U.S.A v. Vasquez

Decision Date01 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-2411.,09-2411.
Citation611 F.3d 325
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Isaac VASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Jennifer J. Clark (argued), Department of Justice Office of the Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gabriel B. Plotkin (argued), Attorney, Miller, Shakman & Beem, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BAUER, MANION and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Isaac Vasquez appeals his conviction for knowingly failing to register as a sex offender after traveling in interstate commerce, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 1998, Isaac Vasquez pleaded guilty to Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault, Victim Under the Age of 13 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). This conviction required him to register as a sex offender under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act.

After initially registering under the Illinois law, he moved within Chicago but failed to report this change of address as required under Illinois law. After being charged, Vasquez pleaded guilty to Failure to Report a Change of Address and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. Thereafter, Vasquez signed a notification form acknowledging that he had been advised of his duty to register as a sex offender under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act, that he understood this duty, and that his failure to register would constitute a criminal offense under Illinois law.

After being released on parole on March 15, 2005, Vasquez disappeared from where he was placed by Illinois authorities and never returned to the parole office or any other Illinois law enforcement agency as required by the conditions of his parole. On or about March 17, 2005, Illinois issued a warrant for his arrest.

On April 11, 2007, Vasquez was present in Illinois. On July 3, 2007, Vasquez was found in Los Angeles County, California, where he was taken into custody by the United States Marshals Service. After his release from IDOC custody on parole and until the time of his arrest in Los Angeles, California on July 3, 2007, Vasquez failed to register as a sex offender in Illinois, California, or any other state.

Thereafter, Vasquez was indicted for knowingly failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA. After the district court denied Vasquez's motion to dismiss the indictment, the case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. Vasquez stipulated that his prior sex conviction required him to register under SORNA. After denying Vasquez's motion for acquittal, the district court convicted and sentenced him to a prison term of twenty-seven months, a supervised release term of three years, and a $100 special assessment. Vasquez timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Congress enacted SORNA in 2006, which imposes a registration requirement on sex offenders, 42 U.S.C. § 16913, and a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the registration requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). A “sex offender” is defined as any individual who is convicted of a sex offense under either state or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). Pursuant to SORNA, [a] sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). A sex offender must update his registration within three business days of a “change of name, residence, employment, or student status.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). A sex offender who does not comply with SORNA's obligations faces criminal punishment: “Whoever ... is required to register under the [Act]; who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce”; and “knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by the [Act]; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).

On appeal, Vasquez does not dispute that more than three days had elapsed from the date he had most recently changed his address, requiring him to re-register. Further, Vasquez is not arguing a lack of notice of the statute United States v. Dixon made clear that SORNA does not violate due process of law, even when there is no personal notice of the enactment or its requirements. 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir.2008) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Carr v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). Finally, Vasquez cannot contend that he traveled in interstate commerce prior to SORNA's effective date. See Carr, ---U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152. But Vasquez contends that his conviction should be reversed because the government presented no evidence that he “knowingly” violated SORNA when he failed to register. In addition, Vasquez challenges the constitutionality of SORNA and argues that it violates the Commerce Clause because it impermissibly regulates purely local, non-economic activity and because it does not require any nexus between a defendant's travel in interstate commerce and a defendant's failure to register. We review both the denial of a judgment of acquittal and the constitutional challenges under the Commerce Clause de novo. United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Klinzing, 315 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir.2003).

A. “Knowingly” Failing to Register

Vasquez argues that SORNA requires proof that a defendant had specific knowledge that he was required to register under SORNA. Relying upon Flores-Figueroa v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), Vasquez maintains that as a matter of ordinary English grammar, the word “knowingly” in a statute applies to every subsequently listed element of the crime. In Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court held that, in order to convict a defendant of aggravated identity theft for “knowingly transfer[ring], possess[ing], or us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person,” the government must prove that defendant knew that the “means of identification” he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used did, in fact, belong to another person. 129 S.Ct. at 1893 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Vasquez asserts that the government cannot convict him, absent proof that he knew that SORNA required him to register. And Vasquez maintains that the stipulated facts contain no such proof.

This court has not previously addressed whether SORNA requires a defendant to have specific knowledge of his federal obligation to register. However, at least four of our sister circuits have faced this issue, and all have held that knowledge of the federal obligation under SORNA is not required. See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir.2009); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 262 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Baccam, 562 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (8th Cir.2009); United States v. Griffey, 589 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir.2009). Specifically, the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that he could not knowingly violate SORNA because he was not told of his specific registration obligations under the law. Baccam, 562 F.3d at 1199-1200. And the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a defendant's conviction, holding that SORNA did not require that a defendant specifically know that he was violating the statute, only that he “knowingly” violated a legal registration requirement upon relocating. Griffey, 589 F.3d at 1367.

We recently declined to extend the knowledge requirement to the age element in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits “knowingly transport[ing] an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, ... with intent that the individual engage in prostitution” United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir.2009). Cox held that despite the grammatical arguments, the most natural reading of § 2423(a) is that the adverb “knowingly” modifies only the verb “transports” and does not extend to the victim's minor status. Id. Accordingly, while the victim's age is an element of the offense (i.e., the government must prove the victim is under eighteen), the defendant need not have knowledge of the victim's age. Cox noted a departure from Flores-Figueroa is appropriate in interpreting § 2423(a) to not require knowledge of the victim's age. Cox, 577 F.3d at 838 (citing Flores-Figueroa, 129 S.Ct. at 1895-96 (Alito, J., concurring)).

Today we join the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, (and echo our reasoning in Cox ), and hold that SORNA merely requires that a defendant have knowledge that he was required by law to register as a sex offender. The government need not prove that, in addition to being required to register under state law, a defendant must also know that registration is mandated by a federal statute. In this Court's view Flores-Figueroa did not overrule the long line of cases that have defined the term “knowingly,” when used in a criminal statute, to mean “that the defendant realized what he/she was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” See Fed.Crim. Jury Inst. of the Seventh Circuit 4.06 (1999). See also Cox, 577 F.3d at 838. To that end, a defendant can be convicted under SORNA if the government can prove that he knew he was required to register as a sex offender. To the extent that SORNA's registration requirements differ from state law requirements, we need not decide today whether a defendant would be in violation of SORNA if he complied with his state law registration obligations but not his federal registration obligations, when he had not been made aware of additional obligations under the federal statute.

Here, Vasquez stipulated that he was required to register as a sex offender, had previously faced...

To continue reading

Request your trial
49 cases
  • United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • March 17, 2014
    ...of ensuring that sex offenders register and update previous registrations when moving among jurisdictions”); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir.2010) (holding that “[t]o the extent that § 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, the regulatory means chosen are reasonabl......
  • United States v. Carel, 10–1095.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • December 30, 2011
    ...with ample authority to regulate local activity as part of a general scheme regulating interstate commerce.”); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir.2010) (“[Section] 16913 is a logical way to help ensure that the government will more effectively be able to track sex offender......
  • U.S. v. Fuller, Docket No. 09-1437-cr
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • November 30, 2010
    ...to register violated federal law."); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir.2010) (same); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir.2010) (same). Fuller has failed to identify any reason why the term "knowingly," as it is used in SORNA, should not be given its ......
  • United States v. Morgan, Crim. No. 16-0196 (ESH).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • June 9, 2017
    ...commerce. United States v. Coleman , 675 F.3d 615, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Guzman , 591 F.3d at 90 ; United States v. Vasquez , 611 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) ; Ambert , 561 F.3d at 1210–11 ; 255 F.Supp.3d 235 United States v. Gould , 568 F.3d 459, 471–72 (4th Cir. 2009) ; May , 535 F.3......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT