U.S. v. Thomas

Decision Date23 March 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-5585,88-5585
Citation870 F.2d 174
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melody THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

R. Clark Adams, Asst. Federal Public Defender and Lucien B. Campbell, Federal Public Defender, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

LeRoy Morgan Jahn, Asst. U.S. Atty. and Helen M. Eversberg, U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GEE, WILLIAMS and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

After a full trial, a jury found Melody Thomas guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846, and of the use of a federal communication facility, a telephone, to commit a felony, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b). On appeal, she challenges only her sentence. She contends that the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional; that she was entitled to a reduction to her offense level because she accepted responsibility for her crimes; that she was entitled to a reduction in her offense level because she was a minor participant in her crimes; and that the district judge incorrectly computed the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy. Finding no error in the sentence imposed, we affirm.

I

At trial, the government sought to prove, and the jury found, that Thomas had participated in a conspiracy to distribute approximately one kilogram of cocaine. She had used a telephone to arrange a sale of the cocaine to Art Vela, an undercover drug enforcement agent. Thomas defended on the ground that she had been coerced, by her boyfriend's death threats, to commit the crime. She also maintained that, for some time during the conspiracy's operation, she was unaware that the white substance possessed by the conspirators was cocaine.

Thomas was convicted, and sentenced to sixty-three months incarceration--a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range applicable to an offense level of 26 and a criminal history in category I--on the conspiracy count. She received a concurrent sentence on the other count.

II

Thomas challenges the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines. Her argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mistretta v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).

III

Thomas appeals the district court's determination of the amount of cocaine implicated by her conspiracy conviction. See Guideline 2D1.4. She contends that because the conspiracy was incapable of producing the quantity of cocaine that it had negotiated to supply, the district court erred by using that agreement to find that the conspiracy involved one kilogram of cocaine.

The district court's findings about the quantity of drugs implicated by the crime are factual findings, protected by the clearly erroneous rule. The district court may consider a variety of evidence, not limited to amounts seized or specified in the indictment, in making its findings. See United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 806 (5th Cir.1989). The guidelines provide, in Sec. 2D1.4, that a defendant convicted of an incomplete conspiracy will be sentenced as if the object of the conspiracy had been completed. Application Note 1 to that guideline states that drug weights used by conspirators in negotiations should be used to calculate the drug weight applicable in the sentencing proceeding.

In this case, the judge rejected Thomas's account of the conspiracy, believing instead the account contained in the presentence report. This factual finding suffices to support the judge's determination of the drug weight.

In any event, however, Thomas's argument misunderstands Guideline 2D1.4. Application Note 1 to that guideline, upon which Thomas relies, says that where "the defendant was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount the court may depart and impose a sentence lower than the sentence that would otherwise result." This suggestion does not alter the offense level, but instead proposes that the sentencing judge consider a discretionary departure. Thomas's argument, therefore, amounts to a claim that the sentencing judge should have made a downward departure. We will uphold a sentencing judge's refusal to depart from the guidelines unless the refusal was in violation of law. United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir.1989). No law would compel a departure in this case, even were the facts as Thomas contends.

IV

Thomas contends that she accepted responsibility for her crimes, and that the trial court should have allowed her a two-point reduction to her offense level. See Guideline 3E1.1. Whether or not a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime is a factual question. The district court's determination of that question, like its findings with respect to manager status, United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 868 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.1989) and minimal participant status, Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, enjoys the protection of the "clearly erroneous" standard. Because the trial court's assessment of a defendant's contrition will depend heavily on credibility assessments, the "clearly erroneous" standard will nearly always sustain the judgment of the district court in this area. Indeed, the guidelines specifically state that "[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of...

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