U.S. v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 06 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-2386.,02-2386.
• Citation: 339 F.3d 167
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant v. Tammy WATKINS; Anissa Peoples
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 167

339 F.3d 167

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant v. Tammy WATKINS; Anissa Peoples

No. 02-2386.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued January 23, 2003.

Opinion filed: August 6, 2003.

Patrick L. Meehan, United States Attorney, Laurie Magid, Deputy U.S. Attorney for Policy and Appeals, Robert A. Zauzmer (Argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, Barbara J. Cohan, Walter S. Batty, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

David L. McColgin (Argued), Dina Chavar, Maureen K. Rowley, Defenders Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee Tammy Watkins.

Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Matthew B. Holmwood (Argued), Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee Anissa Peoples.

Before: NYGAARD, AMBRO and LOURIE^*, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge.

Tammy Watkins and Anissa Peoples were arrested while attempting to smuggle drugs into the United States. Following a violation of their rights under the Speedy Trial Act, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed all charges against them with prejudice. The Government appeals this ruling on the ground that the clear terms of the Speedy Trial Act, as construed by our Court's precedent, authorized the District Court to dismiss only those charges contained in the complaint (conspiracy to import cocaine), and not the subsequent charges for which the Defendants were indicted (importation of cocaine). We agree.¹

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2001, Watkins and Peoples were arrested at Philadelphia International Airport after arriving on a flight from Jamaica. The next day a Special Agent of the United States Customs Service, Richard J. Stingle, filed a complaint charging them with conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. The complaint stated:

That on or about 7/19/01, at Philadelphia International Airport, at Essington, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, defendants TAMMY WATKINS and ANISSA PEOPLES did knowingly and intentionally conspire, combine, confederate and agree to import more than 500 grams, that is, approximately one kilogram of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, into the United States from Jamaica, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 963.

In a box on the complaint, where the Government was to indicate the "basis of complainant's charge against the accused," was typed "see attached affidavit." That affidavit stated:

Your affiant, Richard J. Stingle, a Special Agent of the United States Customs Service, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I am a Special Agent of the United States Customs Service and have been so employed for the past 21 years. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my personal observations and investigation as well as my interviews of other participating agents and employees of the United States Customs Service.

2. On July 19, 2001, defendants Tammy Watkins and Anissa Peoples arrived at Philadelphia International Airport on USAirways flight 670 from Montego Bay, Jamaica.

3. Defendant Anissa Peoples told Customs inspectors that she was traveling with defendant Tammy Watkins. She was visibly nervous, fidgety and avoided eye contact with inspectors. When her responses to routine Customs questions were found to be wholly inconsistent with those of Watkins, both women were asked to submit to a patdown.

4. Defendant Watkins consented to a patdown, which disclosed a hard object in her groin area. She removed the object, which contained a white powder that was field-tested with positive results for cocaine. Defendant Peoples subsequently was patted down, yielding one hard object in the groin area and numerous pellets from her buttocks. These were also field tested with positive results for cocaine.

5. It was subsequently determined that both women had also swallowed numerous pellets of cocaine. Both were taken to Fitzgerald Mercy [H]ospital. At the time this affidavit is being prepared, defendant Watkins (who admitted swallowing 100 pellets of cocaine) has passed more than 110 pellets of the drug. Defendant Peoples has passed 100 pellets and medical personnel have yet to determine whether any more pellets remain in her body. At least one pellet from each defendant has been field-tested with positive results for cocaine.

6. The packet which had been carried vaginally by defendant Watkins had a gross weight of 191 grams. The packet which had been carried vaginally by defendant Peoples had a gross weight of 154 grams. Your affiant estimates that the total weight of all of the cocaine imported by Peoples and Watkins is approximately one kilogram.

7. Defendant Watkins told your affiant that she had been paid to smuggle drugs into the United States, and had traveled with Peoples, who she claims to have known since high school. Cocaine is a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance.

Defendants initially appeared before a magistrate judge on July 23, 2001, and on July 26th they waived hearings on the Government's motion for pretrial detention and were ordered held without bail pending indictment and trial. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., requires that an indictment or information be filed within thirty days from the date on which the defendant was arrested. Id. at § 3161(b). In this case, both parties agree that the Government was required to charge Defendants by indictment or information by August 20, 2001.

With Defendants' consent, the Government over the next five months moved for a series of five thirty-day continuances extending the initial thirty-day deadline, as permitted by § 3161(h)(8)(A). Each motion was approved by a magistrate judge, and each stated that Defendants had been arrested on warrants "issued pursuant to a criminal complaint charging them with conspiracy to import a controlled substance." The fifth and last of these orders was entered on December 19, 2001, making January 18, 2002, the thirtieth and final day for an indictment. The Government failed to charge either Defendant by January 18th.

On February 20, 2002, Peoples moved to dismiss with prejudice the charge against her on the ground that her Speedy Trial Act rights had been violated. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion on February 22nd, but vacated the order on February 26th after the Government moved for an opportunity to respond.

On February 27, 2002 — forty days after the Speedy Trial Act clock had expired — a grand jury returned an indictment charging both Defendants with one count of conspiracy to import more than 500 grams of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963) and one count of importation of more than 500 grams of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952).

On March 7, 2002, Peoples moved to dismiss the indictment against her with prejudice, again arguing a violation of her Speedy Trial Act rights. The Government's response conceded that the Speedy Trial Act had been violated, but requested that the charges be dismissed without prejudice. The District Court heard oral argument and issued a memorandum opinion and order on March 12, dismissing the indictment against Peoples with prejudice.

On March 14, 2002, Watkins likewise moved to dismiss the indictment against her with prejudice for the same reason. The Government this time responded that its concession of dismissal (without prejudice) was limited only to Count One (conspiracy), and argued that dismissal of Count Two (importation) was precluded by our decision in United States v. Oliver, 238 F.3d 471 (3d Cir.2001). The Government at the same time filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal with prejudice of the indictment against Peoples, and repeated its argument that under Oliver the District Court properly may dismiss only the charge contained in the complaint; i.e., conspiracy.

The District Court disagreed. In an April 19, 2002, opinion the District Court granted Watkins's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice and denied the Government's motion for reconsideration. United States v. Watkins, 200 F.Supp.2d 489 (E.D.Pa.2002). (Thus, both the conspiracy and importation counts against each Defendant had been dismissed with prejudice.) The District Court based its decision on two lines of reasoning: the "inartfulness of the complaint and the affidavit of probable cause," and the "Government's misplaced reliance on Third Circuit caselaw." Id. at 491. On the first line, the Court noted that, although the charging complaint alleged only conspiracy, the affidavit of probable cause upon which the complaint was based failed to mention or even imply the existence of a conspiracy. Had the Government drafted a complaint that was fairly based on the underlying affidavit, it would have included the importation charge from the outset. As for the second line, the Court concluded that the Government's reliance on Oliver was unavailing because in that case the dismissal of the earlier indictment was without prejudice, the later indictment contained no overlapping charges with the original complaint, and, unlike here, there was no evidence of evasion of the Speedy Trial Act deadlines. The Government appeals both dismissal rulings.²

II. CHARGES CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT

We address first the District Court's conclusion as to which charges were contained in the complaint. As noted above, the complaint filed on July 20, 2001, charged that Defendants "did knowingly and intentionally conspire ... to import... cocaine ... in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 963." But it was not until February 27, 2002 — after the Speedy Trial Act violation had occurred — that the grand jury returned an indictment formally charging each Defendant with one count of conspiracy and one count of importation. Section 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act...