U.S. v. Walker

Decision Date11 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 01-3727.,01-3727.
Citation324 F.3d 1032
PartiesUNITED STATES of America Appellee, v. Luwana Latrice WALKER, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Jordan S. Kushner, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Jeffrey S. Paulsen, argued, AUSA, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.

Before LOKEN,1 BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Luwana Latrice Walker was named in the first two counts of a twenty-three count indictment against twelve defendants. She was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute 1.1 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Walker moved to suppress the 1.1 kilograms of cocaine seized from an Express Mail package arguing the postal inspector lacked probable cause to inspect the package. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress. The district court2 adopted the recommendation and denied the motion. After a jury trial, Walker was convicted on both counts. She filed a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. At Walker's sentencing, the district court denied the motion and sentenced Walker to 151 months in prison and five years supervised release. On appeal, Walker contends: (1) the postal inspector lacked probable cause to detain the package and subject it to a canine sniff; (2) the court should have suppressed the items seized from her apartment because the warrant was overbroad and not supported by probable cause; (3) she was denied effective assistance of counsel regarding her plea options; and (4) her sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

I. Facts

Walker was affiliated with members of the Broadway Five Deuce Crips, a gang that was the subject of a long-term Drug Enforcement Administration investigation. The investigation revealed that Walker, in exchange for crack, allowed members of the gang to have packages of crack from California delivered to her St. Paul residence. The gang used Express Mail for the shipments.

A postal inspector stationed at the Los Angeles airport mail facility became suspicious of a package addressed to Tomeka Scott at Walker's address in St. Paul, Minnesota. It was later revealed that Tomeka Scott was an alias used by Walker. The package was a large U-Haul box with handwritten labels. It had been dropped off at an airport facility sixty miles from the sender's purported residence. The sender brought the package to the facility in a rental car, and paid the delivery charge in cash. Given these factors and based on his experience, the inspector placed the package in a separate bag, addressed it to United States Postal Inspector Alan Eklund in St. Paul, Minnesota, and routed it for St. Paul. The inspector in Los Angeles did not detain the package, but did alert Eklund that a package was coming to him in a special bag.

When the bag arrived in St. Paul, Eklund removed the package and inspected it. Eklund testified that in the course of his twenty-one years as a postal inspector, including nine in the narcotics division, he had seen "probably a hundred" U-Haul type boxes that contained narcotics. Eklund also testified that Los Angeles is known as drug source city where many narcotics packages originate. On this assessment, and the information provided by the Los Angeles postal inspector, Eklund requested a narcotics-sniffing canine to inspect the package. The package was placed in a room with other packages and the canine was brought into the room. The canine alerted to the package, indicating the presence of narcotics. Eklund then applied for and received a search warrant for the package. Officers opened the package and discovered cocaine in it. The officers then conducted a controlled delivery to the addressee: Tomeka Scott, 2000 West 7th Street, Apartment 209, St. Paul, Minnesota. Walker accepted the package as Tomeka Scott. A subsequent search of Walker's apartment yielded numerous pieces of false identification in her alias-Tomeka Scott.

II. The Motion to Suppress

We first address Walker's contention that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress the Express Mail package which contained the cocaine. Walker contends the postal inspector lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain and inspect the Express Mail package. "We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but review the underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving `due weight' to the inferences of the district court and law enforcement officials." United States v. Replogle, 301 F.3d 937, 938 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 725-26 (8th Cir.2001)). "The determination of whether a government agent's suspicion is constitutionally reasonable is exceedingly fact specific. We examine the totality of the circumstances arguably supporting a determination of reasonable suspicion, evaluating those circumstances as they would be `understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.'" United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

It is clear under our precedent that when Eklund moved the package to a separate room for a canine sniff, the package was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Demoss, 279 F.3d at 636-37. Having determined there was a seizure, we must decide whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the seizure. It is well established that "[l]aw enforcement authorities must possess a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a package contains contraband before they may detain the package for investigation." United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 601, 603 (8th Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Terriques, 319 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir.2003) ("A seizure will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the authorities have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a package contains contraband ...." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Demoss, 279 F.3d at 636 (holding that "seizure needed only to be supported by an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that the package contained contraband"). "Reasonable suspicion exists when `an officer possesses a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the package contains contraband', that is more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Terriques, 319 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Johnson, 171 F.3d at 603, in turn quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

The facts informing Eklund's decision to move the Express Mail package into a separate room are undisputed. The fighting issue is whether, taken together, these facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion. We believe they do. The Los Angeles postal inspector that forwarded the package to Eklund informed Eklund that the package had identifying characteristics that indicated the presence of contraband. The package was typical of those used by drug dealers for shipping drugs. The address labels were handwritten rather than pre-printed as used by most Express Mail customers. The package came from a narcotics source city. Payment for delivery of the package was made with cash. The package was delivered to the airport by an individual driving a rental vehicle. The vehicle was rented by an individual that lived 60 miles from the airmail facility. Based on this information, his own inspection of the package, and his twenty-one years as a postal inspector, including nine years as a narcotics officer, Eklund requested and scheduled a canine sniff to determine if the package contained contraband.

Our fact specific inquiry examines the totality of the circumstances that inform a law enforcement officer's determination of reasonable suspicion. See Terriques, 319 F.3d at 1056 ("In determining whether the inspector had reasonable suspicion, the court evaluates `those circumstances as they would be understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.'" (quoting Demoss, 279 F.3d at 636)). Each of the factors articulated by Inspector Ecklund, when considered alone, is consistent with innocent mail use. However, when those factors are viewed in the aggregate by a trained law enforcement officer, they give rise to the objectively reasonable suspicion needed to justify a canine sniff. See id. at 1057. See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (in determining existence of probable cause, officer may draw inferences based on experience); Terriques, 319 F.3d at 1055 (reasoning that the officers' training and experience informed their knowledge of identifying characteristics of packages containing narcotics); United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir.1997) ("Here, admittedly, any one of the factors which the postal inspector articulated may be found in innocent mailings as well as packages containing contraband. However, the confluence of all of these factors in a single package when appraised by the postal inspector, an experienced narcotics investigator, amounted to reasonable suspicion that the Express Mail package may have contained contraband and justified the investigatory detention.").

We believe in this case Eklund's appraisal of the package was wholly consistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this area. "Law enforcement officers are permitted to draw `inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.' Nevertheless, those inferences and deductions must be explained. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to explain why the officer's knowledge of particular criminal practices gives special significance to apparently innocent facts." Johnson, 171 F.3d at...

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