U.S. v. Trotta

Decision Date10 November 1975
Docket NumberD,No. 289,289
Citation525 F.2d 1096
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Gerard P. TROTTA, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 75--1267.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Edward R. Korman, Chief Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y. (David G. Trager, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., on the brief), for appellant.

Herbert A. Lyon, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Lyon & Erlbaum, William M. Erlbaum, and Charles Wender, Kew Gardens, N.Y., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LUMBARD, ANDERSON and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT P. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

The appellee, Gerard P. Trotta, was indicted 1 on two counts of extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, based on acts which he allegedly committed while Commissioner of Public Works of the Town of Oyster Bay, Long Island. The indictment charges that Trotta demanded and induced the payments of $2,000 and $1,000, under the respective The appellee moved in the district court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it failed to allege with sufficient specificity all of the necessary facts comprising the offense charged. The court granted the motion, and the Government has appealed. We reverse.

counts, in political contributions to the local Republican Committee from the engineering firm of William F. Cosulich Associates (Cosulich) 'under color of official right.' 2 These charges were prefaced with allegations that, throughout the period of time covered by the indictment, Cosulich was providing engineering services to Oyster Bay, among other municipal corporations; and that Trotta, as Commissioner of Public Works, exercised the functions of making contracts with engineering firms on behalf of the Town and supervising their performance under the contracts. It also alleged that Cosulich, which consented to these payments, reasonably understood that Trotta '(had) the power to take action which could adversely affect (the firm) in obtaining and performing contracts with the Town of Oyster Bay.'

To a great extent the parties' arguments are directed to the substantive interpretation of the crime in question. The Government claims, in effect, that the Hobbs Act is violated when a public official with criminal intent demands and obtains, under color of official right, payment of money by someone who does not owe the money to the official or his office, but who is so situated that he can be adversely and directly affected by the manner in which the public official exercises his powers. It asserts that the indictment in this case charging Trotta's violation of the Act is adequate. The appellee, Trotta, argues, however, that the indictment is deficient because it does not specifically allege and describe an 'identifiable misuse of office' by Trotta, that is to say, it does not explicitly describe what Trotta agreed to do in his official capacity in return for the payment of money--in short, the quid pro quo.

Based largely on this claim by the defendant-appellee, the trial court held 3 that the words 'under color of official right' are too vague and general to meet the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures. 4 The Supreme Court cases on the subject, however, 'indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.' Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). The first criterion Here the pertinent portions of the statute are 'tracked' in the indictment 5 and in addition the dates, approximate location, and amounts of the alleged extorted payments, together with the identity of the payor, are alleged in specific terms. It is true that merely repeating the words of the statute which defines an offense will not make the indictment sufficient if the statutory language fails to apprise the defendant, 'with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him.' Russell, supra, 369 U.S. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1047, citing United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362, 24 L.Ed. 819. But we are of the opinion that the phrase 'under color of official right' as used in § 1951 has an historically recognized and accepted meaning 6 which, taken together with the rest of the indictment, makes it clear that Trotta is charged with using the power of his office over Town engineering contracts to induce payments of money from Cosulich which Trotta had no right to receive.

serves at least two constitutional goals: the Sixth Amendment right of the accused 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation'; and the Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on the charge of a grand jury, as distinguished from and unmodified by any interpolations of the prosecution. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760--61, 766, 770--71, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). Following these criteria, this Circuit has 'consistently sustained indictments which track the language of a statute and, in addition, do little more than state time and place in approximate terms.' United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1277 (2 Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 985, 94 S.Ct. 1579, 39 L.Ed.2d 882 (1974). See also United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727 at 732 (2 Cir. 1975); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 at 1109 (2 Cir. March 7, 1975); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2 Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975); United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79, 81 (2 Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 1205, 22 L.Ed.2d 463 (1969); United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 495 (2 Cir. 1958).

In Palmiotti, supra, the defendant asserted a very similar challenge to his indictment for extortion under the 'force, violence, or fear' portion of § 1951. The indictment charged that, on or about a particular date, he obtained from a named company a specified sum of money, 'with (the payor's) consent induced by wrongful use of threatened force and fear.' 254 F.2d at 495. The defendant argued that 'while the allegations of the indictment follow the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the vital thrust of the indictment lies in the particular kind of 'wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear' relied upon, and that the omission to state this in specific rather than general terms is in effect the omission of the 'essence' of the charge and a fatal defect.' Id. Applying the two criteria for sufficiency, discussed supra, the court rejected this As the appellee and the district court recognized, extortion 'under color of official right' as prohibited by the Hobbs Act is basically equivalent to the common law crime of (official) extortion, 7 and as such its meaning, as a legal term of art, is well-defined. 'At common law a public official who under color of office obtained the property of another not due either to the office or the official was guilty of extortion.' United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289, 89 S.Ct. 534, 536, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). This Circuit long ago 'adopted the classic definition of Blackstone' 8 in construing the crime of extortion by federal officers established by the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 872. 9 Martin v. United States, 278 F. 913, 917 (2 Cir. 1922). The Seventh Circuit has recently described the offense of extortion under color of official right in the following terms:

argument. In Fortunato, supra, the court upheld an indictment which charged the defendant with 'wilfully misapplying' bank funds. Contrary to the defendant's contention that this phrase standing alone was impermissibly vague, the court held that the grand jury was not required to specify more precisely the unlawful means used or the nature of the defendant's alleged abuse of his authority at the bank.

'The use of office to obtain payments is the crux of the statutory requirement of 'under color of official right', and appellants' wrongful use of official power was obviously the basis for extortion. . . . It matters not whether the public official induced payments to perform his duties or not to perform his duties, or even, as here, to perform or not to perform acts unrelated to his duties which can only be undertaken because of his official position. So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.' United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7 Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975).

We conclude that there is no merit in any of the claims made by the appellee. One of the principal assertions is that the indictment is defective because of its failure to allege 'a specifically identifiable misuse of office,' in which Trotta engaged, as an unlawful quid pro quo or a consideration in the nature of official action running from Trotta to Cosulich in return for the payment of the money not lawfully owed. This, it appears, might be an exercise of the powers of his office in his line of duty or a forbearance to carry out a duty. Such a quid pro quo may, of course, be forthcoming in an extortion case, or it may not. In either event it is not an essential element of the crime.

But the pressure exerted by Trotta by means of the power of his public office to induce the payment of the money is, in itself, the misuse of the office; and, as stated in Braasch, supra, it does not matter whether Trotta 'induces payments to perform his duties or not to perform his duties.' Nor does it matter that the payments may have been induced simply by assertion of power or pressure stemming from Trotta's The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for trial.

position as a public official. United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 ...

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