U.S. v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 78-5254
| Decision Date | 12 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-5254,78-5254 |
| Citation | 587 F.2d 782 |
| Parties | 1979-1 Trade Cases 62,425 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
William E. Willis, David B. Tulchin, Howard D. Burnett, New York City, D. R. Cumming, Jr., Carey P. DeDeyn, Harold Wayne Phears, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
William L. Harper, U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., Robert B. Nicholson, Washington, D. C., Bruce E. Fein, John H. Shenefield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Charles C. Murphy, Jr., John T. Orr, Jr., James M. Griffin, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before GEWIN, GEE and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.
Upon entering a plea of nolo contendere, appellant Wells Fargo was convicted of conspiracy to allocate customers and to submit collusive bids for armored car and related services in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). The indictment against appellant was returned on June 21, 1977. It alleged that appellant participated in a conspiracy beginning "at least as early as 1968 and continuing thereafter at least until August 1975. . . ." On December 21, 1974, Congress amended the Sherman Act to increase the maximum fine from $50,000 to $1,000,000 for conduct by corporations in violation of Section 1. Such conduct was thus changed from a misdemeanor to a felony.
In accepting appellant's nolo contendere plea, the district court found that the indictment charged a felony. The trial judge went to considerable lengths to inquire whether appellant and its counsel understood the facts alleged in the indictment, that the indictment charged a felony carrying a maximum $1,000,000 fine and that the plea would waive all constitutional rights attendant to a full and fair trial. To these detailed inquiries, appellant replied through counsel in the affirmative, clearly manifesting an intelligent understanding and voluntary acceptance of the consequences of the plea. The court then entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a fine of $375,000.
On this appeal, appellant contends that that the felony conviction violated the Constitution's prohibition against Ex post facto laws in that the indictment purported to charge a felony without alleging that overt acts occurred during the time period after December 21, 1974, when the...
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US v. Whitty
...need not be dismissed merely because it fails to allege specific acts after the effective date. See United States v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation, 587 F.2d 782, 783 (5th Cir.1979) (indictment charging conspiracy commencing before and continuing after effective date); United State......
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U.S. v. Gibbs, 86-1370
...will subject members of that conspiracy to the provisions of the later enactment. See, e.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Armored Car Service Corp., 587 F.2d 782 (5th Cir.1979). Thus, Sec. 841(b)(6) was applicable to the acts and offense alleged Gibbs argues that because there is no specifi......
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U.S. v. Brumley
...circuit has previously held that a similar error was not sufficient to invalidate a conviction. See United States v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 587 F.2d 782, 783 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that the indictment's failure to delineate any overt acts after the date when the offense in questi......
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U.S. v. Adams
...918 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1482 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 587 F.2d 782, 782 (5th Cir.1979). Because the conspiracy did not cease to operate, and Cohron did not withdraw, before the new sentencing prov......