U.S. v. Walker, 89-5483

Decision Date04 March 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-5483,89-5483
Citation927 F.2d 389
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Thomas Richard WALKER, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Alvin E. Entin, Miami, Fla., for appellant.

Henry J. Shea, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Richard Walker appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court 1 for the District of Minnesota, denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 (1988). After appellant entered into a plea agreement, the district court sentenced him to a term of three years incarceration and a special assessment of $50.00. For reversal, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because, although the appellant had performed his obligations under the plea agreement, the government had breached its obligation under the agreement.

On January 13, 1988, a federal grand jury in Minnesota indicted appellant for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Shortly after the indictment, appellant and the government began plea negotiations. After the agreement, appellant entered a guilty plea to the conspiracy charge in exchange for his being sentenced by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The agreement further provided The government will provide the United States Probation office the facts relating to the defendant's involvement in the offense charged in the Indictment. The prosecution version of the offense will be limited to the allegations in the Indictment.

When the Minnesota probation office prepared the presentence investigatory report (PSI), however, it included information not relating to the indictment. No one disputes the fact that the inclusion of this information violated the plea agreement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida refused to disregard this information and gave appellant the option of either being sentenced in Florida with the detrimental information considered, or of withdrawing his guilty plea and returning to Minnesota. Appellant withdrew his plea and returned to Minnesota.

Appellant filed a motion with the district court in Minnesota to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the government had breached the plea agreement. Although the district court denied the motion, it found that the district judge had unconditionally accepted the plea agreement and that there was no breach of the plea agreement by appellant. The district court decided that appellant was entitled to limited relief in order to prevent the government from obtaining a benefit at his expense. The district court determined that appellant was entitled to specific performance of the original plea agreement, with the exception of the provision for his being sentenced by the Southern District of Florida. Additionally, the district court instructed the Probation Office to use a PSI report that limited its information to the charge in the indictment. In the alternative, the district court offered appellant the option of proceeding to trial.

Appellant then entered into another plea agreement that complied with the district court's order. The agreement allowed appellant to enter a conditional guilty plea with leave to pursue this appeal. A second PSI was prepared. Appellant was found guilty in accordance with his plea, and sentenced to a term of three years incarceration and a special assessment of $50.00.

The issues addressed in this case are whether the government breached the original plea agreement, and whether the Minnesota district court abused its discretion in allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea or in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.

BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT

Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or nolo contendere. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(1). Once a plea agreement has been reached between the defendant and the prosecution, the court may accept, reject or defer its decision until consideration of the PSI. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2). Whatever benefits the parties intend to reap as a result of this agreement are contingent entirely upon the approval of the trial court.

Surely neither party contemplates any benefit from the agreement unless and until the trial judge approves the bargain and accepts the guilty plea. Neither party is justified in relying substantially on the bargain until the trial court approves it. We are therefore reluctant to bind them to the agreement until that time. As a general rule, then, we think that either party should be entitled to modify its position and even withdraw its consent to the bargain until the plea is tendered and the bargain as it then exists is accepted by the court.

United States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 744 (8th Cir.1987) (McGovern ), quoting United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 2316, 68 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981).

Once the court accepts the plea agreement without qualification, it cannot later reject it. United States v. Holman, 728 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir.1984). "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d There is no dispute that Walker upheld his obligations under the agreement. Walker argues that the government breached the agreement when the Florida Probation Office included information in the PSI report that was beyond the scope of the indictment. The government argues that it did not breach the agreement because the Florida district court judge ordered the Florida Probation Office to provide him with a complete...

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10 cases
  • U.S. v. Allen, CR 94-4030-MWB.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • October 8, 1997
    ...remand for specific performance and withdrawal of the guilty plea. Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 354-55 (citing United States v. Walker, 927 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1991)). Although the court noted that the decision as to which to grant rests in the sound discretion of the court, Margalli-Olve......
  • United States v. Vandebrake
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 27, 2012
    ...agreement “cured any prejudice possible” from the district court's rejection of the first agreement); see also United States v. Walker, 927 F.2d 389, 390–91 (8th Cir.1991) (addressing the merits of a claim involving a rejected plea agreement but only because the defendant's second plea agre......
  • U.S. v. Norris, 04-2073.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 23, 2007
    ...v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir.1980)); see also United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 753 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Walker, 927 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir.1991) ("Whatever benefits the parties intend to reap as a result of this [plea] agreement are contingent entirely upon the ap......
  • Margalli-Olvera v. I.N.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • February 9, 1995
    ...for the government's breach of a plea agreement: remand for specific performance and withdrawal of the guilty plea. United States v. Walker, 927 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1991). The decision as to which to grant rests in the sound discretion of the court. United States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 73......
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