U.S. v. Weatherless
| Decision Date | 14 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-5156,82-5156 |
| Citation | 734 F.2d 179 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Raymond Bernard WEATHERLESS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Paul W. Spence, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Md. (Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Public Defender, Richard Bardos, Paralegal, Baltimore, Md., Joseph Glass, Towson, Md., on brief), for appellant.
David B. Irwin, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (J. Frederick Motz, U.S. Atty., Robert B. Green, Asst. U.S. Atty., Robert W. Ferguson, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.
Before HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Raymond B. Weatherless was charged in a three count indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland with: 1) rape in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2031); 2) assault with intent to rape (18 U.S.C. Sec. 113(a)); and 3) assault by striking, beating, or wounding (18 U.S.C. Sec. 113(d)). Following a jury trial and verdicts of guilty on all three counts, Judge Norman P. Ramsey, who presided at the trial, imposed a sentence of fifteen years under Count One, fifteen years under Count Two, and six months, together with a $500 fine, under Count Three, all sentences to run concurrently.
Upon appeal, the Government has conceded that, under the facts and circumstances of the case, should we affirm the conviction and sentence under Count One, Counts Two and Three should merge into Count One. Accordingly, applying United States v. Amos, 566 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir.1977) (), we vacate the sentences for assault with intent to rape and for assault, inasmuch as we are satisfied that the conviction and sentence for rape under Count One should not be disturbed.
The evidence introduced at trial amply supported a factual determination that Weatherless, an employee at the Fort Washington National Park in Maryland, raped a seventeen-year-old summer worker on June 2, 1981. Early that morning, the victim was working alone in an office-trailer facility. Weatherless had known her for about two months and, although he was married to someone else, had proffered invitations for dates to her, which she had declined. He entered the office-trailer, carried her by force to the restroom, 1 pulled down her pants, and raped her. Her testimony was that, while Weatherless never struck her and did not carry a weapon, she stopped crying out in self-defense because of her fear that he was going to hit her. She explicitly testified that the sexual act was committed without her consent.
On the evening of June 2, 1981, she first claimed to have been raped when she told her boyfriend of the event. She reported the incident to her supervisor the next day, and an interview with Federal Park Police soon ensued. A physical examination on June 8, 1981 revealed no bruises, scars, or other signs of physical injury.
There was testimony of other witnesses verifying the victim's isolation in the office-trailer on the morning of June 2, 1981. Moreover, one of her female co-workers testified to "fresh remarks" made by Weatherless on other occasions, and to the agitated state displayed by the victim on the morning of June 2, 1981. The co-worker also recalled the victim's relation to her on June 3, 1981 of what had happened on June 2, 1981.
Taking the stand in his own defense, Weatherless denied that any of his remarks to the co-worker constituted sexual advances. He further testified that the prosecutrix had promised him sexual relationships on a number of occasions, and that she voluntarily engaged in intercourse with him in the office-trailer on June 2, 1981. 2 Thus, the case ultimately turned primarily upon a credibility call between the prosecutrix and the accused, with the evidence sufficient to support either version.
Normally the case would occasion little comment, for under Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (), the evidence was ample to sustain the conviction. A finding that the prosecutrix' testimony was credible would suffice. Cf. Rusk v. Maryland, 729 F.2d 1454, slip op. at 6-7 (4th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (). We must turn, therefore, to the assertion made by Weatherless that there were interrelated errors committed in the course of the trial.
In one important respect, there is no reasonable room for doubt that an impropriety did occur. In closing statements to the jury the prosecutor said:
Anything I say though I don't want you to take as an affront to [defense counsel]. They are doing their job. And, under the evidence of this case it is clear that what their job is is to represent this rapist. (Objection sustained)....
[Defense counsel] talks about his client's testimony for four minutes, because he knows what everybody in this courtroom knows from the evidence, that his client is a liar....
[Defense counsel] saw and the defendant saw [the prosecutrix] testify here on Monday afternoon, and you know, the United States knows, everybody realizes who would believe that something happened to her on that June 2nd and they can't win, they can't get a not guilty verdict by maintaining the story on June 4th that he didn't touch her and they knew it. So, the defendant got up there and lied to you. And everybody knows it. And they can't even get up .... (Objection sustained).
He is a looser [sic]....
He is a looser [sic]....
He is a looser [sic]....
He is a looser [sic]. He couldn't even ejaculate. He has problems....
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