U.S. v. Williams, 92-4671

Citation998 F.2d 258
Decision Date05 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-4671,92-4671
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Dana WILLIAMS, a/k/a Paul William Dana, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Garland Cardwell, Sherman, TX (court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

Carol K. Johnson, Michael E. Savage, Asst. U.S. Attys., Sherman, TX, Bob Wortham, U.S. Atty., Beaumont, TX, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

Appellant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping his estranged wife with the intent of committing "immoral" acts (sexually assaulting his wife while their child watched), being a felon in possession of a gun, and using a gun to commit a crime of violence in interstate commerce. He appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the district court erred in denying him the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine his sanity at the time of the offense and his competence to stand trial; that the court erred in instructing the jury on the scope of the indictment; and that the government's failure to disclose certain materials denied him a fair trial. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

After Lisa Dana (hereafter "Dana") filed for divorce from Paul Dana Williams, a/k/a Paul William Dana (hereafter "Williams"), the two separated and lived apart. Their two year-old son lived with Dana. On or about November 1, 1991, Williams came to Dana's home and convinced her to bring their son out with him to a local shopping mall, so that they could pick out a shiny new wagon for the boy. After they shopped unsuccessfully for a wagon, they returned to Williams' van.

Dana later testified that after they returned to the van, Williams began choking her and produced a gun, threatening to kill her with it. He took her to the back of the van and raped her. Afterward, he bound her with tape and wire, and took her and their son on a journey from Texas to Oklahoma and back again. Along the way, defendant repeatedly threatened, beat and sexually assaulted his wife in front of their young son, who became highly distressed by what he was forced to witness. Williams told Dana that he came prepared to kill her and that he had a shovel in the van with which he would bury her.

Finally, Dana persuaded Williams to hand her the gun and return her to her home. She immediately sought the advice of friends. These friends told her to go directly to a hospital for medical care and an examination to preserve evidence of the rape, and to go to the police to turn over the gun and tell her story. Dana followed this advice. The medical examination revealed that Dana had been violently sexually assaulted.

Williams was convicted by a jury of (1) kidnapping his wife with the goal of accomplishing an "immoral purpose," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (count one); 1 (2) possessing and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce despite being prohibited from doing so based on a prior conviction for a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (count two); 2 and (3) carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count three). 3 Defendant was acquitted of a fourth count pertaining to transporting a person in interstate commerce with the intent to commit rape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421 and Oklahoma Criminal Code Title 21 § 1111(B). Defendant was sentenced to 420 months imprisonment.

ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Count one of the indictment charged Williams with kidnapping Dana for an immoral purpose. Counts two and three of the indictment referred to a particular gun (listing its serial number). Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the "immoral purpose" element of the kidnapping charged in count one, and that there was insufficient evidence to show that the gun introduced at trial in support of counts two and three was the same gun used by him in kidnapping and assaulting his wife.

To the extent that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the verdict must be sustained. 4 The appellate court's The government presented evidence establishing an unbroken chain of possession from the time Dana turned the gun in to the police. Not only did Dana testify that the gun presented in evidence was the same gun used to threaten her, but another witness testified that he believed he had sold that particular gun to Williams. 7 In any case, because Williams made no objection to the admission of the pistol into evidence, he has waived his right to object to its admission on appeal. United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.1991). Since evidence was presented that the gun was manufactured in California, was sold to Williams (a convicted felon) in Texas and used to commit a crime in interstate commerce, there was sufficient evidence supporting the conviction on counts two and three.

                role does not extend to weighing the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. 5  If a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the essential elements of the crimes charged, the conviction should be upheld. 6  We conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to support its contention that Williams kidnapped Dana for an immoral purpose and used the gun with the particular serial number listed in the indictment
                

Williams claims that because the jury acquitted him on count four (rape), there must have been insufficient evidence to convict him on count one (kidnapping for an immoral purpose), and that therefore the jury should have acquitted him on count one. His argument is not so much premised on insufficiency of the evidence on count one, for it clearly was sufficient, 8 but on the inconsistency of the two verdicts. Williams' argument fails for two reasons. First, the "immoral purpose" of the kidnapping in this case may or may not have been rape. The government presented evidence that Williams raped and assaulted his wife in the presence of their infant son, while Williams was transporting his wife and son in interstate commerce against their will. Thus, the jury may have found that the defendant actually intended other "immoral purposes" besides rape--e.g., assault. The government presented evidence of a variety of immoral purposes Williams sought, any one of which would have supported the conviction. Second, even if the two verdicts were inconsistent, a jury may return inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases, even where the inconsistency is the result of mistake or compromise. See e.g., United States v. Fesler, 781 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118, 106 S.Ct. 1977, 90 L.Ed.2d 661 (1986); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346, 102 S.Ct. 460, 464, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) (per curiam); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63, 67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 475, 478, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (where truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, "the most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or in the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt....The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the Government's inability to invoke review, suggests that incompatible verdicts should not be reviewable").

II. DENIAL OF MENTAL EXAMINATION

A district court may order a mental examination of a defendant at public expense under several statutes. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A; Insanity Defense In support of his motion for a mental examination on the twin issues of competence to stand trial and the defense of insanity, Williams stated that he "was under medical and psychiatric care as well as medication," and had been under such care at the time of the offense. The district court never ruled on Williams' request for a mental examination on insanity at the time of the offense, because Williams' attorney explicitly waived the defense at a hearing held on the motion for a mental examination. The district court denied Williams' request for a mental examination on competence to stand trial because it found that there was no reasonable cause to believe that Williams might be unable to understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense. Our review is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion. 10 Under that standard, we cannot say the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mental examination. For the sake of clarity, we will review the denial of defendant's request for a mental examination on sanity at the time of the offense separately from the denial of defendant's request for a mental examination on competence to stand trial.

                Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, 4242. 9  None of these statutory provisions requires that the defendant be granted a mental examination on demand
                
A. DENIAL OF MENTAL EXAMINATION ON SANITY AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE

Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4242, the court is authorized to order a mental examination on the defendant's sanity at the time of the alleged offense, if the defendant has provided notice of his intention to rely on the insanity defense and the government has moved for such an examination. A psychiatrist appointed under § 4242 at the government's request or on the court's own motion is "expected to be neutral and detached," United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir.1971), and reports his findings to the court even if the defendant does not wish him to do so. Under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, by contrast, the mental health expert "fills a different role." Id. The § 3006A expert's conclusions need not be reported either to the court or to the prosecution. Id. The court grants the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • Ricks v. United States, A-10-CA-352-LY
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • July 26, 2013
    ...Cir. 1990). A competency claim requires the defendant to produce more than mere allegations of incompetency. See United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim when he "supplied only the bare allegation that he has a 'history of ment......
  • State v. Kirwin
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 2012
    ...federal cases consistently articulate the substantial evidence standard as focusing on the crime actually charged. United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir.1993) (“If a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the essential elements of th......
  • U.S. v. Whitfield
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 11, 2009
    ...FBI reports in camera and determined that the material was not discoverable, we review only for clear error. See United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 269 (5th Cir.1993). After reviewing the record, we find nothing to suggest that the district court's ruling was clearly erroneous. See id......
  • U.S. v. Skilling
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • January 6, 2009
    ...them. Again, the proper avenue for such an argument would be a motion for a new trial under Rule 33. 74. See e.g., United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 269 (5th Cir.1993) ("After an in camera review, the district court concluded that nothing in the Forms 302 would tend to exculpate the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT