U.S. v. Whitfield
| Decision Date | 07 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | 79-2337,Nos. 79-2305,s. 79-2305 |
| Citation | 203 U.S.App.D.C. 102,629 F.2d 136 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Clarence WHITFIELD, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America v. Norman B. MONROE, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
David A. Levitt, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for Clarence Whitfield.
Harold Damelin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Paul N. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee. Barbara E. Liles and Barry M. Tapp, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., also entered appearances for appellee.
Before TAMM and ROBB, Circuit Judges, and GERHARD A. GESELL, * United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
After jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Appellants Clarence Whitfield and Norman B. Monroe were convicted of unlawful possession of firearms following a prior felony conviction. The appellants raise various arguments concerning the lawfulness of a police search of Whitfield's car and the sufficiency of the evidence introduced against them at their joint trial. We affirm Whitfield's conviction but reverse Monroe's, the latter lacking adequate evidence.
Around February 19, 1979, Detective Johnnie Ray Mathis of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D. C., received information from a previously reliable informant 1 that a man known to the informant as "Lockjaw," later identified as Appellant Monroe, had been selling heroin near a convenience store located in the 1300 block of S Street, N.W., in Washington. The informant stated that Lockjaw's practice was to have another man drive him to the store in a yellow Chevrolet Impala with a white top. The informant also said that he personally had observed drugs and guns in the car.
In response to this tip, Mathis went to the 1300 block of S Street and there, from the information he had received, identified Lockjaw. For about a week, Mathis observed Lockjaw receiving money from people in the vicinity of the convenience store. Around 3:00 p. m. on the afternoon of February 27, Mathis and another detective arrived in the area and saw Lockjaw with several persons gathered around him. Mathis recognized some of these individuals as persons he already believed to be drug runners, i. e., street sellers. The detectives saw Lockjaw give something to one of these persons. Shortly thereafter, they observed this runner take money from approximately ten other persons and give them small white objects in return. On one occasion, the recipient held up a small plastic bag that appeared to contain a white powder. During this same period, the detectives also saw a man later identified as Appellant Whitfield receive money from another runner. The detective accompanying Mathis also saw Lockjaw carry a bundle of clothes into the convenience store in a manner that suggested he was concealing a gun.
After about twenty to thirty minutes, Whitfield left the scene. Approximately five minutes later, he returned driving a white and yellow Chevrolet Impala. He left the car and spoke with Lockjaw. He then returned to the car and pulled it in front of the convenience store, where Lockjaw and two other men got in. Mathis recognized one of the other men as a person he previously had arrested on drug and firearms charges. After a few moments, Lockjaw got out of the car, looked around, and ran into the store. He returned with a green plastic bag. Whitfield then drove the car away with Lockjaw in the right front seat and the other two men in the back.
Mathis radioed a description of the automobile to his superior, Sergeant Lawrence C. Ware, who, along with three other officers, was in a police cruiser nearby. Mathis had been keeping Ware abreast of his investigation of Lockjaw, including the informant's tip and his own subsequent observations. Mathis told Ware that the car had four people inside, one of whom he previously had arrested for drug and firearms violations. Mathis suggested that Ware "spot check" the car and its occupants. He also noted that the other detective with him felt there might be guns in the car. Accordingly, Mathis advised Ware to proceed with caution.
Ware soon spotted the Impala in the 1000 block of 12th Street, N.W. He attempted to activate the cruiser's flashers and siren to pull the car over, but a mechanical problem prevented them from functioning properly. Ware followed the car until it stopped of its own accord in the 300 block of O Street, N.W.
Ware and his fellow officers approached the car. Ware asked the driver for his license and registration. He produced his license, which identified him as Clarence Whitfield, but could not produce the car's registration. In the meantime, the other officers questioned the other passengers, including Lockjaw, who identified himself as Norman B. Monroe. Ware returned to the cruiser and relayed identifying information on the car and its occupants to police headquarters for a computer check. During this time Monroe entered a building and then returned to the car.
While in the cruiser, Ware noticed for the first time that the automobile's license tags, which were only temporary ones, had expired. He returned to the car and told Whitfield that he was impounding the car for expired tags and asked for the keys. Whitfield refused. Ware then reached into Whitfield's pocket and removed the keys himself. Ware ordered the other officers to search the front seat, the back seat, and the glove compartment. 2 Under each side of the front seat, the officers found a loaded gun, out of sight but within reach of the front-seat occupants. The officers placed both Whitfield and Monroe under arrest. Ware and one of the other officers then unlocked and opened the trunk. Inside they found a brown paper bag containing small packages of white powder, which, after analysis, proved to be heroin.
Whitfield and Monroe were indicted on charges of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute, violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976), simple possession of heroin, violations of D.C.Code § 33-402(a) (1973), and possessing firearms following prior felony convictions, violations of section 1202(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a), 82 Stat. 197, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. App. (1976). The trial court subsequently suppressed the heroin seized from the car, and the Government dropped the drug charges. 3 On the other hand, the court did admit the firearms into evidence. At a joint trial, the Government introduced testimony placing both appellants in the car and the guns within easy reach under each side of the front seat. The evidence also showed Whitfield to have been the driver and owner of the car and Monroe the front-seat passenger. A jury convicted both appellants of illegally possessing firearms. They now appeal, claiming that the guns should have been suppressed and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict them.
Both appellants contest the search of Whitfield's car. 4 They contend that the police lacked probable cause and that even if they had probable cause they should have obtained a warrant. 5 We reject both arguments.
We need pause only briefly on the question of probable cause, for we believe it clearly was present. At the time he and his fellow officers stopped and searched Whitfield's car, Ware knew at least that (1) a reliable informant had told Mathis that Lockjaw was selling narcotics from the car and that the informant personally had seen drugs and guns in the car and (2) Mathis on prior days had seen Lockjaw and the car at the location the informant had specified and had observed him taking money from people there. 6 This information is more than adequate to have raised a probability of criminal activity, which is all probable cause requires, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 581, 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 at 692 (D.C.Cir. 1979). See generally id. at 693.
The appellants argue in the alternative that even if the search was supported by probable cause, the police had that probable cause well before they searched Whitfield's car and thus had ample time to obtain a warrant. Under these circumstances, according to the appellants, a warrantless search is no longer permissible, for the usual exigency that allows police to forgo a warrant is absent. We disagree. We believe that the mobility of a motor vehicle, without more, creates an exigency permitting a warrantless search based on probable cause and that the police need not carry out this search immediately upon the crystallization of probable cause.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that "(o)ne of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile on the street or highway because they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 760, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). See, e. g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Due to their configuration, use, and regulation, only a limited expectation of privacy attaches to motor vehicles, 7 and their mobility creates an exigency that makes obtaining a warrant impracticable. Because this exigency outweighs the limited privacy interest in vehicles, police may search them without a warrant, as long as probable cause...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Alston
...by a mere passenger in a searched automobile even if he alleges ownership of the property seized. See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 139 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1980). In the context of the present case, it would appear that nothing short of ownership of, some possessory interest in......
-
U.S. v. Arnold
...the defendant and the gun was the gun's proximity to the defendant. See Birmley, 529 F.2d at 107; see also United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C.Cir. 1980). But as we have shown, this is not a case in which the "record [was] devoid of any . . . evidence" other than the defendan......
-
Larocca v. State
...may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence"); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980)(finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver'......
-
Spencer v. City of Bay City
...to apprehend a felon.... [I]f a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant can usually be obtained"); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding that "with telephonic warrants now permissible ... the delay [in obtaining a warrant] may not be long at all......