U.S. v. Thurston, 02-1966.

Decision Date04 February 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-1966.,No. 02-1967.,02-1966.,02-1967.
Citation358 F.3d 51
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. William THURSTON, Defendant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Michael K. Loucks, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney, and Susan G. Winkler and Gary S. Katzmann, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on brief, for appellant.

Matthew D. Brown, with whom Joseph P. Russoniello and Cooley Godward LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Before LYNCH, LIPEZ, and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

William Thurston, a vice president of Damon Clinical Testing Laboratories, Inc., appeals his conviction for conspiring to defraud the Medicare program of over five million dollars.1 The charged conspiracy involved the manipulation of physicians into ordering unnecessary ferritin blood tests2 for Medicare beneficiaries in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.

The essence of the scheme charged was that Damon, through Thurston and others, bundled the ferritin blood test — previously ordered by doctors less than two percent of the time — into a panel of blood tests known as the LabScan, which was ordered thirty to forty percent of the time. When doctors or patients (instead of insurers) paid for the bundled LabScan, Damon provided the ferritin test for free, leading doctors to believe there was no extra charge for this test. Doctors were not told that, when Medicare paid for the bundled LabScan, Medicare was charged extra for the ferritin test. Indeed, both a letter and marketing materials indicated the added ferritin test was "free"; that is, that there was no charge beyond the standard LabScan charge. Those unnecessary ferritin tests were not free to Medicare. Damon charged Medicare roughly $21 per ferritin test on top of the approximately $24 charged for the LabScan. Nor were doctors told that the ferritin test could be ordered separately; the test requisition form did not offer that option. The physicians, then, were induced to order and to certify as medically necessary a large number of ferritin tests that were not medically necessary.

The government's theory was that Damon did this to offset Medicare's 1988 reduction in reimbursement rates of sixteen percent, which was projected to cause Damon an estimated annual loss of $800,000 in revenues. In just one of Thurston's labs, the orders for ferritin tests were expected to increase from approximately three hundred per month to roughly ten thousand per month. Thurston testified that he was innocent, and that he neither had knowledge of nor responsibility for key components of the conspiracy. The jury disagreed.

Although the sentencing guidelines called for a sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months, the district court sentenced Thurston to only three months' imprisonment. It did so by granting a downward departure to "correct" a perceived disparity between a five-year sentence of imprisonment for Thurston and the sentence of three years' probation given to the company president, Joseph Isola, who had pled nolo contendere and assisted the government. Its second ground for departure was its sense that the good works Thurston did for his church and community were extraordinary.

This sentence outraged the prosecutors, who appealed, arguing that the district court lacked the power to depart downward for any of the reasons it gave, and that, even if a departure were appropriate, the extent of the departure was excessive. The government also appeals the district court's failure to impose a fine, on the basis that the sentencing guidelines, if not the statute, mandated a fine. Finally, the prosecution argues that if some departure for good works was warranted, the district court was required to address an issue it avoided: the government's request for an upward departure on the ground that Thurston had obstructed justice by committing perjury on the witness stand.

Thurston also appeals, arguing that the conviction must be vacated because the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, because he was entitled to a jury instruction and to acquittal on the basis that he reasonably interpreted the law to mean he could rely on the physicians' certifications of medical necessity, and because of other errors. In addition, Thurston argues that his sentence was too high because his base offense level calculation depended on an amount of loss, either actual or intended, that was unproven and excessive. Thurston also defends the downward departure.

Several important issues are raised by these appeals. The government's appeal requires us to address the effect of the new Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650,3 on the standard that the courts of appeals use to review downward departure decisions by district judges in sentencing, as well as the availability of a downward departure for a record of good works under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11. Thurston's appeal invites, inter alia, clarification of the defense doctrine concerning a defendant's reasonable interpretation of the law; the issue of when a statute of limitations defense must be raised; the ramifications of a trial judge's failure to respond to jury instructions proposed by counsel; the evidence needed to show an intended loss; and the question whether fines are mandatory.

In the end we sustain the conviction but find that the sentence was in error.

I. FACTS

We state the facts as the jury could reasonably have found them, including a fair description of the defense evidence.

A. Background

Medicare provides certain medical services and care, including clinical laboratory testing services, to persons aged sixty-five and older and to persons with disabilities. At the time of the conspiracy, Medicare was administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HCFA in turn contracted with private insurance companies ("carriers" and "intermediaries") to handle claims for reimbursement to Medicare program beneficiaries. By law, Medicare only reimburses clinical laboratory services if those services were medically necessary for the treatment or diagnosis of a beneficiary's illness or injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 424.10(a) (1988). Medicare did not generally reimburse screening tests. Medicare reimbursed one-hundred percent of the cost of necessary clinical blood tests.

Damon was, at the time, a Massachusetts corporation that provided clinical laboratory testing services to physicians, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and their patients nationwide. Approximately thirty percent of Damon's revenues were from Medicare. Damon owned and operated a national system of clinical laboratories, and Damon was an approved Medicare provider. When Damon billed the Medicare program, it submitted to the carriers a HCFA 1500 form saying that it certified the lab tests were medically necessary. Physicians did not see those bills.

Thurston served as Regional Vice President of Damon from 1987 to 1990, and was responsible during all or part of this time for Damon's regional laboratories in Newbury Park, California; Phoenix; Chicago; and San Francisco. His office was at the Newbury Park lab; he traveled to the other labs and was in regular phone contact. Thurston was promoted to Senior Vice President of Operations in 1990. Thereafter, he relocated to the company headquarters in Needham, Massachusetts and supervised only the San Francisco lab. Another company purchased Damon in August 1993; Thurston later switched employers and moved to Utah.

B. Theories of Prosecution and Defense

The government's theory was that the defendants tricked doctors into ordering medically unnecessary tests, for which Medicare paid. Damon added little-used tests to more popular panels of tests; it then tricked doctors by concealing that the panels could be ordered without the added tests and that Medicare was being charged for the tests. To conceal from doctors that Medicare was being charged, and to encourage doctors to order ferritin tests regardless of medical necessity, the defendants charged doctors and patients little or no extra fee for the added tests; provided literature saying that ferritin was provided free; otherwise failed to disclose to doctors the cost to Medicare of the expanded LabScan; and made it difficult to order the bundled test without ferritin.

The defense theories were that there was no conspiracy and, if there were, that Thurston was not a knowing participant. The defense contended that Damon complied with existing Medicare regulations, which neither prohibited bundling nor imposed a requirement on the lab to disregard a physician's certification that tests were medically necessary. It further argued that even if Thurston's interpretation of the regulations was incorrect, it was objectively reasonable, and so Thurston lacked the required criminal intent. Thurston's defense was also that any fraud was carried out by his subordinates, without his knowledge. He testified that he did not instruct the labs to add ferritin; did not authorize or condone any decision to forego a fee increase for doctors or private-pay patients on the expanded LabScan; did not instruct subordinates to conceal that doctors could order a LabScan without ferritin; and had nothing to do with requisition forms or particular pieces of marketing literature.

C. Evidence of Conspiracy to Defraud
1. Addition of Ferritin

In late 1987, HCFA announced that effective April 1, 1988, Medicare would reduce by almost sixteen percent the fees paid to laboratories, including Damon, for providing clinical laboratory services to beneficiaries. If Damon maintained its existing practices and fee structure, then Damon would lose...

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