U.S. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-4162,96-4162
• Citation: 152 F.3d 294
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Crandale WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 294

152 F.3d 294

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Michael Crandale WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-4162.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 5, 1998.

Decided July 30, 1998.

ARGUED: Fred Warren Bennett, Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, Washington, DC, for Appellant.Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, NC, for Appellee.ON BRIEF: Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, J. Benjamin Davis, Third Year Law Student, Yale Law School, Miguel Hull, Third Year Law Student, University of North Carolina School of Law, Raleigh, NC, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded by published opinion.Senior Judge PHILLIPS wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge MOTZ joined.

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal by Michael Williams in which he challenges his convictions and the resulting sentences imposed for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 846, knowingly possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and being a convicted felon in possession of several firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I.

On April 19, 1995, local law enforcement officers arrested Michael Williams, Pedro Gonzalez, and Juan Gonzalez, Jr. for selling cocaine out of a mobile home in Murfreesboro, North Carolina.The officers apprehended the three men upon their return to the mobile home in an Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight.Upon searching the vehicle, the officers discovered a .45 caliber pistol, a 9mm Smith and Wesson handgun, 2.9 grams of cocaine base (crack), .7 grams of cocaine powder, and about $800 in cash.Williams was immediately arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back seat of a police vehicle.The officers then proceeded to search Williams's parked Chevy Blazer finding additional firearms, considerable ammunition, and approximately $7000 in cash.During this search, Williams escaped from the police vehicle and was not apprehended until the following morning.

Testimony at trial revealed that all three defendants had come to North Carolina from their hometown of Allentown, Pennsylvania.At Williams's request, both Gonzalezes had accompanied Williams on a trip from there through Ohio and Virginia on their way to North Carolina.In Ohio, Williams showed the Gonzalezes "two cookies" of crack cocaine claiming that they weighed 10 ounces.After arriving in North Carolina, the three men stayed at a mobile home belonging to a friend of Williams.

Pedro Gonzalez, who agreed to cooperate with the government after pleading guilty on two counts, testified that during their stay Williams directed him to distribute crack cocaine and supplied $1000 worth of "$20 hits" of crack cocaine.Pedro Gonzalez also testified that he had sold cocaine with Williams in North Carolina on a prior visit and that Williams distributed cocaine in Pennsylvania as well.Other witnesses also testified that Williams had engaged in distribution of both crack and cocaine powder.

Several witnesses also testified that Williams possessed various firearms and carried or used them frequently on and just prior to the date of his arrest.Pedro Gonzalez explained that Williams almost always carried the .45 caliber pistol in a holster strapped to his side when orchestrating or completing drug deals.Another witness, John Hendrick, testified that Williams was carrying a firearm when he sold Hendrick a substantial amount of crack.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts against Williams.The presentence report, prepared by the probation office following the verdict, attributed 712.5 grams of crack cocaine and 113.4 grams of cocaine powder to Williams.The quantities were derived mainly from out-of-court statements of Pedro Gonzalez.The PSR also recommended that Williams be assessed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.At the sentencing hearing, the district court rejected objections by Williams to both the drug quantity amount and the obstruction of justice enhancement recommended by the PSR.The court then sentenced Williams to imprisonment for a term of 384 months.

This appeal followed.On it, Williams raises various claims of error affecting his convictions and the sentences imposed.

II.

Williams first argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard.The following instruction was given to the jury:

The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all.The government has the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must find the defendant not guilty.

And thus while the government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that the defendant's guilt be proven beyond all possible doubt.It is only required that the government's proof exclude any reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt.

Now, reasonable doubt is a real doubt based upon reason and common sense and careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

(J.A.at 210.)

Before the jury was charged, Williams requested a more detailed instruction defining reasonable doubt.The district court refused.Williams now complains that the reasonable doubt instruction as given entirely failed to provide any meaning to the concept because it did not define the term.Alternatively, he argues that, to the extent a definition was offered, it was incomplete and improperly reduced the government's burden of proof.

It is per se reversible error to give a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction.Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182(1993).The proper inquiry in reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the reasonable doubt standard in an unconstitutional manner.Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583(1994).The trial court is not required to define reasonable doubt as a matter of course so long as the jury is instructed that a defendant's guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the Constitution does not obligate a court to further define the standard.Id.

In accordance with Victor and because of our belief that efforts to define reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept, we have repeatedly held that a district court need not, and in fact should not, define the term "reasonable doubt" even upon request.United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 45(4th Cir.1994)("[W]e have consistently and vigorously condemned the attempts of trial courts to define reasonable doubt.");United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950(4th Cir.1991)(expressing a "categorical disdain" for attempts at defining reasonable doubt).Therefore, Williams's claim that the district court erroneously refused to define reasonable doubt is contrary to the law of this circuit.

Williams's argument that the district court's instruction improperly lessened the government's burden of proof is similarly unpersuasive.In Adkins, we expressly held that an instruction containing the first two paragraphs quoted above from the district court's charge survived constitutional scrutiny.937 F.2d at 949-50.In particular, we observed that the instruction "left 'reasonable doubt' to its 'self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror.' "Id. at 949(citations omitted).

The district court's instruction that "reasonable doubt is a real doubt based upon reason and common sense and careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case" does not convert the Adkins-approved portion of the instruction into an unconstitutional definition.This additional sentence merely admonished the jury to exercise reason and unbiased diligence in reaching a decision.This general guidance neither impeded the jury's application of the "selfevident meaning" of reasonable doubt nor "undermine[d] or destroy[ed] their common sense appreciation of that term's meaning."Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 476(4th Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334(1986).It therefore did not reduce the government's burden of proof.SeeTruesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749(4th Cir.1998)(holding that an instruction equating "reasonable doubt" with "real doubt" did not improperly reduce the government's burden of proof).

III.

Williams next argues, for the first time, that the indictment was facially defective because, in count two, it charged him with "possessing," rather than "using" or "carrying," a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c).Although an objection based on the sufficiency of an indictment can be lodged at any time, if it is first raised on appeal, the "indictment ... [is] construed more liberally ... and every intendment is then indulged in support of ... sufficiency."United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 479(4th Cir.1992);United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1200(4th Cir.1990) .Moreover, "where the post-verdict challenge to the indictment relates to the absence of an element, the indictment will be held sufficient if it contains words of similar import."Id. at 1201(quotation and citation omitted).

To pass constitutional muster, an indictment must (1) indicate the elements of the offense and fairly inform the defendant of the exact charges and (2) enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy in subsequent prosecutions for the same offense.Sutton, 961 F.2d at 479."One of the principal purposes of an indictment is to apprise the accused of the charge or charges against him so ...