U.S. v. Valle
| Citation | 538 F.3d 341 |
| Decision Date | 30 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-50869.,07-50869. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Santiago Efrain VALLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Mark Randolph Stelmach (argued), Asst. U.S. Attys., San Antonio, TX, for U.S.
M. Carolyn Fuentes (argued), Henry Joseph Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Def., San Antonio, TX, for Valle.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
Santiago Valle was convicted of bribery and extortion. He appeals his convictions. We affirm.
On September 13, 2006, Valle was indicted on one count of bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C), and one count of extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 872. He was tried by a jury. The evidence at trial showed that Valle was employed as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, assigned as a classification officer to the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") El Paso Processing Center, an immigration holding and processing detention facility. Detained aliens were brought to the center by various agencies that provided the alien registration file for each detainee. The alien registration file contained initial reports, such as an arrest form, notice to appear, and an I-213, which is the record-of-deportable-alien form. When turned over to the facility, a processing officer reviewed each file and determined the alien's classification within the center, depending upon his criminal history. After processing, the alien registration files were sent to the deportation section to begin removal proceedings, and a detention file was created. Valle's duty as a classification officer was to review each detainee's detention file to confirm that he was properly classified. He also had access to the alien's registration file held at the deportation section. If officials became aware of new criminal charges against a detainee that were not known when the alien was initially processed, they would contact officials of the agency that issued the warrant to determine if they wanted the alien extradited to them.
In addition to his duties as a classification officer, Valle was assigned to collect intelligence. After reviewing the aliens' I-213 forms, he had the authority to interview detainees to obtain information about alien smuggling, contraband in the facility, or anything else that would benefit the DHS or any other agency. After gathering intelligence, Valle often generated reports and provided them to the appropriate authorities. His collateral duty to collect intelligence gave him additional authority to review alien registration files that had been sent to the deportation section.
During Valle's employment, he met with Francisco Gutierrez-Avila ("Gutierrez"), a Mexican national, who was in custody at the facility. On the night that Gutierrez was taken into custody, he had been driving in a separate car behind his daughter who was driving a vehicle that Gutierrez owned. Both cars were stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint, and the officers determined that some of the occupants of the car that Gutierrez's daughter had been driving were illegal aliens. Gutierrez was detained for traveling outside the parameters authorized by his visa.
During his first meeting with Gutierrez, Valle asked him if he knew Mario or Mauricio Romero, from whom Gutierrez had borrowed money for his business. Valle told Gutierrez that he was a former brother-in-law of the Romeros, and either Mario or Mauricio Romero had asked him what could be done to help Gutierrez. During their second meeting, Valle told Gutierrez that he had removed criminal charges against Gutierrez and that Gutierrez owed him $20,000 for that action. Unaware that there had been any criminal charges against him, Gutierrez spoke to his attorney about the alleged criminal charges and Valle's demand. After the second meeting, Valle began pressuring Gutierrez for the money. Meanwhile, because he had disclosed Valle's request for payment to his attorney, Gutierrez was taken to a different facility where he met with federal agents. An agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") later posed as Gutierrez's brother-in-law and gave Valle $20,000. During recorded conversations with the undercover agent, Valle told him that the money was for taking away criminal charges against Gutierrez.
Gutierrez's I-213 showed that he was suspected of involvement in alien smuggling. However, the I-213 noted that an Assistant U.S. Attorney had been contacted about Valle, and the prosecutor had declined prosecution of Valle for alien smuggling. Furthermore, Immigration and Customs Enforcement had declined to interview or prosecute him.
Valle claimed that the $20,000 was for a business debt that Gutierrez owed to Mario Romero. During cross-examination of Gutierrez, defense counsel showed him an alleged promissory note, and Gutierrez acknowledged that his signature was on the note. The document was not offered into evidence.
At the close of the government's case, Valle moved for a judgment of acquittal. He asserted specific grounds for acquittal of the bribery count, arguing that there was no evidence that Valle would personally receive anything from the deal and that the government failed to show that there were ever criminal charges against Gutierrez. Valle renewed his objection for the same reasons at the close of all evidence. Both motions were denied.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note that read: "We need the following evidence, promissory note for $20,000 dated February the 4th." The district court gave a supplemental instruction to the jury: Valle objected to the second sentence of the instruction, which was overruled. He also requested additional instructions, which were denied.
The jury convicted Valle of both counts. He appeals his convictions, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to receive something of value in exchange for an official act, and that the jury instruction regarding the alleged promissory note shifted the burden of proof to Valle and deprived him of a fair trial.
(1) Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review de novo denials of properly-made Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motions for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.2003). In conducting our review to determine if there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, the "relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
However, Valle's sufficiency of the evidence claim necessarily involves interpreting the meaning of the bribery statute, and we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir.2004).
The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. When construing a criminal statute, we must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language. Terms not defined in the statute are interpreted according to their ordinary and natural meaning ... as well as the overall policies and objectives of the statute.
Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
The language of the bribery statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C), provides:
[w]hoever ... being a public official ... directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for ... being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person.
In interpreting this statute, this appeal centers on whether an official must intend to commit the violation of his official duty to be convicted under the statute.
(2) Analysis
We first look to the plain language of the statute for guidance. For a conviction, § 201(b)(2)(C), in relevant part, requires that the official "corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value ... in return for ... being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of [his] official duty." By its terms, the statute does not require that the official actually commit the violation of his official duty; it only requires that he demand or agree to accept something of value in return for "being induced" to commit the violation. The statute also clearly requires that the official's demand be "corrupt." Nonetheless, the plain language leaves ambiguity as to whether "being induced" requires that the official intend to commit the violation of his duty when he corruptly demands something of value in return for being induced, or whether it is sufficient that he corruptly demanded the payment while knowing that it was for the purpose of inducing him to violate his duty.
A statute is ambiguous if it is "susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation or more than one accepted meaning." Kay, 359 F.3d at 743 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). "If, after application of these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, we may turn to legislative history." Id. Because the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation regarding this issue, we turn to its legislative history.
Before 1962, §§ 201-13, relating to bribery and graft, each applied to different categories of persons. S.REP. No. 87-2213, at 7 (1962), as reprinted in ...
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