U.S. v. Watson, 04-3135.

Decision Date03 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-3135.,04-3135.
Citation409 F.3d 458
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Talib D. WATSON, Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 03cr00314-01).

Robert J. Kovacev argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Stacy D. Belf.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge.

This case comes before us on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Appellant-Defendant Talib Watson challenges his criminal conviction on two grounds: First, he submits that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting cross-examination of a police officer and of a cooperating witness. Second, he submits that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding Defendant's prior bad acts when Defendant was notified of the nature of the evidence only shortly before the court commenced voir dire examination of the jury. For the reasons set forth below, this Court affirms Watson's conviction and remands the record to the District Court for re-sentencing in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker.

I. Background
A. The Stop, the Search, the Arrest, and the Questions

On June 23, 2003, Watson was driving in Northwest Washington when he was pulled over by Officer John Cox of the U.S. Park Police. Cox testified that he pulled Watson over because the windows of Watson's Cadillac Escalade were tinted excessively, in violation of District of Columbia law. Cox determined that Watson was subject to an outstanding misdemeanor warrant and arrested him. Watson had $7,675 on his person. After arresting Watson, Cox searched the Escalade, finding $1,650 in the center console. The Escalade was moved to another site, where Cox continued the search. In a side door panel, he found two firearms: a loaded KelTec 40-caliber semi-automatic handgun and a loaded Beretta 9-mm pistol. In other doors he found socks containing more KelTec and Beretta ammunition. In the back seat and map pocket he found "hideaway" (i.e., disguised) cans, one of which contained marijuana and had Watson's fingerprints on it.

Hours later, Cox took Watson out of the jail cell, whereupon, according to Cox, he allegedly gave him a "rights card" and read him his Miranda rights, to which Watson replied "yes" to all questions. No one was present at the time, and the waiver card allegedly signed by Watson was not produced at trial. According to Cox's testimony, Watson admitted to Cox that the "stuff" in the car was his. Cox did not write down Watson's statement.

Police determined that the KelTec handgun had been sold lawfully to a Russell Lane ("Lane") by a Christopher Bannock. The government interviewed Lane in August 2003. In December 2003, Lane was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of crack cocaine; in early 2004 he entered a plea agreement in which he was obligated to testify truthfully for the government in the Watson matter.

Watson was indicted for felonious possession of firearms—i.e., the KelTec and the Beretta—and ammunition, and for simple possession of marijuana.

B. Testimony of Cox

At trial, Cox testified to his observations and to his account of Watson's alleged admission of ownership of the weapons. Watson sought to suppress the fruits of Cox's search, including Watson's alleged statements, on the theory that Officer Cox lacked probable cause to stop Watson's car and that the stop was pretextual. At the suppression hearing, Watson, who is black, attempted to introduce evidence purporting to show that Cox had a propensity for stopping black drivers on window-tint charges. In 18 months, Cox allegedly stopped at least 27 black drivers for window-tint violations that culminated in drug charges. The District Court refused to allow Watson to cross-examine Cox on this particular issue, for reasons discussed further below.

At trial, Watson sought to cross-examine Cox regarding 33 cases in which he alleged that Cox had "stopped young black males for tinted windows and many of those cases also had the marijuana component to it." This, he said, suggested Cox's "bias" so as to impeach his credibility. The court expressed skepticism as to the relevance of this line of questioning. Following arguments, the court precluded that line of cross-examination, for reasons discussed further below.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor extolled Cox's impartiality.

C. Testimony of Lane & Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

At trial, Lane testified that he sold the recovered KelTec handgun to an individual known as "Q," whom Lane watched passing the firearm to Watson. Lane also testified, over Watson's objection, that he had previously sold another firearm to Watson. This second firearm was not a part of the Watson indictment and was never actually recovered from Watson.

At a status conference one week before the trial began, the Government warned that it would offer such a "cooperating witness," but would not disclose either the witness's identity or the "facts and circumstances" surrounding his testimony. The government did not give notice that the witness would be offering Rule 404(b) ("prior bad acts") evidence. Watson notes that the Government had stated during discovery that it had no 404(b) evidence "at this time," and never amended that response. That response was dated August 2, 2003, before the Government contacted Lane and months before Lane's December 2003 arrest and subsequent plea bargain.

On the day the trial began, before jury voir dire, the Government revealed Lane's identity and the fact that Lane would testify to the two KelTec handguns he sold Watson (only one of which Cox recovered). Watson objected to the late notice.

Following voir dire, the prosecutor turned over to Watson's counsel a large amount of information about Lane, and suggested that after arguments the court break for the day so that Watson's counsel could have an opportunity to go over the material. But Watson's counsel disagreed, suggesting that the government begin direct examination of its first witness, saying, "I would be ready to go in the morning." After lunch, defense counsel changed course and raised the Rule 404(b) notice requirement, arguing he wasn't sure he had "ample notice to do a thorough investigation and a meaningful cross-examination." The court ruled that it would permit introduction of the 404(b) evidence.

Lane testified less than 48 hours after the prosecutor revealed Lane's identity. While Lane was on the stand, defense counsel cross-examined him regarding his plea agreement. The defense sought to challenge Lane's credibility by questioning him about an exchange between the prosecutor1 and the judge in Lane's case regarding the prosecutor's recommendation that Lane be released pending sentencing. The exchange was as follows:

The Court: All right, when do you want to come back?

Prosecutor: Your honor, the government is actually particularly optimistic about Mr. Lane's ability to complete his cooperation within the next three or four months. It's a scheduling matter.

See Tr. of June 4, 2004 at 142 (from the Watson proceeding, reading back the exchange from the Lane proceeding). On cross-examination, Watson's counsel sought to introduce this statement as to the prosecutor's "optimis[m]," arguing at the ensuing bench conference that this was evidence of bias on Lane's part, in that it showed that Lane had committed to "cooperate" by supplying prosecution-favored testimony—whether truthful or not. The prosecutor argued, and the court agreed, that the statement went to a scheduling matter, not to the substance of Lane's Watson-case testimony. "Cooperation" meant nothing more than testifying per se, not testifying favorably. The judge did not preclude cross-examination, but instructed defense counsel that cross-examination would have to focus on "the whole context of [the statement]." Defense counsel did not challenge this ruling; instead, he said, "I'll move on. I'll move on." The Court sustained the prosecutor's objection.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor extolled Lane's credibility.

D. Conviction and Sentencing

On June 8, 2004, the jury found Watson guilty of firearms and drug offenses, and not guilty of an ammunition offense. On September 9, 2004, the court sentenced Watson to 108 months' imprisonment on the firearms offense and 12 months' imprisonment on the marijuana offense, to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.

II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 616 (D.C.Cir.2004); United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 122 (D.C.Cir.2003). Despite the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation clause [t]he district court nonetheless has considerable discretion to place reasonable limits on a criminal defendant's presentation of evidence and cross-examination of government witnesses. It must be cautious, however, particularly where a party is seeking to impeach a witness whose credibility could have an important influence on the outcome of the trial.

Whitmore, 359 F.3d at 615-16 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because "[w]e . . . recognize that the district court is in the best position to conduct the balancing test," we "review a FED. R. EVID. 403 ruling `only for grave abuse.'" Id. at 619 (quoting United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795 (D.C.Cir.2002)).

B. Cross-Examinations of Cox & Lane
1. Officer Cox

Watson argues that, by precluding defense counsel from...

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