U.S. v. Wilkes

Decision Date20 February 2001
Docket NumberNo. CR. 97-10235-NG.,CR. 97-10235-NG.
Citation130 F.Supp.2d 222
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Jonathan WILKES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Stewart H. Grimes, New Bedford, MA, for Joseph Tremblay, Defendant.

Martin Boudreau, Milton, MA, for Paul Loura, Defendant.

Angela G. Lehman, Cullen & Resnick, Boston, MA, Elliot M. Weinstein, Boston, MA, for John Wilkes, Defendant.

James H. Fagan, Fagan & Goldrick, Taunton, MA, for Jodi King, Defendant.

Joan C. Stanley, Boston, MA, for Kenneth G. Perry, Defendant.

James P. Duggan, Boston, MA, for Robert Coute, Defendant.

Michael D. Ricciuti, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for U.S.

                                                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 225
                II. FACTS .................................................................... 226
                    A. The Conspiracy to Distribute Marijuana ................................ 226
                    B. The Conspiracy to Launder Money ....................................... 227
                    C. The Indictment ........................................................ 227
                    D. Wilkes' Guilty Plea ................................................... 228
                    E. Wilkes' Background and Post-arrest Conduct ............................ 228
                III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE OF
                      IMPRISONMENT............................................................ 229
                     A. Apprendi and Its Progeny ............................................. 230
                        1. Apprendi v. New Jersey ............................................ 230
                        2. Post-Apprendi Developments ........................................ 232
                           a. Apprendi's Application to Drug Quantity ........................ 233
                           b. Apprendi's Extension to Indictments ............................ 233
                     B. The Standard for Reviewing Indictment Errors ......................... 234
                
                    C. Application of the First Circuit's Standard to Wilkes ................ 238
                IV. ARGUMENTS FOR ADJUSTMENTS AND DEPARTURES ................................. 238
                    A. Upward Adjustment for Role in the Offense ............................. 239
                    B. Departure Based on Overstatement of Criminal History .................. 239
                    C. Downward Departure Based on Extraordinary Post-arrest Rehabilitation... 240
                V. CALCULATION OF WILKES' SENTENCE ........................................... 241
                   A. Count One .............................................................. 241
                   B. Count Two .............................................................. 241
                   C. Multiple Count Adjustment .............................................. 241
                   D. Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility ............................ 241
                   E. Total Offense Level .................................................... 241
                   F. Criminal History Score ................................................. 241
                   G. Guideline Sentencing Range ............................................. 241
                   H. Departures ............................................................. 241
                      1. Criminal History .................................................... 241
                      2. Extraordinary Post-arrest Rehabilitation ............................ 241
                VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 242
                

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

GERTNER, District Judge.

This memorandum concerns the sentencing of Jonathan Robert Wilkes ("Wilkes"). Wilkes pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

Wilkes' sentencing raises a number of important questions under the Constitution and the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Does the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) [hereinafter "Apprendi"], require the government to specify the quantity of marijuana in the indictment charging Wilkes with a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846? If the indictment failed to do so, is the Court without jurisdiction to impose a sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (a sentence triggered by a finding that the defendant distributed a specific quantity of marijuana)?

Apart from the Apprendi questions, the case also raises two general departure issues: Is Wilkes entitled to a downward departure from the applicable Guideline range based on his post-offense efforts to rehabilitate himself, or because his criminal history score overstates the seriousness of his criminal record?

For the reasons set forth below, I reject Wilkes' Apprendi objection to the enhanced sentence, but GRANT his motion for a downward departure [docket # 143].

I. INTRODUCTION

The government seeks an enhanced sentence in excess of five years incarceration on the basis of the amount of marijuana involved in Wilkes' § 846 offense.1 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). Wilkes opposes the enhanced sentence because the government's failure to bring the question of quantity before the grand jury violates his Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law and to a grand jury indictment. U.S. Const. amend. V; cf. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63; United States v. Tran, 234 F.3d 798 (2d Cir.2000) [hereinafter "Tran"].

First, I find the following rule governs § 846 drug prosecutions: The indictment must specify the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy if the government seeks an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1) on the basis of that fact.2 United States v. Shepard, 235 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter "Shepard"]; United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir.2000) [hereinafter "Doggett"]. Since the government here seeks to increase the maximum penalty to which Wilkes is exposed on the basis of a fact not specified in the indictment (i.e., the amount of marijuana), the indictment is deficient under Apprendi, and Wilkes' Fifth Amendment rights are violated. Cf. Terry, 240 F.3d at 74 (finding Apprendi indictment error harmless under the circumstances of that case) United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 310 (1st Cir.2000) (same) [hereinafter "Mojica-Baez"].

At the same time, I am obliged by First Circuit precedent to find that the instant indictment error is harmless. See Terry, 240 F.3d at 74; Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d at 310-11. The First Circuit has held that despite the fact that the grand jury did not have an opportunity to screen the issue, and despite the centrality of the issue of drug quantity to the defendant's sentence, this defect is not jurisdictional and does not preclude an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). Terry, 240 F.3d at 75. Rather, the omission of drug quantity is, like trial errors, subject to harmless error analysis. By that standard, the present error is harmless.

Finally, with regard to the actual sentence to be imposed on Wilkes, I agree that his post-arrest efforts at rehabilitation are truly "extraordinary," far exceeding my expectations for the typical offender. I also find that Wilkes criminal history score overstates the seriousness of his criminal record. Thus, Wilkes' motion for a downward departure is allowed on those two grounds. He is sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of five years.

II. FACTS

Wilkes was a participant in a conspiracy to purchase marijuana in southern California, primarily in the San Diego area, and to ship the marijuana to the Taunton, Massachusetts, area for distribution. The conspirators in Massachusetts then returned a portion of the illicit proceeds to the conspirators in California by way of Western Union transfers or couriers. In total, approximately 750 pounds of marijuana were distributed during the charged conspiracy. The Court has already sentenced twenty-two defendants charged in this and a related case.3

A. The Conspiracy to Distribute Marijuana

Wilkes' tale begins with his co-defendant, Joseph Tremblay ("Tremblay"), a marijuana dealer who operated in Taunton, Massachusetts. Prior to the events underlying the instant indictment, Tremblay was involved in numerous other drug trafficking conspiracies that are the subject of a related case.4

In or about April 1994, Tremblay contacted co-defendant Paul Loura ("Loura") in California to establish a new marijuana supply for Tremblay. Loura and Tremblay established at least two sources of marijuana shortly thereafter. Wilkes became one of them.

In May 1994, Loura asked co-conspirator Michelle Reilly ("Reilly") if she would receive packages of marijuana for Tremblay in exchange for $500 per package. Reilly agreed. From May through September, Loura sent Reilly two or three packages of marijuana per month for Tremblay.5 After receiving the packages, Reilly would contact Tremblay. Either Tremblay or co-defendant Robert Coute ("Coute") would pick up the packages from Reilly.

At some point prior to Labor Day weekend in 1994, Wilkes began shipping marijuana to Tremblay. From September through November, Wilkes sent Reilly approximately one package of marijuana per week. In September 1994, Tremblay also recruited another co-defendant, Kenneth Perry ("Perry"), to receive packages for Tremblay. At one point, Wilkes shipped a five-pound package of marijuana to Perry in Taunton, Massachusetts.

In November 1994, Tremblay arranged for Reilly to live with Wilkes in San Diego for several weeks. During this period, Reilly mailed several packages of marijuana to Tremblay on Wilkes' behalf. Eventually, Wilkes and Reilly had a falling out; Reilly moved into a hotel. Her activities on behalf of Wilkes subsequently decreased and, by January 1995, ended entirely.

In total, Reilly estimates that she mailed twenty to twenty-five packages to Massachusetts on behalf of Wilkes.

In March 1995, Reilly moved back to Taunton and began to receive occasional packages from Wilkes. In June 1995, Reilly recruited co-defendant Jodi King...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • U.S. v. Mueffelman
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • July 26, 2004
    ...at least two different interpretations — what I have called the impact analysis, and the statutory analysis, see United States v. Wilkes, 130 F.Supp.2d 222, 230 (D.Mass.2001). (1) The impact analysis: This approach suggests that if the factor at issue has a substantial impact on the sentenc......
  • US v. Prentiss, No. 98-2040
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • July 12, 2001
    ...conclusion here."). Its holding has also been questioned by a district court within the First Circuit. See United States v. Wilkes, 130 F. Supp. 2d 222, 237-38 (D. Mass. 2001) (applying Mojica-Baez as circuit precedent but stating that "in effect, the First Circuit did precisely what Stiron......
  • State v. Jess
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • March 31, 2008
    ...to allege a required and essential element of the felony crime for which [the defendant] was convicted"); cf. United States v. Wilkes, 130 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (D.Mass.2001) (concluding that because the indictment did not specify the amount of marijuana, "the indictment [was] deficient under ......
  • U.S. v. Malouf, No. CRIM.03-CR-10298-NG.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • June 14, 2005
    ...ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909)). 9. In United States v. Wilkes, 130 F.Supp.2d 222, 231 (D.Mass.2001), I noted that there are "[t]hree currents" of constitutional analysis in Apprendi. I described them as (1) The impact......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT