U.S. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 11 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-10320.,02-10320.
• Citation: 314 F.3d 552
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

314 F.3d 552

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-10320.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

December 11, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael G. Nichola, Orlando, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Yvette Rhodes, Tamra Phipps, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before BARKETT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The petition for rehearing filed by appellee, United States of America, is GRANTED. Accordingly, we VACATE our previous opinion published at 309 F.3d 762 and replace it with the following opinion.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-Appellant David Williams appeals his conviction for several drug-related offenses, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because the indictment was not filed within thirty days of his arrest as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (the "Speedy Trial Act"). He also contests the district court's grant of his motion to proceed pro se, maintaining that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2000, the government filed a criminal complaint against Williams and arrested him pursuant to a warrant. The complaint alleged that Williams had committed several drug-related offenses. On December 18, Williams made an initial appearance before a magistrate judge, who assigned Williams a court-appointed attorney to serve as temporary counsel for one day. During this initial appearance, the magistrate judge granted Williams's oral motion to continue the preliminary examination. The government, in turn, requested a three-day extension because the prosecutor was "involved with some other stuff." The magistrate judge scheduled the preliminary examination for December 21 and appointed Peter Kenny as Williams's counsel.

On December 21, the court heard limited testimony and then, due to the limited availability of the U.S. Marshals, continued the preliminary examination until the next day. On December 22, after hearing more testimony, the magistrate judge continued the hearing until December 28 because the courts were closing for the Christmas holiday. On December 28, the magistrate determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that Williams had committed the offenses alleged in the complaint. In granting the continuances between each of the four proceedings, the magistrate judge made no explicit findings that the ends of justice served by granting these continuances outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

On January 4, 2001, Williams, through Kenny, filed a "Waiver of Speedy Trial." The document provided, "After consultation with his undersigned counsel, the Defendant, DAVID WILLIAMS, hereby voluntarily and knowingly waives his right to speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This is a waiver of speedy trial for sixty (60) days." After consultation, Williams authorized Kenny to sign and file the waiver, but Williams himself never signed the document.

On March 13, 2001, Williams moved for Kenny to withdraw and for the court to appoint new counsel. The magistrate judge granted the motion on March 16 and appointed new counsel on March 20. Then, on April 5, Williams filed a pro se motion to dismiss his new attorney and also moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, contending that he had not been indicted within thirty days of his arrest as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

While Williams's motion was still under advisement, the government filed its indictment on April 10, 2001. The indictment charged Williams with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base and five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 486; possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii); possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii); and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense and in furtherance thereof, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). On April 20, the magistrate judge determined that Williams's motion to dismiss the criminal complaint was moot because an indictment had already been returned against him.

The magistrate judge allowed Williams to proceed pro se, and with the help of standby counsel, Williams prepared for trial. In May, Williams filed two more motions to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, both of which were denied. The five-day trial lasted from June 5 to June 12, 2001, and the jury convicted Williams on all counts.

During post-trial proceedings, the district court analyzed whether the timing of the government's indictment violated the Speedy Trial Act. It denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment had been filed within thirty days of Williams's arrest.¹ Alternatively, the court concluded that even if the indictment was not timely, the charges contained in the criminal complaint should be dismissed without prejudice because the drug and firearms offenses were "extremely serious," because the "one- or two-day delay" in filing the indictment was minimal, and because there was no prejudice to Williams because the delays were made at his request and for his benefit.

Williams argues that the district court erred in applying the Speedy Trial Act when calculating the number of days between his arrest and the filing of the indictment; he contends that the district court improperly excluded days that should have been included under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Further, Williams urges that the date of his initial appearance should not have been excluded because the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) does not specifically exclude it. He also argues that the district court improperly excluded the period during which his preliminary examination was continued because the continuances were granted to accommodate the government, the U.S. Marshal Service, and the DEA agents and because the magistrate did not find that the continuances served the "ends of justice." See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). In addition, Williams contends that the sixty-day period during which his attorney waived his right to speedy trial should not be excluded because there was no showing that the continuance served the ends of justice. Williams submits that the indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a claim under the Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district court's factual determinations on excludable time for clear error. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2002).

III. ANALYSIS

Under the Speedy Trial Act, the government must indict a defendant within thirty days from the date on which the defendant was arrested or served with a summons. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). In calculating this thirty-day period, certain events, as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h), "toll" the speedy-indictment clock. First, delays resulting from certain "proceedings concerning the defendant" are excludable. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). These include any delay resulting from a pretrial motion, which is calculated from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the disposition of the motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). Second, the thirty-day calculation does not include

[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11th Cir.1987). Therefore, the clock is tolled for pretrial motions and certain other proceedings concerning the defendant per 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) and also for ends-of-justice continuances per 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).

For there to be a valid ends-of-justice continuance, the court need not explicitly enunciate its findings when it grants the continuance "so long as there is sufficient evidence in the record indicating that it considered the factors identified in the statute when it granted the continuance."² United States v. Vasser, 916 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir.1990).

If an indictment is not filed within the Act's time limit, the charges against the individual that were contained in the criminal complaint "shall be dismissed." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1); see also United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir.1996) (explaining that when the indictment violates the Speedy Trial Act, a court generally should dismiss "only the charge[s] contained in the criminal complaint"). The court must then determine whether to dismiss the charges in the complaint with or without prejudice. In making this decision, the court considers three statutory factors: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and (3) the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Act and on the administration of justice. Id.; United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d...