U.S. v. Whitehead

Citation618 F.2d 523
Decision Date20 March 1980
Docket NumberNos. 78-5160,s. 78-5160
Parties5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1046 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph Motley WHITEHEAD, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Wayne HOLLEY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Aubrey HENDERSON, Appellant. to 78-5162.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

David Epstein, Washington, D. C. (Mary Beth Schiffman, David Kolman Tochen, Washington, D. C., Joseph R. Johnson, Jr., Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for appellant Whitehead.

William Rosenberger, Jr., Lynchburg, Va. (Killis T. Howard, Richard E. Spies, Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for appellant Henderson.

George H. Fralin, Jr., Norman A. Kinnier, Lynchburg, Va., on brief, for appellant Holley.

Robert S. Stubbs, Asst. U. S. Atty., Roanoke, Va. (Paul R. Thomson, Jr., U. S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before WINTER, RUSSELL and HALL, Circuit Judges.

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Appellants were convicted, following a month-long trial, of violating the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO), by promoting an interstate prostitution ring through a bribery scheme, and of conspiracy to commit that offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 1 Appellant Henderson was also convicted of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act) by traveling, and causing prostitutes to travel, in interstate commerce to promote the prostitution enterprise. On appeal, they contend that various trial errors, including evidentiary rulings by the district court and allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, mandate a reversal of their convictions. Appellant Henderson also assigns error to the district court's refusal to grant him a severance. 2 We are convinced that none of the alleged errors, singly or in combination, deprived appellants of a fair trial, and we affirm the convictions.

A 1977 indictment charged that Harold Wayne Dowdy, Herbert Owen Boyd, Thomas James Barker and Appellant Henderson operated an interstate prostitution ring centered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia. The indictment further charged that Appellant Whitehead, who was Commonwealth Attorney for Pittsylvania County from 1964 through 1975, offered protection to the prostitution ring, including advance warning of planned raids and leniency in prosecution, in return for cash payments from the operators and free sexual services from prostitutes employed by the ring. Appellant Holley, a Pittsylvania County businessman and friend of Whitehead, was charged with serving as "bagman" for the cash payments, in return for free sexual services. The four operators were accused of numerous violations of the Travel Act, and they, along with Whitehead and Holley, were also charged with both conspiring to violate, and violating, the RICO statute.

Dowdy, Boyd and Barker, pursuant to agreements with the prosecution, entered pleas of guilty to the RICO conspiracy charge and to Travel Act violations, and appeared as government witnesses at Appellants' trial. They testified that Whitehead had approached them, through Holley, and demanded regular cash payments in return for allowing them to remain in business. They also stated that the cash payments, to Whitehead through Holley, had begun in 1973 and continued at least through the end of Whitehead's term in 1975. 3

The testimony of the three operators was corroborated by that of numerous prostitutes who had worked for them or for Henderson, and who testified to the extraordinary services provided to Whitehead and Holley in exchange for promises of protection. 4 State and local law enforcement officers testified that Appellant Whitehead had made vigorous, and largely successful, efforts during his first term of office to close the houses of prostitution operating in the county, but that prostitution activity had proliferated in the county by 1973, the time when the alleged payoff scheme began. Two officers also testified that, following a 1974 raid on local prostitution establishments, Whitehead had attempted to curb the activities of a deputy sheriff who was continuing the investigation, by ordering him to stay away from one of Dowdy's establishments, and by attempting to have him fired for "harassing" the operators.

The government's witnesses also testified that Whitehead had instructed the four operators to cooperate with one another, and that the operators' cooperation included sharing prostitutes, jointly conducting "parties" for Whitehead and Holley, sharing information regarding law enforcement activities, and planning strategy following the 1974 raids.

None of appellants testified at trial. After three days of deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all appellants on the RICO conspiracy and substantive counts, and against Henderson on four Travel Act counts. 5 Appellants raise numerous issues on appeal, only two of which merit extended discussion.

I. Prosecutorial Comments

Appellants contend that on three occasions during trial, the prosecutor adversely commented on the defendant's failure to testify. We believe that only one of these instances even arguably constitutes such an improper comment. 6 Near the end of the government's direct examination of Harold Wayne Dowdy, after questioning regarding Dowdy's earlier conviction on charges of tax evasion, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Now in your tax evasion, did you take the stand and testify in your own behalf?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. If I would have testified to the truth, it would have convicted me, and if I would have lied under oath, I would have been guilty of perjury. I would not lie under oath.

Appellants did not object to either question at the time it was asked, but a short time later they moved for a mistrial, contending that the questioning was a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to indirectly state that avoidance of perjury was the reason for their failure to take the stand. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the questioning was simply an attempt to bolster Dowdy's credibility. 7 The court's offer to strike the questions and answers, and to instruct the jury appropriately, was refused by defendants.

We recognize that "(c)rafty questioning may constitute 'comment' despite its obliquity," United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1977). The test for determining whether an indirect remark constitutes improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify is: "Was the language used manifestly intended to be, or was it of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 701 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 211, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (quoting United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1969)). Applying this rule, we do not believe that the questioning can be fairly read as a comment on appellant's failure to testify. Even assuming, as appellants contend, that both the questions and answers were carefully planned by the prosecutor, we believe that their "manifest intent," as well as their likely impact on the jury, was confined to a comment on Dowdy's probable veracity while testifying under oath. Moreover, the jury was repeatedly instructed, throughout the trial, that no adverse inferences should be drawn from defendants' decision not to testify. We are convinced that "the jury in all probability did not understand the government to be commenting on (the defendants') failure to testify, but that, if it did, the judge's instructions were sufficient to cure that impression." United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 40 (3d Cir. 1976).

Appellants also contend that the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments contained improper remarks, including attacks on defense counsel, comments on the credibility of government witnesses, and comments on matters not in evidence. "Improper argument by the prosecutor is not grounds for reversal unless there is 'substantial prejudice as well as error.' " United States v. Kim, 193 U.S.App.D.C. 370, 383, 595 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C.Cir.1979). After examining these remarks in context, we are convinced that any error was minor and did not result in substantial prejudice to appellants.

II. Whitehead Impeachment Material

Shortly before the defense rested, Appellant Whitehead's counsel informed the court that "because of the circumstances that have occurred during the course of this trial . . . we feel compelled to put Mr. Whitehead on the stand and have him testify." Defense counsel requested an advance ruling from the court, "before making a final decision" on whether Whitehead would take the stand, on the admissibility of evidence concerning Whitehead's 1975 suspension from practice from the Virginia State Bar for "conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation." 8 Whitehead contended that neither the fact that he had been suspended, nor the document containing the disciplinary tribunal's decision, was admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence for purposes of impeaching his credibility. Counsel represented that if the district court ruled that Whitehead could not be impeached on the basis of his suspension from the Virginia bar, he would testify in the case. The district court ruled that Whitehead could be cross-examined about his suspension under FRE 608(b) 9 as a "specific instance of conduct . . . probative of truthfulness," and that if Whitehead testified about the suspension, the document evidencing it could be introduced.

Whitehead's counsel never stated unequivocally that a ruling permitting cross-examination about the suspension, as distinguished from admission of the document, would cause Whitehead to decide not to testify. 10 Even after the court's ruling, defense counsel's response was limited to the request, "(w) ell, could we have a little time to consult with our client and...

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