U.S. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 02 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-3300,81-3300
• Citation: 679 F.2d 504
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry E. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 504

679 F.2d 504

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry E. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-3300.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 2, 1982.

Virgil M. Wheeler, Jr., New Orleans, La., Herbert Shafer, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Richard T. Simmons, Jr., Michael Schatzon, Asst. U. S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GOLDBERG, WILLIAMS and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

For the second time in as many years, appellant Henry Williams comes before this court challenging his federal extortion conviction. ¹ In this appeal, our attention is focused upon two important rights afforded criminal defendants: the accused's right to know the nature and cause of the government's accusations and his right to be provided with the information necessary to the preparation of an adequate defense. Specifically, we are asked whether this defendant was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial because the government's indictment failed to include specific allegations of fact in support of the interstate commerce element of the charged offense and because the government refused to provide a Bill of Particulars.

We conclude that a federal indictment which alleges interstate commerce effects in conclusory terms, without evidentiary detail, is not fatally insufficient and that the trial court's refusal to order a Bill of Particulars did not constitute reversible error in this case because the government did provide the defense with pretrial access to the facts used to establish the interstate commerce effects of the charged offense. We therefore affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from allegations that appellant Henry E. Williams, a former member of the Jefferson Parish School Board, willfully extorted illegal bribes and kickbacks from contractors and suppliers doing business with the school district. Williams was indicted on three counts of violating the Hobbs Act. ²

The defendant entered a plea of not guilty on all counts and proceeded to file motions challenging the sufficiency of the indictments. Specifically, Williams argued that two counts of the indictment were fatally deficient insofar as they failed to set forth any specific facts which could sustain a finding that his allegedly extortionate acts affected interstate commerce. Along with his challenge to the sufficiency of the indictments, the defendant also filed a request for a Bill of Particulars which would set forth specific facts relating to the interstate commerce element of the charged offense. The district court denied each of the defendant's pretrial motions.

Prior to trial, the prosecution provided discovery documents in a cooperative and timely fashion. Moreover, the parties stipulated to certain expected testimony and identified documents bearing upon the interstate commerce element of the charged offenses. Thus, prior to trial the defendant was apprised of all the facts which the prosecution ultimately used in establishing the interstate commerce element of the charged offense.

Following a three day trial, the case was submitted to a jury which returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. The defendant then sought a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing: (1) that a conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act required a showing that the defendant had threatened or actually used violence, force, or fear in unlawfully obtaining property; and (2) that the Hobbs Act itself was unconstitutionally vague. The district court agreed and entered a directed verdict for the accused. United States v. Williams, 480 F.Supp. 1040 (E.D.La.1979). The government then appealed.

On appeal, this court reversed the directed verdict of acquittal, finding that proof of coercion was not a necessary element of a Hobbs Act extortion case and that the Hobbs Act was not so vague as to be unenforceable. We therefore remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury's verdict and for sentencing. United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1980). As per our instructions, the district court reinstated the jury verdict and sentenced Williams to 18 months of incarceration on count 1; and a four year probationary period on counts 2 and 3. The defendant then brought this appeal.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Defendant Williams raises two closely related but analytically distinct arguments on appeal. First: Williams contends that counts 1 and 2 of the indictment were fatally insufficient insofar as they failed to set forth specific facts which could support a finding that his allegedly extortionate acts affected interstate commerce. ³ Second: Williams argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant his pretrial request for a Bill of Particulars. Specifically, Williams contends that since the indictment failed to allege specific facts bearing upon the interstate commerce element of the charged offense, the prosecution was obligated to at least set forth such facts in a Bill of Particulars.

Appellant does not contend that the evidence actually introduced at trial was insufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction. Williams' argument is that he was denied his right to be apprised of these facts prior to trial by way of indictment or a Bill of Particulars.

III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Henry Williams is challenging his conviction before this Court for a second time. Before proceeding to the merits, we should first explain why this criminal defendant is being afforded two opportunities for appellate review. ⁴

In the first appellate incarnation of U. S. v. Williams, this defendant appeared before us in the role of appellee. As such, he was allowed only to respond to the government's arguments. If in the earlier appeal Williams had sought to raise the arguments he now brings before us, his cross-appeal would have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction; as the victor in the district court, Williams was not then an aggrieved party entitled to review. Moreover, as the defendant in a criminal action, he could not come before this court in the role of appellant until he had been sentenced. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518, 76 S.Ct. 912, 916, 100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-213, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165-166, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937). It was only after the district court's directed verdict of acquittal had been reversed, the case remanded, and a sentence had been imposed, that Williams could raise the arguments he now urges upon the court in this appeal. Since this is the first time Mr. Williams could appear before us in the role of appellant, we conclude that this case is now properly before us.

Having explained why Mr. Williams is getting two bites at the appellate apple, we now move on to the core issues in this appeal.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENTS

Appellant Williams argues that a Hobbs Act indictment which simply charges interstate commerce effects in the generic language of the statute, without any allegations of specific facts in support of that claim, is facially insufficient. As appellant correctly notes, counts 1 and 2 of this indictment did not set forth any specific facts which would establish the interstate commerce element of the charged offenses. ⁵ The indictment alleged that the defendants' acts affected interstate commerce, but it did so without providing any evidentiary detail. The question now before us is whether the district court erred in refusing to dismiss such an indictment.

Rule 7(c), F.R.Crim.P., states that federal indictments must provide "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offenses charged." However, this does not mean that the indictment must set forth facts and evidentiary details necessary to establish each of the elements of the charged offense. As Judge Rubin has stated:

"An indictment, to be sufficient, must allege that the defendant committed each of the essential elements of the crime charged so as to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any subsequent prosecution for the same offense ... It is not necessary for the indictment to go further and to allege in detail the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges."

United States v. Crippen, 579 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1978).

As a general rule, an indictment which alleges an element of the charged offense merely by reciting the words of the applicable statute is valid so long as the indictment alleges each of the requisite elements of the charged offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2807, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); United States v. Davis, 592 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Strand, 566 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Slepicoff, 524 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1975). However, appellant Williams suggests that this case comes within an exception to this well-established principle, arguing that in cases where the very core of criminality depends upon a specific identification of fact, an indictment must do more than simply parrot statutory language; it "may not simply recite ... generic terms but ... must descend to particulars. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979). Our question is whether an allegation of interstate commerce effects presents one of those special instances where such evidentiary detail is required.

In United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), we passed upon this very issue and concluded that an indictment which merely alleged interstate commerce effects in conclusory terms was not fatally insufficient. In Diecidue, a criminal defendant challenged the sufficiency of an indictment which charged the interstate commerce effects of the substantive...