U.S. v. Wayne County, Michigan

• Decision Date: 23 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-2245.,02-2245.
• Citation: 369 F.3d 508
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America; Michael A. Cox, Attorney General for the State of Michigan, ex rel Michigan Natural Resources Commission; Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants, City of Riverview, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 508

369 F.3d 508

UNITED STATES of America; Michael A. Cox, Attorney General for the State of Michigan, ex rel Michigan Natural Resources Commission; Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants City of Riverview, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-2245.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 9, 2004.

Decided and Filed: April 23, 2004.^*

Kerry L. Morgan (argued and briefed), Pentiuk, Couvreue & Kobiljak, Wyandotte, MI, for Appellant.

Kathryn E. Kovacs (argued and briefed), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Pamela J. Stevenson (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Appellees.

Before: SILER, MOORE and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

On May 24, 1994, the United States and the State of Michigan negotiated a consent decree with Wayne County, Michigan and several communities in the area that deliver sewage to a Detroit-area wastewater collection system and wastewater treatment plant. The consent decree resolved a 1987 action under the Clean Water Act regarding sewage discharges into the Detroit River, and sought significant improvements to the collection system and the treatment plant. Under the consent decree, the parties agreed that only eight of 24 bypasses — points at which raw sewage is discharged into the Detroit River during storms that overload the waterway — would be necessary to handle emergency rainfall situations on the waterway and that all other bypasses would be sealed by October 1, 2002.

In April 2001, one of the parties to the consent decree, the City of Riverview, filed a motion to amend the decree to permit the City to keep its bypass open permanently. The City claimed that severe storms in 1998 and 2000 proved that its bypass needed to remain open because the storms caused extensive basement flooding in the homes of its residents. The district court denied this motion, and we affirm.

I.

Wayne County owns the Wyandotte Wastewater Treatment Plant, which is located on the Detroit River, and the Downriver Wastewater Collection System, which carries sewage from communities in the area to the treatment plant. Wayne County lets local communities purchase capacity on the collection system, allowing each community to discharge a specified amount of sewage into the pipes leading to the treatment plant. Communities bear responsibility for regulating their own flow levels so as not to exceed their purchased capacities. In normal weather conditions, that task raises few challenges. When extreme rainfall occurs, however, effective operation of the wastewater collection system requires a balance between controlling flows to the treatment plant and sanitary sewer overflow on the one hand and bypass discharges to the Detroit River on the other. When this balance is compromised, one of two things happens: Too much sewage is discharged into the Detroit River or too much basement flooding occurs.

In 1987, the United States and the State of Michigan filed an action against Wayne County, alleging that it had violated the federal Clean Water Act, the Michigan Water Resources Commission Act and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit that it had been issued under those acts. The complaint was amended in 1988 to add a violation of the Michigan Drain Code as well as claims against several communities and drainage districts delivering sewage to the system (the "downriver communities"), including the City of Riverview. The amended complaint alleged that Wayne County and the downriver communities violated the Clean Water Act by exceeding the effluent limitations for discharges into the Detroit River and had failed to construct necessary additional treatment facilities required by the discharge permit. The amended complaint also alleged that the downriver communities "caused or contributed" to Wayne County's violations. First Am. Compl. at 11. Plaintiffs asked that the defendants be enjoined from continuing to violate the Clean Water Act, various Michigan water laws and the permit, and be ordered to develop a plan for improving the system to avoid future impermissible discharges into the Detroit River.

On May 24, 1994, Wayne County and the downriver communities entered into a consent decree designed to bring all defendants into compliance with federal and state law. The consent decree required Wayne County and the downriver communities to expand the wastewater treatment facility and to improve the regional wastewater transport system. The defendants also agreed to reduce their use of the system's bypasses and to seal all but eight of them by October 1, 2002. The bypass operated by the City of Riverview was not among the eight bypasses that were allowed to remain open.

On April 13, 2001, roughly a year and a half before the remaining bypasses were to be sealed, the City of Riverview filed a motion to modify the consent decree so that its bypass could be left open permanently. Riverview claims that the motion became necessary in the aftermath of three related events: (1) unanticipated severe storms, one in 1998 and two in 2000, which produced extreme rain; (2) a lightning strike that disabled the power grid supplying voltage to the system's pump stations; and (3) a raft of lawsuits arising from residential basement flooding caused by the two storms. The district court denied the motion without prejudice, reasoning that it was premature because system improvements contemplated by the consent decree had not yet been completed.

On June 5, 2002, Wayne County and the downriver communities filed a motion to modify the consent decree by extending the deadline for sealing the bypasses one year (until October 1, 2003). They hoped the extension would allow for adequate time to collect additional data to determine "the future importance of certain bypasses." Wayne County Mot. to Amend at 3. On July 1, 2002, the City of Riverview renewed its own motion to amend the consent decree to allow it to keep its bypass open permanently. The United States and Michigan opposed both motions. Consistent with the consent decree, they noted, the defendants had completed a study of the system capacity needed to handle various rainfall events, had proposed a system that could handle those events and were still in the process of constructing the new system. On top of this, the governmental plaintiffs argued, the defendants' study confirmed that the eight bypasses remaining open under the consent decree would adequately handle extreme rainfalls.

On August 30, 2002, the district court conducted a hearing on the motion filed by Wayne County and the downriver communities. At that hearing, the City of Riverview's counsel also addressed the court on the merits of the City's motion, which was scheduled for a hearing on September 24, 2002. The district court officially denied the motion of Wayne County and the downriver communities on September 20, 2002. On September 24, 2002, it convened a hearing on the City of Riverview's motion, and denied the motion that day. The City of Riverview, but not the other defendants, appeal the district court's refusal to modify the consent decree.

II.

We review a district court's denial of a motion to modify a consent decree for abuse of discretion. Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (6th Cir.1992). "A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard." Id. at 1148 (quotation and citation omitted).

A.

The City of Riverview first raises a procedural challenge to the district court's ruling. In the City's view, the court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a formal hearing regarding the motion. We disagree.

The modification of a consent decree by a court without the consent of all parties to the agreement is indeed a signal event that requires a material change in circumstances that only a formal hearing and appropriate findings of fact can demonstrate. Traditionally,

courts have []considered the modification of a consent decree to be serious, leading to "perhaps irreparable" consequences.... As a contract, a decree ... reflects a compromise or agreement negotiated between parties who each have a purpose. Judicial approval of a settlement agreement places the power and prestige of the court behind the compromise struck by the parties. The standard for justifying the modification of a decree is a strict one and a consent decree is, after all, a judgment entitled to a presumption of finality.

United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 150 (6th Cir.1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Recognizing the significance of modifying the terms of a consent decree over the objection of one of the parties, this Court has required district courts to hold "a complete hearing" and to make appropriate findings of fact before making such modifications. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir.1994); see also Gonzales v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526, 535 (6th Cir.1998) (noting that "a `complete hearing' of an issue does not necessarily require a full-blown evidentiary hearing").

That a formal hearing should be held before a court alters a consent decree, however, does not mean that a court must hold a formal hearing before it refuses to modify a consent decree. When a motion does not raise a serious challenge to the consent decree and merely appears to be "a post-judgment attempt by a party to escape from obligations it had voluntarily assumed," Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 981 (3d Cir.1982), it may well be appropriate for a trial court to reject the motion without holding a formal hearing.

In this instance, the district court scheduled two pertinent hearings — one for August 30, 2002 on the motion filed by Wayne County and the...