U.S. v. Twitty, No. 94-1618

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: EDGAR, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH
• Citation: 44 F.3d 410
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sadie Mae TWITTY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 94-1618
• Decision Date: 17 January 1995

Page 410

44 F.3d 410 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Sadie Mae TWITTY, Defendant-Appellant. No. 94-1618. United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit. Argued Nov. 15, 1994.
Decided Jan. 17, 1995.

Page 411

Patricia G. Blake (briefed), Joseph J. Allen, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Detroit, MI, for plaintiff-appellee.

Jonathan Epstein (argued and briefed), Federal Public Defenders Office, Detroit, MI, for defendant-appellant.

Before: CONTIE and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and EDGAR, District Judge. ^*

EDGAR, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined.

CONTIE, J. (pp. 414-15), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

EDGAR, District Judge.

Sadie Mae Twitty appeals the district court's revocation of her probation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565. The revocation was predicated on conduct which occurred before Twitty was sentenced to probation. We REVERSE.

I.

On July 23, 1992, Twitty was brought before a United States Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. She had been charged in a complaint with using one or more unauthorized access devices (credit cards) in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029. The magistrate judge released her on bond. One of the conditions of her release was that "[t]he defendant shall not commit any offense in violation of federal, state or local law while on release in this case."

On October 13, 1992, Twitty waived indictment and pled guilty to a one-count information charging her with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029. The district court continued Twitty's bond pending sentencing.

In December 1992 Twitty, posing as her deceased sister, cashed three General Motors Corporation checks and a United States Treasury check. On January 7, 1993, the district judge, who did not know about the defendant's December conduct, sentenced her to probation for five years. As a condition of her probation she was to spend six months in a community treatment center. This condition was modified in March 1994 to sixty days in home confinement. In October

Page 412

1993 she pled guilty in state court to "uttering and publishing as an habitual offender," conduct represented by her December 1992 criminal activity. In January 1994 Twitty was sentenced on the state charges to five years probation. On May 17, 1994, the district court, at the behest of the government, revoked Twitty's probation because of her December 1992 criminal conduct, and sentenced her to nine months in prison.

II.

When the district court revoked Twitty's probation it was, of course, aware that Twitty's December 1992 criminal conduct had occurred before she was sentenced to probation. The district court reasoned that this circuit's decision in United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 431, 130 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994), warrants revocation of probation for preprobation conduct, even if that conduct occurred prior to the imposition of probation, so long as the defendant has "fair notice" to remain crime free. The district court found "fair notice" in the condition of Twitty's appearance bond that she not commit any violation of federal, state or local law while released on bond.

The statute governing a district court's authority to revoke probation is 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565(a) which reads in relevant part: "If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of probation, the court may, after a hearing ... revoke the sentence of probation...." In Williams, the Court interpreted the predecessors of this statute, but also observed that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565 "clearly grants courts authority to revoke probation for pre-probationary conduct." 15 F.3d at 1359 n. 4. This circuit in Williams, and other circuits, have held that the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565 and its predecessor statutes authorize the revocation of probation for conduct occurring after imposition of the probationary sentence but before commencement of probation. United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 369 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Daly, 839 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Camarata, 828 F.2d 974 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1036, 98 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1988); United States v. Davis, 828 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1036, 98 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1988); United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Veatch, 792 F.2d 48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 407, 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986); United States v. Ross, 503 F.2d 940 (5th Cir.1974). In all of these cases, the defendant at least had fair notice of the terms of probation which could result in revocation. Indeed, since revocation of probation may result in loss of liberty, the Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be accorded due process. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); United States v. Dodson, 25 F.3d 385, 388 (6th Cir.1994). Due process requires, among other things, notice or fair warning of what conduct might result in revocation. United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Grant, 816 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1977). Here, Twitty had no fair warning that her December 1992 conduct could result in a violation of the terms of her probation because those terms had not yet been imposed. When she forged her sister's endorsement on the checks in December 1992, she knew that her appearance bond could indeed be revoked for criminal conduct. But she did not know that she could receive nine months imprisonment for a probation violation. She has not been accorded due process.

The only case holding that probation is revocable for presentence conduct is United States v. James, 848 F.2d 160 (11th Cir.1988). In construing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3653, a predecessor of the currently applicable 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565, the Eleventh Circuit, in finding that presentence conduct can be the basis for probation revocation, reasoned that "[a] return to illegal activity prior to sentencing is just as contemptible as a return to illegal activity prior to the beginning of the probationary term." 848 F.2d at 162...