U.S. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 15 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-3119.,00-3119.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Michael D. THOMPSON, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

279 F.3d 1043

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Michael D. THOMPSON, Appellant.

No. 00-3119.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued October 18, 2001.

Decided February 15, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 00cr00016-02).

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the cause for the appellant.

John K. Han, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief for the appellee.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Michael D. Thompson was convicted on one count of unlawful distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(a)(3). He appeals, contending that the district court erroneously excluded evidence and erroneously charged the jury; he also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the district court's rulings and uphold his conviction.

I.

On October 22, 1997 Detective David Dessin of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and a confidential informant (Robert) approached Mitchell Douglas (Douglas) to buy cocaine base. Gov't App. Tab B, at 6-7. Dessin was working as an undercover agent for the High Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area Task Force, a joint task force of the MPD and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 8/29/00 Tr. 5-6. Douglas agreed to sell but told Dessin that he would complete the transaction — $1500 for 62 grams of cocaine base — the next day at 5:00 p.m. in a nearby Popeye's Chicken parking lot. Id.

On October 23, 1997 Dessin waited in an unmarked police car, a Lexus, in the restaurant parking lot. Shortly after Dessin arrived, Robert drove into the parking lot and parked next to Dessin. Dessin did not expect to see him because Robert had earlier told him that he could not participate in the bust. 8/29/00 Tr. 14. Dessin told him to get into the Lexus so that the targets would not become suspicious of his separate arrival. Id. at 15.

At approximately 5:10 p.m., an unknown person later identified as appellant Thompson approached Dessin and asked, "Are you Rob's boy?" 8/29/00 Tr. 16. Dessin responded, "Yeah." Id. Thompson then stated, "Mitch told me to give you this." Id. Dessin told Thompson to get into the car. Thompson opened the driver's side rear door and sat behind Dessin. Dessin asked him, "Do you have that joint?" Id. at 18. Thompson responded by handing him a large Burger King cup with a lid on it. The cup was later shown to have contained cocaine base. Dessin then gave Thompson a bundle of money in exchange. Thompson asked, "What's this?" Dessin responded, "15" (meaning $1500). Id. at 25. Thompson asked, "Are you straight?", to which Dessin replied, "I'm straight." Id. Thompson got out of the car and walked out of the parking lot.

Thompson and Douglas were subsequently indicted on various drug charges. Douglas was charged in all four counts of the indictment, which included two separate acts of distribution and two telephone facilitation counts. Thompson was named in count four only, which charged both Thompson and Douglas with unlawful distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base on or about October 23, 1997. Douglas pleaded guilty and was ultimately sentenced to 70 months' imprisonment.

Thompson proceeded to trial as the sole defendant on count four of the indictment. Following a three-day jury trial, Thompson was found guilty of unlawful distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(a)(3). On November 14, 2000 the district court sentenced Thompson to 188 months' imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of supervised release.

II

A. Excluded Testimony

At trial, Thompson's defense was that he lacked the requisite mens rea because he did not know the cup he delivered to Dessin contained cocaine base. Thompson testified that before the transaction with Dessin, Douglas asked him to deliver a Burger King cup that Douglas said contained $2600 to a Lexus in the Popeye's Chicken parking lot. Thompson assumed that the money was to pay a gambling debt because Douglas was a "compulsive gambler and owes people at times." 8/30/00 Tr. 21. The government objected to Douglas's statements as hearsay. The district court overruled the objection, explaining that the statements were offered for the non-hearsay purpose of "prov[ing]... the defendant's state of mind." 8/30/00 Tr. 12.¹ Thompson also tried to testify about what Douglas told him immediately after the event when he returned with the $1500 Dessin had given him. 8/30/00 Tr. 23. According to Thompson, the evidence was critical to his defense because it explained the otherwise unlikely sequence of events, that is, that Thompson received $1500 in exchange for what he thought was in the cup — money to pay a gambling debt. Appellant's Br. at 8. Nevertheless the district court sustained the government's hearsay objection to any testimony regarding Douglas's post-transaction statements.

On appeal, Thompson argues that Douglas's post-transaction statements, like Douglas's pre-transaction statements, were offered to show Thompson's state of mind and therefore should not have been excluded as hearsay.² Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). An out-of-court statement that is offered to show its effect on the hearer's state of mind is not hearsay under Rule 801(c). See United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 653 (D.C.Cir.1994) (district court improperly excluded evidence bearing on officer's state of mind as hearsay); United States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir.1988) (exclusion of evidence of defendant's state of mind as hearsay reversible error). Regardless of the actual contents of the closed cup, the jury might have been able to draw from Douglas's statements an inference as to Thompson's guilty knowledge vel non of the cup's contents. If Thompson offered Douglas's post-transaction statements only as they might tend to bear on his state of mind, the testimony would not have been hearsay.³

Rule 103(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, provides that an error may not be predicated upon a ruling excluding evidence unless "the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked." Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). The proponent of excluded evidence must alert the trial court, in some fashion, to the substance of his proposed testimony. See United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1985) (defendants's failure to make known basis for seeking to admit excluded evidence barred appellate review).⁴ But defense counsel simply attempted unsuccessfully to rephrase his question and then finally moved on without apprising the trial court of the substance of the excluded evidence. 8/30/00 Tr. 22-23.⁵ Because Thompson did not proffer his intended response or otherwise inform the court of the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced or, at minimum, the purpose for which the evidence was being offered, we are substantially hindered in reaching the conclusion that the district court erred. See United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098-99 (D.C.Cir.1986) (exclusion of threatening phone call as hearsay not error under Rule 103 because defendant failed to inform district court of nature of testimony); see also Chedick v. Nash, 151 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C.Cir.1998) (plaintiff's appeal of exclusion of emotional distress evidence foreclosed because of her failure to inform trial court of legal basis of admissibility).

Even if a party fails to comply with Rule 103(a), review is nonetheless available under the "plain error" provision of Rule 103(d) which states, "[n]othing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain error affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Fed. Evid. R. 103(d). Under the plain error standard, "before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.'" United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 897 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quotation omitted)). "If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. at 1549). Under this stringent standard, the district court's decision to exclude the post-event testimony did not constitute plain error affecting substantial rights because it did not "gravely hamper" Thompson's presentation of his mens rea defense. Wright, 783 F.2d at 1099 (erroneous exclusion not plain error where duress defense nonetheless presented). Reviewing Thompson's testimony, we note that he did testify that Douglas told him before the transaction that the cup contained money and that he was "confused" by Dessin's delivery of $1500 in exchange. In the absence of a proffer showing otherwise, it appears the excluded testimony was cumulative. In addition, the evidence of Thompson's guilt was fairly strong. Most of the facts supporting his conviction were undisputed. See supra 1045-47. The only disputed issue at trial was whether Thompson knew that the cup contained cocaine base which, based on the evidence before it, the jury could reasonably find that he did. Thompson thus incurred no significant...