U.S. v. Watts

Decision Date07 October 1993
Docket NumberNos. 93-1526,93-1527,s. 93-1526
Citation7 F.3d 122
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gordon Earl WATTS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Virginia Guadalupe Villa, Minneapolis, MN, argued (Scott F. Tilsen, and Birch P. Burdick, on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

James E. Lackner, Minneapolis, MN, argued (Francis X. Hermann and Paul A. Murphy, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, MAGILL and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Gordon Earl Watts appeals from his conviction after trial by jury of one count of selling and possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988), and also appeals the sentence imposed upon him on a charge of failure to appear for trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) (1988). The only issue raised with respect to the firearm charge is whether the police unlawfully obtained the serial numbers of certain firearms. Watts further argues that if he is successful on this claim, we should order resentencing on the failure to appear count because his sentence was based in part on the firearm conviction. We conclude that the district court 1 did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the serial numbers of the firearms, and accordingly, affirm the firearm charge. This makes it unnecessary for us to consider the arguments with respect to the failure to appear charge, and thus, we affirm Watts' conviction and sentence.

The police stopped Watts and Lesley Eiler as they were driving away from a house at 1615 Third Street NE in a blue van. A neighbor had called the police to report "suspicious persons loading items into a blue van, including long guns." Two squad cars arrived at the house. The first squad car, driven by Officer Sporny, arrived as the van was leaving the house. Sporny pulled the van over, asked the driver, Watts, for identification, and received a valid driver's license. Sporny explained to Watts that he had received a report of property being loaded into a van. Watts replied that he was moving property for a friend, John Schmeck. Officers Yellow Bird and Walrich then arrived in the second squad car, and they talked to the passenger, Eiler. Watts and Eiler gave conflicting answers when asked if any guns were in the van. The officers then asked Watts and Eiler to move to the back of the van. Sporny left them there with the other two officers while he searched under the front passenger seat for "weapons or anything." Sporny found a bag containing bolt cutters and screwdrivers. He then opened the van's side door and saw three closed long gun cases, one partially-opened long gun case with an exposed gun barrel, a guitar case, a 13-inch television, suitcases, and various other items. Sporny pat searched Watts and Eiler and placed them inside a locked police car. Sporny's continued search of the van uncovered ammunition, a fishing license, a social security card, and a grocery bag containing jewelry.

Yellow Bird and Walrich then went to the address of the original call, 1615 Third Street NE. They met John Schmeck, the apparent owner of the house. He informed the officers that Watts and Eiler were moving the property for its owner "Greg." He denied knowing Watts or Eiler. The officers then returned and shared this information with Watts and Eiler, at which time Eiler declared Schmeck a liar. At this point, Sporny and Yellow Bird examined the guns, made sure they were unloaded, and copied their serial numbers. The guns' numbers turned up clear, and the officers released Watts and Eiler. After Watts and Eiler left, Officer Sporny found a driver's license next to the cruiser where Watts had been standing.

Later, Fred Atton reported that on June 30, 1991, the day the police stopped the van driven by Watts, he was away from his apartment, but returned that night and found that his apartment had been ransacked. Four firearms, an Ovation guitar, a JVC VCR, a 13-inch RCA color television, a "boombox," jewelry, clothing, ammunition, and paintings were missing. His fiancee, Charisse Matson, identified the driver's license that Officer Sporny found on the ground next to the police car as hers. Watts was indicted for being a felon 2 in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924.

Watts filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the van. Magistrate Judge Jonathan G. Lebedoff 3 conducted a hearing and filed a report and recommendation that the motion to suppress the evidence, specifically the serial numbers of the weapons, be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Watts. Watts fled before the trial ended, but was later apprehended by United States Marshalls. He was indicted for failure to appear at trial in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), and pleaded guilty to this charge.

On appeal, Watts argues that several aspects of the stop and search of the van were improper. He first argues that Officer Sporny lacked a sufficient basis to stop him. Next, he argues that the officers obtained the serial numbers after any reasonable suspicion supporting the investigative stop had dissipated, as the officers had no reason to believe that the supposed burglary at 1615 Third Street NE had occurred. Third, he contends that the subsequent search of the van exceeded the appropriate scope of a valid investigatory stop. We consider these arguments in turn.

Watts first argues that Officer Sporny's stop of his van violated the Fourth Amendment. 4 At least since Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), officers have been permitted to conduct "investigative stops" when they have "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir.1992); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. The suspicious activity need not conclusively prove guilt. United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir.1988). Conduct consistent with both guilt and innocence may suffice. Id. Automobiles, as well as people, are subject to Terry stops. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). We will reverse a district court's finding of reasonable suspicion only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1205 (8th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 41, 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993). In this case, Officer Sporny received a citizen report describing "suspicious persons loading items into a blue van, including long guns." The district court found that this report provided reasonable articulable suspicion for Officer Sporny to stop the van. This finding was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 988-89 (5th Cir.1987) (citizen's identification of "suspicious" car sufficient for Terry stop); United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 1086-87 (8th Cir.) (anonymous phone call and suspicious conduct sufficient to support Terry stop), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 370, 116 L.Ed.2d 322 (1991).

Watts next argues that the searches of the van, even if incident to a lawful stop, exceeded the permissible limits set by the Fourth Amendment. We consider his argument in three parts: (1) Were Officer Sporny's initial searches of the van lawful? (2) Did the officers' reasonable suspicion dissipate when they determined that no burglary occurred at the reported location? (3) Was the subsequent removal of the long guns from their cases and taking down of their serial numbers outside the permissible scope of a search incident to an investigative stop?

We first consider whether Officer Sporny's initial searches of the van were lawful. There is no clear line delineating the boundaries of permissible searches in conjunction with investigative stops. Saffeels, 982 F.2d at 1205. Each case turns on its unique facts. Officers may, however, search for weapons and take any additional steps "reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 684, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). Watts argues that the officers' searches exceeded the bounds permitted during an investigative stop. The district court disagreed. We subject the district court's determination of whether a search exceeded the permissible scope of an investigative stop to de novo review. Saffeels, 982 F.2d at 1205; United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1425-26 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991).

Sporny first searched the van's front seat for "weapons or anything," while Watts and Eiler were behind the van with Yellow Bird and Walrich. He found a bag containing bolt cutters and screwdrivers. He then opened the van's side door to obtain a better view of the rear cargo area, where he found a number of items, including three closed long gun cases. After pat searching and placing Watts and Eiler in a locked police car, Officer Sporny further searched the van and found several items including ammunition, identification cards with other people's names, and a grocery bag containing jewelry.

An officer, incident to a valid Terry stop, may search "the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden ... if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Officer Sporny's initial searches fall well...

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