency pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6212, asserting that the couple owed over $145,000 in taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985. The Tempelmans filed a timely petition under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a), seeking a redetermination of the deficiencies by the United States Tax Court. On October 4, 1991, the Tempelmans entered into an agreement with the Commissioner of the IRS, in which they stipulated that their tax deficiencies with additions for 1983, 1984, and 1985 amounted to approximately $44,635 plus interest. The Tax Court adopted the parties' agreement in a decision entered on November 27, 1991.

On December 23, 1991, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury made assessments against the Tempelmans for 1983, 1984, and 1985 in accordance with the Tax Court's decision.4 A delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury issued notices of these assessments to the Tempelmans and made demand for payment. The Tempelmans have failed to make full payment. Their outstanding liability for tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985 is $158,319.15 plus statutory interest from September 3, 1999.

C. Deficiency and Assessment for Tax Year 1990

On April 26, 1993 and September 26, 1994, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury made assessments against the Templemans for their 1990 federal income tax liability in the amounts of $5505.26 and $4236.00, for a total of $9741.26. A delegate of the Secretary of Treasury issued notices and made the required demands for payment of the 1990 assessments. The Tempelmans have not fully paid the assessed amount. Their outstanding indebtedness for tax year 1990 is $4909.94 plus statutory interest from September 3, 1999.

D. Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Liens

On August 14, 1992, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien based on the Tempelmans' unpaid tax liabilities for 1984 and 1985 in the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. On December 22, 1993, the IRS filed a similar notice of federal tax lien based on the Tempelmans' 1983 and 1990 liabilities in the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds.

E. The Administrative Levy

At some point not clearly indicated by the record, the IRS levied upon the Maple Street property and attempted to sell the property at public auction.5 The person who bid on the property apparently defaulted on the sale. Thereafter, on August 6, 1998, the IRS released its levy on the property.

F. The Fellowship of Perfect Liberty

On or about August 12, 1998, the Tempelmans purportedly transferred their interests in the Maple Street property to the Fellowship of Perfect Liberty. The Fellowship is a church or religious organization founded by Andrew Tempelman in 1977. Priscilla Tempelman also is a member of the Fellowship. Members of the Fellowship regularly meet at the Maple Street property for discussions and/or services.

The Tempelmans did not receive any consideration from the Fellowship in exchange for the Maple Street property. Rather, they view the purported transfer as a donation. After the purported transfer, the Tempelmans continued to operate the inn and restaurant on the property in the same manner as previously.

G. Citizens Bank of New Hampshire

The government named Citizens Bank of New Hampshire, the successor in interest by merger to The Bedford Bank, as a defendant in this action because it had recorded a mortgage against the Maple Street property. In an endorsed order dated June 21, 1999, this court granted the government's motion for default judgment against Citizens Bank. In its motion, the government requested that any court-ordered sale of the Maple Street property be free of Citizens Bank's mortgage lien and that the Bank's lien attach instead to the sale proceeds, prior in right to the federal tax liens, to the extent that the Templemans had any remaining indebtedness to the Bank. On June 22, 1999, the Clerk entered a default judgment against Citizens Bank in accordance with the June 21, 1999 endorsed order.

H. The Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection

The government now moves for summary judgment, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in this case and that it is entitled as a matter of law to the following: (1) a judgment against the Tempelmans for the unpaid balance of their assessed federal income tax liabilities for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1990, which amounts to a total of $163,229.09 plus interest from September 3, 1999; (2) a decree that the government holds federal tax liens, arising from the Tempelmans' unpaid tax liabilities for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1990, upon the Maple Street property; and (3) a decree that those liens be foreclosed by a sale of the Maple Street property, free of the claims of all other parties to this action, upon a proper post-judgment motion by the government.

The Tempelmans, acting without benefit of legal counsel, have objected to the government's motion on a variety of grounds. Read in the generous light appropriate to filings by pro se litigants, the Tempelmans' objection contends that summary judgment in the government's favor is unwarranted because: (1) the government is precluded from bringing this enforcement action by virtue of its prior levy upon the Maple Street property and its release of that levy; (2) the property passed by donation to the Fellowship free from the government's liens; (3) the assessments for tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985, upon which some of the liens are based, were invalid because they flowed from a Tax Court decision tainted by fraud and/or duress; and (4) the assessment for 1990 was inaccurate.6 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the Tempelmans' arguments are insufficient to forestall summary judgment against them.7

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law"; a genuine factual issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, which must "produce evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact, under the appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe all the evidence produced by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1174, 145 L.Ed.2d 1082 (2000).

III. DISCUSSION
A. The Prior Levy and Release of Levy

The Tempelmans' primary challenge to the government's summary judgment motion is based on the prior levy upon the Maple Street property and the release of that levy after the unsuccessful attempt to sell the property at auction.8 Construed generously, the Tempelmans' objection asserts that because the government released the levy upon the property, it cannot now seek to enforce its liens by means of this suit. I reject the Tempelmans' contention because, as explained below, it rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of tax liens and the government's authority to enforce them.

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