U.S. v. Washington

Decision Date19 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-30163.,No. 05-30285.,05-30163.,05-30285.
Citation480 F.3d 309
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Derek WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Daniels, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before SMITH, GARZA and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

OWEN, Circuit Judge:

The defendants in this case, Derek Washington and Danny Daniels, pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. In this consolidated appeal, Daniels challenges his conviction and both defendants challenge their sentences. For the reasons that follow, the conviction and sentences are affirmed.

I

Derek Washington pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The factual basis for Washington's plea established his involvement in an operation involving more than 4,000 pounds of marijuana, which were transported from Dallas to Shreveport. Washington's role was to store the marijuana at his property in Shreveport.

The sentencing proceeding took place in February of 2005, after the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker.1 Washington was sentenced to 108 month's imprisonment, the high end of the advisory federal Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) range. On appeal, Washington contends that his sentence should have been reduced under sections 5C1.2 and 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines and that his sentence is unreasonable.

A

Even after Booker, the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo and its fact findings are reviewed for clear error.2 In this case, the district court calculated Washington's sentence without awarding a 2-point reduction under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(7) and 5C1.2(a). Section 5C1.2(a) requires, among other things, that the defendant did not "possess a firearm . . . in connection with the offense" and "truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense . . . ."3 Because Washington failed to meet this latter requirement, in refusing to cooperate fully and provide information to the government, we need not address the firearm-possession requirement.

During the sentencing hearing, the government stated that Washington had refused to cooperate in its investigation of others and that Washington "never told us what role he had. He never told us whether or not he used the guns for his drug business. He never told us how much he got paid by the pound, whether it was $15 to store it or $400 a load." In response, Washington asserted that his lack of cooperation was based in part on his fear of reprisal, and he maintains on appeal that fear of reprisal justified his conduct, entitling him to the 2-point reduction.

This court has not addressed this precise issue,4 but eight other courts of appeals have considered the argument, and all have rejected it.5 As the Second Circuit noted, "The Sentencing Commission evidently contemplates that risk of injury to a defendant or his family will not excuse withholding information, because such a risk is explicitly identified as a factor to be considered in determining the extent of a cooperation departure."6 As the First Circuit stated, "Defendants often have reasons, such as loyalty to a confederate or fear of retribution, for not wanting to make full disclosure. But full disclosure is the price that Congress has attached to relief under the statute, and the burden remains on the defendant to prove his entitlement."7 For these reasons, other courts of appeals have decided against "creating a fear-of-consequences exception to the safety valve provision."8 Because Washington presents no persuasive reason for creating a fear-of-consequences exception in this case, the district court did not err in refusing to grant the 2-point reduction.

B

Washington also contends he should have received a mitigating-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because his only involvement in the conspiracy was storing the drugs. Because this issue was not raised in the district court, the plain-error rule applies.9 The district court did not err in refusing to grant the mitigating-role reduction. Washington was not charged or sentenced based on some larger conspiracy involving more drugs than he stored; he was only charged and sentenced based on the drugs stored on his property. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a mitigating-role reduction under section 3B1.2.10

C

Washington asserts his 108-month sentence is unreasonable because (1) it was imposed at the high end, as opposed to the middle, of the advisory Guidelines range; and (2) the district court relied "almost entirely on the guideline range and the quantity of drugs" and failed to consider his character and history. Following Booker, a sentence "is reviewed for `unreasonableness' with regard to the statutory sentencing factors enumerated in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)."11 A sentence imposed within a properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines range is afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.12

A district court is not required to give "a checklist recitation of the section 3553(a) factors."13 "`If the sentencing judge exercises [his or] her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, . . . we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.'"14 In this case, the record supports the inference that the district court considered the relevant factors. During the sentencing proceeding, Washington's history and characteristics were discussed, including his family life, work history, and completion of self-help programs. The nature and characteristics of the offense were also discussed. The district court noted that Washington stored over 4,300 pounds of marijuana on his property. As the district court stated, by thus participating in the conspiracy, Washington became "a very big drug dealer." Based on these facts, Washington was sentenced at the highest end of the advisory Guidelines range. Washington has presented no evidence rebutting the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to his sentence. Therefore, his sentence is affirmed.

II

Danny Daniels also pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Six weeks after he pleaded guilty, Daniels filed a motion to withdraw that plea. Daniels' motion was opposed by the government and denied by the district court, which did not hold a hearing on the matter.

The sentencing proceeding was held in February of 2005, after the Supreme Court decided Booker15 but before this court published United States v. Mares.16 In determining Daniels' sentence, the district court discussed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and decided to impose a sentence within the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. The district court made fact findings based on information in the presentence report (PSR). Daniels objected, largely because the information in the PSR was neither admitted by him nor supported by evidence submitted by the government. Daniels also objected to the district court's application of the career-offender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, arguing that his deferred adjudication was not a prior conviction. Daniels' objections were overruled.

Daniels was sentenced to imprisonment for 235 months. On appeal, Daniels challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the career-offender enhancement, the fact findings at sentencing, and the allegedly mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

A

The validity of a guilty plea is reviewed de novo.17 To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent.18 A plea is voluntary if it "`represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'"19 When determining whether a plea is voluntary, this court considers all relevant circumstances and examines whether the conditions for a valid plea have been met.20 The conditions for a valid plea require, among other things, that the defendant have notice of the charges against him, understand the constitutional protections waived, and have access to the advice of competent counsel.21 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, district courts must address defendants in open court and determine that their pleas are voluntary.22 However, the district court must not coerce the defendant into pleading guilty.23

Daniels argues that his guilty plea was involuntary, claiming he was denied access to counsel and pressured into pleading guilty. The record reveals otherwise. The district court's attentiveness led Daniels to reveal his uncertainty about pleading guilty. After learning that Daniels was uncertain about pleading guilty, the district court suggested he go to trial, offered to set a trial date, allowed Daniels to confer with counsel until counsel announced "ready," explained the benefits offered in the plea agreement, and concluded, "If you have a serious problem, we ought to stop and go to trial." After Daniels conferred with his attorney, Daniels repeatedly assured the district court that he wanted to plead guilty. When, as here, a defendant equivocates about a plea, the district court may accept the plea if, after sufficient time to consult with counsel, the defendant announces he is ready to plead guilty and his...

To continue reading

Request your trial
139 cases
  • Hernandez v. United States, CAUSE NO. SA-14-CA-644-DAE (PMA)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • December 1, 2014
    ...Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); United States v.Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). "Ordinarily a defendant will not be heard to refute his testimony given under oath when pleading guilty." United States v. ......
  • U.S. v. Oliver
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • January 6, 2011
    ...is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.”); United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that the defendant's “statements that his plea was knowing and voluntary and that he understood the rights he w......
  • United States v. Mills
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 8, 2016
    ...completed deferred adjudication admissible at punishment phase of subsequent conviction).2 See, e.g., United States v. Washington , 480 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding a deferred adjudication is a prior conviction for purposes of § 4B1.1); United States v. Ramirez , 367 F.3d 274, 277......
  • U.S. v. Arledge
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 22, 2008
    ... ... reason why he failed to present evidence at trial that would have relieved the district court's concerns about trustworthiness, nor has he given us reason to believe that the evidence was inherently trustworthy. Finally, the district court's failure to redact the document sua sponte is not ... 553 F.3d 897 ... for clear error. United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir.2007) ...         The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids Congress from enacting a law that "`imposes a punishment ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT