U.S. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 09 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-6285,94-6285 |
| Parties | 42 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 148 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alphonzo Leon WILLIAMS, a/k/a Hoss, a/k/a Alphonso Leon Williams, a/k/a Alfonzo Leon Williams, a/k/a Alfonso Leon Williams, a/k/a Fred Bell, Defendant-Appellant. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Adam M. Porter, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.
William G. Simpson, Walter E. Braswell, Acting U.S. Atty., Birmingham, AL, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before KRAVITCH, HATCHETT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
Alphonzo Leon Williams appeals his conviction under the federal carjacking statute and his twenty-five-year sentence. We affirm.
On April 28, 1993, Scott Whitehead was driving his pickup truck in Birmingham, Alabama, with Tim Donaldson sitting in the passenger seat. After noticing a car following them, Donaldson loaded a pistol that he had previously placed underneath his seat.
Eventually, Whitehead stopped at an intersection. At this point, the appellant, Williams, exited the tailing vehicle, and approached. When Williams reached Whitehead's door, he pointed a gun inside the truck. In response, Donaldson, from his position in the passenger seat, began shooting across Whitehead and through the driver's window, hitting Williams. One of Donaldson's shots also struck Whitehead in the side of the head.
When Williams began to retreat, Donaldson noticed that Whitehead was unconscious. He then pushed Whitehead against the driver's door and began to operate the truck. As Donaldson started to speed away, Williams fired several shots.
Approximately twenty-four hours later, Whitehead died as a result of the gunshot wound.
On October 1, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Alabama returned an indictment charging Williams with one count of attempted carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2119 and 2. 1 Before trial, Williams filed a motion to exclude any evidence concerning Whitehead's death. A magistrate judge recommended that Williams's motion be denied, explaining that the carjacking statute
Due to this comment in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the government superseded the indictment so as to charge Williams with a carjacking "resulting in the death of Richard 'Scott' Whitehead." Williams then filed a motion to strike this added language in the indictment, or alternatively, to bifurcate the trial into a guilt phase and a penalty phase.
In granting Williams's request for a bifurcated trial, the district court disagreed with the magistrate judge, and found that death is only a sentencing enhancement feature, not an element of the carjacking statute. The district court, however, agreed with the magistrate judge that evidence of Whitehead's death would be admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, during the guilt phase, the government elicited testimony from Donaldson, over Williams's objection, that Whitehead was physically located "in the cemetery."
After three days of trial, the guilt phase concluded on January 5, 1994. Before sending the indictment to the jurors for their deliberations, the district court redacted the words "resulting in the death of Richard 'Scott' Whitehead" from the carjacking count. The next day, the jury found Williams guilty of carjacking. 2 The second phase of the trial then commenced. A forensic pathologist, who testified for the government about the cause of Whitehead's death, was the only witness during the penalty phase. After the court charged the jury, it found that a death did not result from Williams's violation of the carjacking statute.
On March 21, 1994, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines to Williams's convictions, the presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a range of 140 to 175 months imprisonment based on a total offense level of twenty-eight and a criminal history category of VI. In arriving at the total offense level, the PSR added seven levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) because Williams discharged a firearm during the carjacking. Williams objected to this increase, arguing that he only fired shots straight into the air after Donaldson made his escape. Although the district court recognized that Williams may have fired the shots into the air, it rejected his contention, and accepted the increase. Also over Williams's objection, the district court granted the government's motion for an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.1, explaining that "by a preponderance of the evidence, and using that standard rather than the much higher standard that the jury was operating under, that under the terms of 5K2.1 death did result." Accordingly, the district court increased Williams's total offense level to thirty-four, which placed him in a guideline range of 262 to 327 months. The district court then sentenced Williams to 300 months (twenty-five years) in prison. 3
Williams contends that Congress did not have the authority to enact the federal carjacking statute under the Commerce Clause, and even if it did, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Whitehead's death during the guilt phase of his trial because it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Finally, Williams contests his sentence, arguing that he did not fire his gun during the commission of the carjacking; therefore, the district court erred in increasing his offense level under section 2B3.1(b)(2)(A); he also claims that the upward departure, pursuant to section 5K2.1, was erroneous because the jury found that Whitehead's death did not result from his carjacking violation.
With respect to Williams's constitutional challenges, the government responds that courts throughout the country have consistently rejected his Commerce Clause claim; further, the government asserts that the carjacking statute is not unconstitutionally
vague because it clearly proscribes patently criminal conduct. In response to Williams's evidentiary claim, the government argues that Whitehead's death was relevant, and that such evidence did not substantially prejudice the jury. Finally, with respect to the sentence, the government contends that Williams fired several shots as Donaldson was driving away, therefore, the seven-level increase pursuant to section 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) was justified; the government also contends that the district court's upward departure pursuant to section 5K2.1 was proper because Whitehead died as a result of the carjacking.
This appeal requires us to decide whether: (1) Congress possessed the authority, under the Commerce Clause, to enact the federal carjacking statute; (2) the carjacking statute is unconstitutionally vague; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Whitehead's death; (4) the district court properly applied a seven-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(A); and (5) the district court erred in granting an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.1.
In 1992, Congress enacted the federal carjacking statute. The original version provided:
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both.
18 U.S.C. Sec. 2119 (1992). This version of the statute was in effect when the grand jury indicted Williams and when the trial jury convicted him. On September 13, 1994, Congress amended the statute. As a result of the amendments, the statute now reads:
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. Sec. 2119 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, as the emphasized portions indicate, the 1994 amendments changed the intent requirement, and added the possibility of the death penalty. The overall structure of the carjacking statute, however, remains intact.
Williams argues that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the federal carjacking statute. While this is an issue of first impression for this court, several of our sister circuits have been presented with identical challenges to section 2119, and all have held that its creation was a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442, 444-45 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir.1994); United States v....
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