U.S. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 30 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-5881,95-5881
• Parties: NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 145

91 F.3d 145

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-5881.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 30, 1996.

Before: MERRITT, Chief Circuit Judge; MILBURN, Circuit Judge; and O'MALLEY, District Judge ^*

MERRITT, Chief Judge.

Defendant Keith Thompson was charged with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and filed a motion to suppress the cocaine found in his car and statements he made following his arrest. The motion to suppress was denied and Defendant appealed.

I.

The facts related herein are those found by the Magistrate Judge after an evidentiary hearing. The parties are not in dispute as to the basic facts at issue here.

The Shelby County, Tennessee, Sheriff's Office received information from a confidential informant that drugs were being sold by a particular individual from a certain address in Memphis, Tennessee. The informant gave a description of the person and the address and, based on this information, a search warrant issued. The warrant directed a search of "(a) a residence more commonly known as 2577 Dakar, all automobiles and outbuildings located on said premises to be included...." Defendant has not challenged the validity of the warrant.

When officers arrived at the residence to execute the warrant, five males, including Defendant Keith Thompson, were in the yard. An automobile was parked in the driveway of the residence, about five to ten feet from the house. The men were trying to figure out how to get into the car because the keys had been locked inside the vehicle. According to the police, one of the males, ultimately determined to be Defendant Thompson, matched the description of the person selling drugs given to the police by the informant. The police drew their weapons, ordered all the men to lie face down on the ground and handcuffed them. The officers did not ask if any of the persons present owned or lived in the house. The officers then proceeded to search the house. Approximately $1500 was found during the search but no drugs.

After searching the house, the officers stated that they wished to search the car in the driveway. The officers did not attempt at this point to ascertain the owner of the car, but did ask where the keys to the car were. Defendant told the officers that the keys were locked in the car. The officers used a coat hanger to open the car. A drug-sniffing dog was put in the car and alerted officers to the door panel. The panel was removed and officers could see a clear plastic bag. At this point, Defendant Thompson, who was cuffed and lying nearby on the ground, tried to run away. He was apprehended.

Before the drugs were removed, the officers asked who owned the car and Defendant Thompson answered that it was his. An automobile registration check done on the scene confirmed ownership. The bag was removed and found to contain 33 grams of cocaine base. Defendant and one other person were arrested and advised of their Miranda rights. Defendant was taken to the Shelby County Jail where he remained for one and one-half days; he was then transferred to a combined federal/state facility and was questioned by a federal officer after again receiving Miranda warnings. Defendant gave a statement admitting that the crack found in the car was his and that he sold crack.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, his statement to police at the scene that the car was his and his later statement to the federal officer that the crack was his and that he was a drug dealer. The grounds for the motion were (1) Defendant was a visitor to the residence identified in the warrant so his car should not have been searched; (2) Defendant was improperly detained during execution of the warrant; (3) Defendant was interrogated in a custodial situation at the scene about ownership of the car without having received a Miranda warning and (4) Defendant's later statements were tainted by the earlier statement given at the scene about ownership of the car.

An evidentiary hearing was held before Magistrate Judge James Allen. Defendant testified that he did not live at 2577 Dakar but instead lived nearby with his girlfriend. Defendant testified that his father owns the residence searched, but Defendant is free to visit when he likes and does so once or twice per week.

The Motion to Suppress was denied. The Magistrate Judge held (1) that the search warrant implicitly authorized the officers to detain persons found on the premises for the duration of the search; (2) that the search warrant authorized by its terms the search of automobiles found on the premises, although it later turned out that the automobile did not belong to anyone living on the premises; (3) that the officers' question concerning ownership of the car was routine biographical questioning not meant to elicit incriminating information, (4) in any event, the questioning was not custodial in nature and (5) the questioning by the federal officer that elicited incriminating statements was not tainted by the earlier events. Magistrate Report and Recommendation at J.A. 30-32. Defendant filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. J.A. at 25. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in full. J.A. at 53.

Defendant entered a guilty plea conditioned on ability to appeal the denial of the Motion to Suppress. This appeal followed.

II.

A. Search of Defendant's Automobile

Defendant argues that the scope of the search warrant did not authorize the police to search his car because he was a visitor to the premises and the car was not owned by the owner of the premises to be searched. Although the Supreme Court apparently has not addressed this issue directly, a majority of the courts that have addressed the issue have upheld the search of a car on the premises, even where the search of vehicles was not expressly included in the wording of the warrant, regardless of whether it was owned or controlled by the owner of the premises searched. See, e.g., United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.1980) (upholding the search of a truck belonging to a third party who arrived at the searched residence during execution of the warrant), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981).

In a case somewhat analogous to the situation here, the Sixth Circuit stated that where officers act reasonably and in a way that is authorized by a valid warrant, the search will be upheld. In United States v. Combs, 468 F.2d 1390, 1392 (6th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973), the warrant authorized a search of "the premises," including "all outbuildings and vehicles thereon, including all adjacent properties used by the said Pearl Combs [defendant's father]." The officers in Combs searched a car belonging to defendant that was parked near the house in an area where the family generally parked their cars assuming that the car belonged to Pearl Combs. Contraband was found in the car. In fact, the car was parked on the lot next door to Pearl Combs and belonged to defendant, Pearl Combs' son, who moved to suppress the evidence. This Court held that because the car was located within the curtilage of the house and reasonably appeared to belong to the owner of the premises searched, the search was legal. Id.

We find that the officers in the instant case acted reasonably in assuming the vehicle to be within the scope of the warrant due to its location on the premises to be searched. The search warrant here specifically included in its scope any vehicles present on the premises. It did not limit the search only to vehicles belonging to the owner of the residence to be searched. Under the circumstances, it appears that the search of the car was reasonable.

B. Detention of Defendant During Search

There is no doubt that the detention of a person during a search where he is handcuffed and forced to lie face down, as occurred here, constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The question is whether under the circumstances the seizure was "reasonable." A limited seizure while officers execute a search warrant may be reasonable and has been recognized as an exception to the need for probable cause before detaining a person. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 694, 700-05 (1981). In Summers, the Supreme Court found that "a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Id.

Following Summers, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 608 (1993), found that restraining occupants, even nonresidents, with...