U.S. v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 22 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:95cr52.,6:95cr52. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Polla Denice THOMAS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
JUSTICE, District Judge.
On November 15, 1995, a jury convicted Polla Denice Thomas, the defendant in this criminal action, of all offenses charged in a three-count indictment. Specifically, Thomas was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base ("crack"), and marijuana, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Thomas now moves for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.
The convictions against the defendant stem from the seizure of illegal drugs found inside a car she was driving en route from Houston, Texas, to Shreveport, Louisiana. During a routine traffic stop, Thomas gave consent to two law enforcement officers to search the car. Inside a black bag in the trunk of the car, the officers found three bags, which contained, respectively, marijuana, cocaine, and cocaine base ("crack"). Also located in the black bag was a book and tablet inscribed with the defendant's name.
The defendant seeks a judgment of acquittal on her drug convictions, asserting that the evidence failed to establish that she had knowledge of drugs being in her car or that she intended to possess such drugs.
Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in relevant part, provides:
The court on motion of a defendant ... shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment ... if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal based upon allegedly insufficient evidence is, whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2173, 64 L.Ed.2d 801 (1980). In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court is not permitted to substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury; thus, it is not the role of the trial court to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.; United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir.1996). Rather, the trial must consider all of the evidence, all reasonable inferences therefrom, and all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 386-87; see United States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir.1981).
In a 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) case, the government most prove: (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed (2) a controlled substance, (3) with the intent to distribute it. Jaras, 86 F.3d at 386. A jury may infer the elements of § 841(a)(1) from circumstantial evidence alone. United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417, 1423 (5th Cir.1989). In proving possession, it is not necessary to show that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs. It is sufficient to establish constructive possession — specifically, that the defendant had ownership, dominion, or control over the drugs or over a vehicle where the drugs were found. United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir.1995) ().
At trial, the defendant did not dispute that drugs were found in her bag and that these drugs were of a sufficient quantity to find intent to distribute. Instead, she disputed and continues to dispute the finding that she knowingly or intentionally possessed the drugs. The government's case against the defendant with respect to knowing possession of drugs included the following facts:
1. On September 25, 1995, at about 2:30 a.m., the defendant was stopped by Panola County deputies Joe Mims and Chris Rivers on U.S. Hwy. 59 for speeding. Two other persons, McDaniel Smith and Tina Marie Stills, were in the rental vehicle with the defendant. The defendant told the deputies she was traveling from Houston and that her destination was Shreveport, Louisiana.
2. A rental receipt found in the car showed that it was rented by Carl White.
3. Deputy Mims testified that Smith was asked how long the passengers had been in Houston, and he said, "just for a couple of days." The defendant, on the other hand, in response to the same question, said about a week. Subsequently, Deputy Mims asked for and received consent from the defendant to search the vehicle.
4. During the search, Deputies Mims and Rivers, in addition to Officer Keith Edgmon, who had since arrived at the scene, observed a black bag in the trunk. The defendant told the deputies that the bag was hers and that they should be careful in searching it because it contained her "dirty undergarments." No dirty undergarments were found in the bag.
5. Inside the bag, in fact, were a plastic bag containing about a half pound of marijuana, a plastic bag containing nine smaller bags of crack cocaine, and a paper sack containing a clear plastic bag filled with approximately one pound of cocaine. The defendant did not express surprise when she saw that drugs had been found in her bag.
6. The black bag contained a book and tablet inscribed with the defendant's name.
7. A receipt, which was found among the defendant's personal property, showed that on August 26, 1995, she wired $2,000 to Stills in Houston.
In rebuttal, the defendant offered the evidence of her husband, her mother, a friend, and herself. None of these witnesses disputed that drugs were found in the defendant's bag or that these drugs were marijuana, cocaine, and crack. Rather, the defendant's case rested on the theory that she did not know the drugs were in her bag. Her case centered on the testimony of her husband, Melvin Thomas ("the husband").
The husband testified as follows:
His wife did not have knowledge of the drugs in her bag; but he, along with Stills, Smith, and a drug dealer named Carl White, were actually responsible for the drugs being in the car. The drugs were being transported to Shreveport to fulfill drug sales the husband had arranged. The husband did not know who had placed the drugs in Thomas' bag; however, Smith told him that he had placed the drugs in what he thought was Stills' bag. He had brought his wife with him to Houston because she was "scared" to stay in Shreveport alone. His wife had no knowledge of his involvement with drug dealing. The husband gave the defendant $2,000 to transfer by wire to Stills in Houston, thus accounting for the receipt dated August 26, 1995. He untruthfully told her that the $2,000 was for a ground effect kit for her car.
In light of the above evidence, it is found that the jury was fully entitled to conclude that the defendant was knowingly in possession of illegal controlled substances and had the intent to distribute them. Unquestionably, the jury was entitled to disbelieve the testimony of the husband. The jury was also entitled to infer, from the fact that drugs were found in the defendant's bag placed inside a car she was driving, that she knew the drugs were in her bag, and that she had knowing possession over them. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir.1988) (). Further, other circumstantial evidence supports the jury's finding: (1) the defendant's statement to the Panola County deputies that they might not want to look in the bag because of her dirty undergarments, when, in fact, there were no undergarments in the bag; and (2) the receipt found among the defendant's property for a wire transfer of $2,000 to Stills. After consideration of this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession with intent to distribute is without merit.
A new trial should be granted "if required in the interest of justice." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. A court exercises broad discretion in considering such a motion, see United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 617 (5th Cir.1991), and "[a]ny error of sufficient magnitude to require reversal on appeal is an adequate ground for granting a new trial." 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 556 (2d ed.1982).
In her motion for new trial, the defendant lists the following bases for relief: (1) the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to systematically exclude black jurors; and (2) the prosecutor in his closing argument intentionally made misleading and false statements which resulted in the conviction of the defendant. Each of these challenges will be addressed in turn.
At trial, the defendant, who is black, objected to two of the government's peremptory challenges, contending that such challenges were made solely on the basis of her race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The government peremptorily challenged five prospective jurors; two of these jurors were black. These two jurors, Sonja Cox and Joyce Byrd, were the only prospective jurors who were black and in a position to sit on the jury after venire members had been successfully challenged for cause, and thus, the absence of these jurors resulted in an all-white jury. Following the defendant's objections to these challenges, the prosecution was ordered to furnish...
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