U.S. v. Vinson

• Decision Date: 28 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-10005,94-10005
• Citation: 39 F.3d 1190
• Parties: NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo Raynard VINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1190

39 F.3d 1190

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo Raynard VINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-10005.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 5, 1994.

Decided Oct. 28, 1994.

Before: GOODWIN, O'SCANNLAIN and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^*

We are asked to determine whether the district court coercively interposed itself between the jurors and their deliberations, prejudicing the defense. We conclude that it did, and we reverse. ¹

Facts

Appellant Angelo Raynard Vinson was charged with a single count of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2114, armed postal robbery. Vinson's defense was alibi. The dispositive issue on appeal concerns the conduct of the district judge after the jury had retired for its deliberations, and we focus our discussion accordingly.

After three days of testimony and argument, and a four day recess, the court instructed the jury and it retired about 2:00 p.m., to deliberate. After about three hours of deliberation, the jury indicated to the marshal that they had not yet reached a verdict. They gave no indication that they were deadlocked. While the record is silent on the purpose of the contact with the marshal, the inference is that they were curious whether they were to keep working, go home, or plan on eating supper as a group.

The district judge learned that the jury had a question and told counsel that he would recall the jurors and ask the foreperson whether they were on the verge of reaching a verdict. If they were not, he would excuse them until the next morning:

THE COURT: What I propose to do is call the jury in, remind the foreperson about the instruction about communicating in writing, and then I propose to ask him if they deliberated a little longer, that we could save a day and see what the response is from the foreperson; and if it appears that there's no likelihood of reaching a verdict before 6:00 or 6:30, I propose to excuse the jurors until 9:30, tomorrow morning.... That in general is what I propose to do.

Instead of following the stated plan, the judge began polling the jurors, over defense counsel's repeated objection, to determine whether any among them would find it "helpful" to have the court reread selected excerpts from the jury charge. He reread the instruction on reasonable doubt, reminding the jurors that the standard of proof doesn't "requir[e] you to take leave of your common sense." He reread portions of the instruction on the duty to deliberate. Then he said: "the main issue is the identity of the defendant," and began to repeat the instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The following colloquy next occurred in the presence of the jury:

THE COURT: Now, I'd like to assist the jurors in this discussion with an illustration of direct and circumstantial evidence. Does anyone object to that?

MR. MARTINEZ: As it applies to this? Yes.

THE COURT: Why do you object?

MR. MARTINEZ: The jury has not requested that.

THE COURT: Would it be helpful to you if I give you an illustration in this case as to what's direct or what's indirect? You can answer yes or no.

A JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: The juror nods yes. Do you still--do you want to keep from this jury a clear illustration of what is direct and indirect evidence in this case? You don't want the jury to know that?

MR. MARTINEZ: I would object to the entire procedure of questioning the jury.

THE COURT: What's your authority for that? Show me one case in which it's improper for a judge to try to help the jury to understand the instructions and to reach a fair decision. Show me what's--

MR. MARTINEZ: I would like to be heard at side bar.

(At side bar)

MR. MARTINEZ: What I want to say is that I believe that in an attempt to assist the jury, the court is inadvertently influencing or may influence the jury adversely against my client by several things. One--

THE COURT: By what?

MR. MARTINEZ: By picking and choosing different instructions and asking the jury if they want those instructions read over and suggesting that specific instructions be read. Your honor is picking and choosing separate instruction.

THE COURT: All right, counsel, are you finished?

MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: What's your authority for that? Do you have any authority?

MR. MARTINEZ: The right of Mr. Vinson to be tried by a jury without influence.

....

(Before the jury)

MR. MARTINEZ: I would ask the court to refrain from asking the jury questions in the absence of questions from the jurors that they need assistance in any specific regard.

THE COURT: Well, I'll say to you, counsel, in all friendliness, I regard the duty of this court to do everything it can to help the jurors to follow the law.

The judge next offered an illustration of circumstantial evidence, which the jurors had not requested and which was a surprise to both counsel. We express no opinion on the quality of the illustration, but note that it was wholly uncalled for at the time it was given.

The judge next instructed the jurors to return to the jury room, saying that he would like them to return a verdict within the hour, but they were not obligated to. He added, "[t]here is no reason to believe that another jury can do a better job than you can. So, go ahead."

At 6:30 P.M., the judge called the jurors a second time to the courtroom. The judge asked whether "another 15 or 20 minutes will result in a verdict." The foreman said "no," and this remarkable lecture from the bench followed:

THE COURT: Now, I'm not concerned as to which way the jury decides they have reached a verdict, but I see no reason for not reaching a verdict. The evidence in this case was quite complete, well presented and I'm distressed that this jury has not been able to reach a verdict on the evidence in this case. I'm about to excuse you for the day. But I'm going to ask you to review the evidence, consider the views of your fellow jurors, and don't give up any conviction of your own and don't just be stubborn. When you're in the jury room, I want you to discuss the case. It's been a long hard day for the jurors, the attorneys and, as a matter of fact, the court.... Perhaps a good night's sleep will enable you to reach a decision. It doesn't seem to me that the evidence in this case--it's up to you to decide, of course--is all that complicated. It seems to me that on the instructions I have given you, you ought to be able to reach a verdict, a proper verdict, for one side or the other. It's difficult for me to understand why you haven't. I'm not expressing a view as to what your verdict ought to be, one side or the other.

The jurors were at last sent home for the day. They reconvened to deliberate at 9:30 A.M. the next morning. The record does not reveal how long the jury deliberated that morning, but at 10:15 A.M., the attorneys were notified that the jury was ready to deliver its...