U.S. v. Vidal-Cruz, 98-277(CCC).

• Decision Date: 01 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-297(CCC).,No. 98-287(CCC).,No. 98-280(DRD).,No. 98-289(DRD).,No. 98-283(PG).,No. 98-284(SEC).,No. 98-282(DRD).,No. 98-291(HL).,No. 98-292(CCC).,No. 98-277(CCC).,No. 98-285(PG).,No. 98-279(HL).,No. 98-290(DRD).,98-277(CCC).,98-279(HL).,98-280(DRD).,98-282(DRD).,98-283(PG).,98-284(SEC).,98-285(PG).,98-287(CCC).,98-289(DRD).,98-290(DRD).,98-291(HL).,98-292(CCC).,98-297(CCC).
• Citation: 67 F.Supp.2d 35
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Allyson VIDAL-CRUZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 35

67 F.Supp.2d 35

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Allyson VIDAL-CRUZ, et al., Defendants.

No. 98-277(CCC).

No. 98-279(HL).

No. 98-280(DRD).

No. 98-282(DRD).

No. 98-283(PG).

No. 98-284(SEC).

No. 98-285(PG).

No. 98-287(CCC).

No. 98-289(DRD).

No. 98-290(DRD).

No. 98-291(HL).

No. 98-292(CCC).

No. 98-297(CCC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 1, 1999.

Desiree Laborde-Sanfiorenzo, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for U.S. Attorneys.

Luis R. Rivera-Rodriguez, Hato Rey, PR, for Allyson Vidal-Cruz (1), defendant.

Efren T. Irizarry-Colon, Arecibo, PR, for William Rios-Torres (1), defendant.

Juan A. Pedrosa-Trapaga, San Juan, PR, for Eduardo Rivera-Pares (1), defendant.

Efren T. Irizarry-Colon, Arecibo, PR, Emilio Hidalgo-Nazario, Hatillo, PR, for John D. Navas-Rivera (1), defendant.

Carlos Noriega-Rodriguez, Hato Rey, PR, Efren T. Irizarry-Colon, Arecibo, PR, for Luis G. Alfonzo-Delgado (1), defendant.

Marlene Aponte-Cabrera, San Juan, PR, for Miguel A. Torres-Rivera (2), defendant.

Juan A. Pedrosa-Trapaga, San Juan, PR, for Rafael Franco-Rodriguez (1), defendant.

Manuel San-Juan-DeMartino, San Juan, PR, for Angel G. Lopez-Rivera (2), defendant.

Francisco M. Dolz-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Jose Maldonado-Montalvo (1), defendant.

Ivan Dominguez-Perez, El Monte Mall, Hato Rey, PR, for Carlos A. Rivera-Rodriguez (2), defendant.

Luis R. Rivera-Rodriguez, Hato Rey, PR, for Felix R. Mendoza-Benitez (1), defendant.

Rafael F. Castro-Lang, San Juan, PR, for Edwin Otero-Vazquez (2), defendant.

Victor M. Agrait-Defillo, Carolina, PR, for Rafael Hernandez-Dones (1), defendant.

Maria del Mar Davila-Rexach, San Juan, PR, for Jose A. Roman-Ramos (1), defendant.

Luis F. Abreu-Elias, Hato Rey, PR, Maria H. Sandoval, Santurce, PR, for Osvaldo R. Fuentes-Torres, defendant.

Francisco M. Dolz-Sanchez, San Juan, PR, for Wilfredo Picon-Rivera, defendant.

Jose F. Quetglas, San Juan, PR, for Julio A. Lopez-Garcia (2), defendant.

Benjamin Ortiz-Belaval, Hato Rey, PR, Efren T. Irizarry-Colon, Arecibo, PR, for Jose Antonio Lopez-Caceres (1), defendant.

Benjamin Ortiz-Belaval, Hato Rey, PR, for Neftali Velez-Ramos (2), defendant.

Efren T. Irizarry-Colon, Arecibo, PR, for Victor R. Gonzalez-Alvarez (1), defendant.

Carlos Noriega-Rodriguez, Hato Rey, PR, for Efrain Ramos-Rosario (2), defendant.

Marlene Aponte-Cabrera, San Juan, PR, for Miguel A. Torres-Rivera (4), defendant.

Before LAFFITTE, Chief Judge, PEREZ-GIMENEZ, CEREZO, CASELLAS, and DOMINGUEZ, District Court Judges.

OPINION & ORDER

LAFFITTE, Chief Judge.

Defendants in the above captioned cases are charged with delivery or conspiracy to deliver adulterated milk in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA").¹ 18 U.S.C. § 871, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2). Federal jurisdiction is premised upon interstate commerce as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(b). Specifically, defendants are charged with delivering into interstate commerce milk adulterated through the addition of water and salt, as defined in 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f) and 342(b)(4), and delivered in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a). Before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment for want of federal criminal subject matter jurisdiction, and the government's opposition to those motions. For purposes of judicial economy, a joint hearing was held on August 18, 1999, to address the jurisdictional issue.²

DISCUSSION

The government proposes three arguments in support of federal jurisdiction over this matter: 1) a presumption of jurisdiction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 379(a); 2) that the addition of an ingredient that had been shipped in interstate commerce is sufficient to render intrastate sales of the ultimate product subject to federal jurisdiction; and 3) that defendants delivered adulterated goods to a purchaser with the knowledge that the goods would subsequently be introduced into interstate commerce. For the following reasons, the Court finds federal jurisdiction over the present actions.

I. Background: The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, post United States v. Lopez

Defendants are charged with violations of section 331(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which prohibits, "[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded." 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). As with any statute concerning the regulation of interstate commerce, Congress enacted this statute pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States' Constitution, which states that, "Congress shall have the Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 8. Defendants initially contend that there is no jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause because the government has failed to allege a genuine, legitimate federal interest. Defendants rely on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), which the Court now considers, in turn addressing both the case law before and after Lopez.

During the first half of the present century, the Supreme Court of the United States took an expansive view of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). As to the latter half of the century, this trend continued, and although it faced occasional obstacles, no significant constraints were placed upon Congress' Commerce Clause powers. See García v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), reh'g denied 471 U.S. 1049, 105 S.Ct. 2041, 85 L.Ed.2d 340, cert. denied 488 U.S. 889, 109 S.Ct. 221, 102 L.Ed.2d 212, overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). This tendency to approve any regulation promulgated under the Commerce Clause faced a sudden and abrupt stop with the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional and striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp.1996), which prohibited any unauthorized individual from possessing a gun while on the premises of a school area).

In an attempt to draw boundaries around Commerce Clause related legislation, the Lopez Court determined that,

"there are three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."

Id. at 558-559, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (citations omitted).

However, the "substantially affecting commerce" requirement in no way alters the burden of proof that the government must carry on a jurisdictional factor within the criminal litigation context, but rather "the extent to which purely intrastate activities must impact interstate commerce before Congress may legislate under the Commerce Clause." United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Therefore,

it remains the law that where a federal criminal statute contains a jurisdictional element requiring proof that an object was "in or affecting" commerce, the government need only meet the "minimal nexus" test enunciated in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977). [United States v.] Blais, 98 F.3d 647, 649 (1st Cir.1996) ("Scarborough is still good law after Lopez."), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1134, 117 S.Ct. 1000, 136 L.Ed.2d 879 (1997).

Id. See also United States v. Díaz Martínez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir.1995).

The FDCA clearly contains the so-called "jurisdictional element," by specifying in multiple occasions the interstate commerce requirement. Furthermore, "[t]he López Court ... made it perfectly clear that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could regulate, inter alia, those activities which have a consequential effect on, or which bear a meaningful relation to, interstate commerce." United States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). In the present case, it is clear that there is more than a minimal nexus between the regulation of milk and the concomitant prohibition on adulterated milk that is shipped in interstate commerce.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the FDCA, "rests upon the constitutional power resident in Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3. To the end that the public health and safety might be advanced it seeks to keep interstate channels free from deleterious, adulterated and misbranded articles of the specified types." United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 434, 67 S.Ct. 1283, 91 L.Ed. 1585 (1947). Consequently, this Court finds that the federal interest in protecting milk consumers by regulating the sale of adulterated milk entering interstate commerce is significant and sufficient to allege a legitimate federal interest.³

II. Presumption of Jurisdiction: 21 U.S.C. § 379(a)

In support of their argument for federal jurisdiction, the government first cites 21 U.S.C. § 379(a); P.L. 105-220, amended on November 21, 1997, and effective 90 days thereafter, which provides that "the connection with interstate commerce required for jurisdiction in such action shall be presumed to exist."⁴ However,...