U.S. v. Wattleton
| Decision Date | 09 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-14549.,No. 00-13125.,00-13125.,00-14549. |
| Citation | 296 F.3d 1184 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Earl WATTLETON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Brian Mendelsohn, Fed. Def. Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Susan Coppedge, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before ANDERSON, HULL and KENNEDY*, Circuit Judges.
The defendant David Earl Wattleton was indicted for making bomb threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e), and the jury rendered an insanity verdict. At a post-verdict hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d), the district court determined that Wattleton was not eligible for release. On appeal, Wattleton contends (1) that the government impermissibly imposed the insanity defense on him at trial, (2) that § 4243(d)'s placing the burden of proof on the insanity acquittee at the post-verdict hearing violates his due process rights, and (3) that the court erred in denying Wattleton's release. After review and oral argument, we affirm both the jury's verdict and the court's release decision.
On May 27, 1999, Bill Jones, the president of U.S. Motivation, fired the defendant Wattleton from his sales position. Upset by the news, Wattleton hit Jones and another employee. That evening, Wattleton made several threatening telephone calls. He left a message on U.S. Motivation's voice mail system, threatening to blow up its building and kill Jones and his family. Wattleton also left a message on the home answering machine of Ralph Quinn, a U.S. Motivation supervisor, threatening to kill Quinn and his family. Concerned by these calls, Jones, Quinn, and their families left their respective residences that evening and called police.
The next day, May 28th, Wattleton made threatening telephone calls to numerous businesses, including AirTran Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Home Depot. During each call, Wattleton stated his name, spelled his last name, identified himself as a U.S. Motivation employee, and provided a U.S. Motivation telephone number. In his telephone calls to the airlines, Wattleton stated there was a bomb on one of the planes without identifying a specific flight. In his Home Depot message, Wattleton threatened to kill two named Home Depot employees and to blow up a store every hour until Wattleton got the "police off his back."
Later that day, FBI agents arrested Wattleton for making telephonic bomb threats. Wattleton told an FBI agent, "I've been waiting here all day for you guys." Wattleton subsequently confessed and explained that he had made these threats to prompt an investigation into the conspiracy of police harassment against him. At one point, however, Wattleton indicated that he had made the calls out of revenge against his former employer, U.S. Motivation.
Wattleton was indicted on one count of making a telephonic threat and conveying false information concerning an attempt to unlawfully damage and destroy property by means of fire or explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). The remaining three counts charged Wattleton with making telephonic threats to kill, injure, or intimidate persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). After pleading not guilty, Wattleton provided notice of his insanity defense, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2. That pre-trial notice, which was never withdrawn, advised that Wattleton intended to rely on the insanity defense and to introduce related expert testimony.1
Consequently, Dr. Artigues, for the government, and Dr. Rand, for the defendant, conducted psychiatric examinations of Wattleton. Both experts concluded that Wattleton suffered from a delusional disorder of a persecutory type that impaired his ability to appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his behavior. Specifically, Wattleton believed that the police were harassing him by gathering information about his past mental history and his small genitalia and then sharing this information with his employers who, in turn, would fire him.
After these examinations, the district court granted a joint motion for continuance so that the parties would have additional time to explore plea options. The court noted that "[t]his case is unusual in that both parties' experts have found the defendant was suffering from a severe mental illness which impaired his ability to appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his behavior." The medical experts' conclusions tracked the definition of insanity: "[A]t the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).2 Thus, both experts, in effect, agreed Wattleton was legally insane at the time of his offense conduct. However, both experts also determined that Wattleton was competent to stand trial.
As a result, the government filed a motion informing the court that if the defendant was found competent to stand trial, the government would move for a "not guilty only by reason of insanity verdict, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b)." On June 5, 2000, the district court held a hearing regarding Wattleton's competency and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. In so doing, the district court considered the medical experts' evaluations and questioned Wattleton about his understanding of the legal process. Wattleton's jury trial then commenced on that day.
In its opening statement, the government acknowledged that to obtain an insanity verdict it would have to prove first that Wattleton was guilty of the charged offenses. Thus, the government described how Wattleton was guilty of making the threatening calls. The government then described Wattleton's delusional disorder and how the jury would hear doctors' testimony. The government proposed that the appropriate verdict was not guilty only by reason of insanity.3 Defense counsel did not object to the government's intent to present insanity evidence or to any part of its opening statement. Thus, even the government was conceding insanity and requesting an insanity verdict. This gave the defense the opportunity to focus more on the threshold issue of whether Wattleton was guilty of the charged offenses.
In his opening statement, defense counsel first described the progression of Wattleton's delusional disorder, its impact on his behavior, and how Wattleton believed that U.S. Motivation's firing him was the "culmination of the police conspiracy" after which physical harm from the police was imminent. Defense counsel specifically proposed that the jury may have to decide between the verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity and not guilty. Defense counsel indicated that he thought the government may argue that Wattleton was not guilty only by reason of insanity. Again, defense counsel did not object to the government's arguing for an insanity verdict but acknowledged the government may do so. Defense counsel, however, stated that he would argue for a not guilty verdict because Wattleton lacked the necessary criminal intent for the charged offenses.
The government's witnesses testified about Wattleton's threatening calls and related events.4 The government then called forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Artigues, to testify about Wattleton's mental condition at the time of the calls. Specifically, Dr. Artigues testified that Wattleton had a delusional disorder of the persecutory type. Dr. Artigues explained that individuals with delusional disorder "may have a system of beliefs that reflects the fact that they are not in touch with reality"; in other words, they have a "system of beliefs that are true for them, definitely, but wouldn't be true for anyone else." Since delusional disorder may affect an individual's belief system, the disorder, in turn, can influence an individual's behavior.
Dr. Artigues concluded that Wattleton had made the threats as a result of his delusional belief system. Dr. Artigues testified that Wattleton wanted to be arrested by the FBI so that he could draw attention to the conspiracy of police harassment against him. Wattleton believed that police in three different cities were conspiring to spread information about his small genitalia and mental health history to his employers so that he would be treated differently and ultimately fired. Defense counsel did not object to any of Dr. Artigues's testimony.5
Indeed, on cross-examination, defense counsel went further and had Dr. Artigues testify or reiterate (a) that Wattleton was suffering from a severe mental disease or defect, and (b) that his severe mental disease or defect impaired his ability to understand the nature and quality of his behavior at the time of the offense. Dr. Artigues acknowledged that in her pre-trial report she had concluded that Wattleton was not criminally responsible for the charged offenses because of his delusional disorder.
When the government rested, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. At this juncture, there was still no objection to the government's insanity evidence or its request for an insanity verdict. The only Rule 29 argument that related to Wattleton's mental state was that there was no case or controversy about guilt. Defense counsel stated briefly: In other words, defense counsel not only did not object to the...
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U.S. v. Flores, No. 08-10775.
...threat would be carried out, and [3] that he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or inform [the] police." United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1196 n. 20 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1104 (11th Cir. 1995)). This court has explained that "[t]he fi......
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U.S. v. Weed, 03-5100.
...that placing the burden of proving eligibility for release on the acquittee does not violate due process. See United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1267-68 Cir.1992); United States v. Wallace, 845 F.2d 1471, 1474-75 (8th Cir......
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USA v. Vela Jr
...prevailed in his defense of insanity. The cases relied upon by the government do not support that proposition. In United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir.2002), the defendant had appealed a conviction and sought and obtained a reversal with instructions to enter a verdict of not......
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Grayden v. Rhodes
...constitutionally due); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 984, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (same); United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir.2002) (same). Under the Mathews identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration o......