U.S. v. Voice
Decision Date | 17 April 2009 |
Docket Number | No. CR. 08-30101-01-KES.,CR. 08-30101-01-KES. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Harold George VOICE, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Jay P. Miller, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pierre, SD, Jeremy R. Jehangiri, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rapid City, SD, for Plaintiff.
Edward G. Albright, Federal Public Defender's Office, Pierre, SD, for Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
Defendant, Harold George Voice, is charged with one court of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Docket 1. Voice moves to dismiss the indictment filed against him based upon the fact that the Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act (SORNA) is unconstitutional in several respects.
The court referred the motion to dismiss the indictment to the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recommends that this court deny Voice's motion to dismiss the indictment in all respects. Voice objects to several legal conclusions in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The government has not responded to Voice's objections.
The court must make a de novo review "of those portions of the [Magistrate's] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599 (8th Cir.2003); Jones v. Pillow, 47 F.3d 251, 253 (8th Cir.1995). 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires that when a party objects to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge concerning a dispositive matter, "[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). After a de novo review of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and a review of the record, the court adopts the report and recommendation as supplemented below.
The magistrate judge found that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution.
The magistrate judge found that SORNA works prospectively because it creates a new punishment for a new offense, which is failing to register as a sex offender after July 27, 2006. Voice objects to this finding, arguing that applying SORNA to him imposes punishment for an act that was not punishable at the time it was committed.
Voice is charged with failing to register between August 5, 2008, and October 2, 2008. This time period is after SORNA's effective date and after the Attorney General's regulations were promulgated clarifying SORNA's applicability to previously convicted sex offenders. Under similar circumstances, in United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir.2008), the Eighth Circuit determined that SORNA works prospectively and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Pursuant to this precedent, the court finds that SORNA applies prospectively and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The magistrate judge further determined that SORNA did not retroactively increase Voice's punishment. Voice objects to this finding, contending that SORNA imposes additional punishment to the punishment he received when he was initially convicted of the sex offense in 1998. Voice argues that at the time of his 1998 underlying conviction, he was subject to a Class I misdemeanor penalty for failure to register pursuant to the Jacob Wetterling Act. SORNA increases that penalty to a federal felony that carries up to ten years in prison. Voice urges that this difference in penalties distinguishes his case from the May case.
In May, the Eighth Circuit did not need to address whether SORNA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it subjected a defendant to higher penalties than the statutory scheme in place at the time the defendant committed the initial sex offense, because as a repeat offender, May was already subject to a ten-year statutory maximum under the Lychen Act. Id. at 920, n. 4.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008), however, did reach this issue and found that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Defendant had argued that the only laws in effect at the time of his offense were state statutes and the Jacob Wetterling Act, which carried lesser penalties than SORNA. In rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit adopted the rationale of May that SORNA is a civil retroactive registration scheme that relies on criminal penalties to further its civil intent and does not increase the punishment for acts committed prior to SORNA's effective date. Id. at 938. Therefore, based upon the Eighth Circuit's rationale in May and the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hinckley, the court finds that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not increase the punishment of Voice for acts committed prior to SORNA's effective date.
The magistrate judge concluded that SORNA is a civil and non-punitive regulatory scheme. Voice objects to this finding, arguing that SORNA is a punitive statute based, in part, on the fact that it provides penalties for failure to comply with it. The Eighth Circuit has determined that SORNA is regulatory, not punitive, and as a result it does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. May, 535 F.3d at 919-920. Accordingly, Eighth Circuit precedent requires this court to find that SORNA is not punitive in nature and thus does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The magistrate judge also found that SORNA does not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
The magistrate judge determined that Voice could comply with SORNA even if the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe has not implemented SORNA. Voice objects to this finding, contending that the Attorney General guideline should not be applicable to the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, which has no sex offender registry program in existence. Additionally, Voice argues that Crow Creek Sioux Tribe's failure to implement SORNA excuses his alleged illegal activity. In sum, Voice emphasizes that because the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe does not have a sex offender registration program, he could not register with the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe in compliance with SORNA. Voice also points out that South Dakota has not adopted SORNA.
The parties have not cited controlling authority that directly addresses this issue. But, as indicated in the magistrate judge's opinion, there is a plethora of recent persuasive authority indicating that the failure of a state to implement or update its registration in accordance with SORNA does not relieve the sex offender of his duty to register all information that is required by then existing state law. See, e.g., Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 939 ( ); United States v. Shenandoah, 572 F.Supp.2d 566, 578 (M.D.Pa.2008) ( ); United States v. Contreras, 2008 WL 5272491, at *6 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 18, 2008) ( ); United States v. Benton, 2008 WL 5273971, at *6 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 16, 2008) ( ); and United States v. Senogles, 570 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1157-58 (D.Minn. 2008) ( ). As a result, it is irrelevant whether South Dakota has completely complied with the SORNA registry requirements. Sex offenders residing within the jurisdiction of South Dakota must register with the state.
Likewise, courts have also determined that even if an Indian tribe fails to implement a sexual offender registry pursuant to SORNA, a sex offender still has an independent duty to register with the state. See United States v. Begay, 2009 WL 465026, at *2 (D.Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009) ( ) and United States v. Watchman, 2009 WL 464995, at *2 (D.Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009) (same). Those courts reasoned that Congress has authority to implement federal criminal statutes of general applicability on tribal lands and that Congress intended SORNA to apply to tribal lands because SORNA violations can occur if a defendant enters, leaves, or resides in "Indian country." Id. at *2. SORNA requires sex offenders to register "in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student." Id. at *3. These courts construed the phrase "each jurisdiction where the offender resides" broadly, finding that it requires a sex offender not only to register on the reservation but also to register with the state in which the reservation is located. These courts broadly interpreted the phrase because "[t]o read the statute more narrowly would mean that offenders residing on or moving to reservations that had opted into SORNA but had not yet...
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