U.S. v. Van Hawkins, s. 88-5338

Citation899 F.2d 852
Decision Date27 March 1990
Docket Number89-50037,Nos. 88-5338,s. 88-5338
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daryl VAN HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andre Pierre BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Elizabeth A. Barranco, Lakeside, Cal., for defendant-appellant Van Hawkins.

Robert J. Waters, Nasatir & Hirsch, Santa Monica, Cal., for defendant-appellant Brown.

Amalia L. Meza, Asst. U.S. Atty., argued; Amalia L. Meza and Judith S. Feigin, Asst. U.S. Attys. on the briefs; San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before TANG, HALL and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.

TANG, Circuit Judge:

Andre Brown and Daryl Hawkins appeal their jury convictions of a number of cocaine related offenses. We affirm.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

In April 1988, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Brown and Hawkins with conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute, distribution of cocaine base, and possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 and 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2.

On August 9, 1988, Brown and Hawkins moved to strike the term "cocaine base" from the indictment as unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected that motion. Later, a jury convicted Brown and Hawkins on all counts. Brown and Hawkins filed timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

Brown and Hawkins contend that both 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) are unconstitutionally vague because neither these sections (which penalize the trafficking of cocaine base) nor Schedule II (the listing of controlled substances) defines "cocaine base." 1 We disagree.

We review de novo a challenge that a statute is unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Stansell, 847 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.1988).

Analysis under the void-for-vagueness doctrine involves examining a penal statute We reject Brown and Hawkins' vagueness challenge because their challenge fails to satisfy either prong of the vagueness test. On the first prong, the statute, as Brown and Hawkins concede, makes clear that trafficking any form of cocaine will result in punishment. Thus, an ordinary person should understand that trafficking a cocaine related derivative such as "cocaine base" 2 will result in punishment.

                under two prongs.  First, the statute must " 'define the criminal offense with sufficient definitiveness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited' " Id. at 615 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).  Second, the statute must " 'establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' "    Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974))
                

On the second prong, the District of Columbia Circuit recently held that the term "cocaine base" does establish sufficient guidelines for law enforcement. United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 975-76 (D.C.Cir.1988). The Brown court reasoned that the term "cocaine base" excludes some forms of cocaine (cocaine salts) and therefore performs some limiting function. Id.

We adopt the rationale of the Brown decision for this circuit. The record in this case supports the Brown court's conclusion that the term "cocaine base" does establish minimum guidelines for law enforcement. The government offered expert testimony that the term "cocaine base" excludes cocaine hydrochloride, which is a cocaine salt. This testimony indicates that the term "cocaine base" is not a catch-all term, but instead a term with scientific meaning which (1) establishes sufficient guidelines for law enforcement and (2) does not allow law enforcement to act with unfettered discretion.

Moreover, when a vagueness challenge is not based on First Amendment freedoms, the challenge must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand. See United...

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