U.S. v. Williams, 96-2075

Decision Date12 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-2075,96-2075
Citation113 F.3d 1155
Parties97 CJ C.A.R. 715 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dora WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Submitted on the briefs: *

Ron Koch, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.

John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Charles L. Barth, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before PORFILIO, McWILLIAMS, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

JOHN C. PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.

Of the several issues raised in this appeal of her conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the question whether defendant Dora Williams was competent to stand trial predominates. We conclude she was not, vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine Ms. Williams' competence to stand trial. However, whatever slate that determination produces, we also conclude it is free of the question of any possible evidentiary taint from the allegedly unlawful search professed here.

I.

Ms. Williams was a passenger on an Amtrak train which DEA Special Agent Kevin Small boarded during a routine stop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Suspicious of the new tweed suitcase perched above her seat in the coach car, Agent Small questioned Ms. Williams and her traveling companion, Maricella McToy. Based upon their statements, Agent Small seized the suitcase, broke off the locks, and uncovered approximately five kilograms of cocaine. The grand jury subsequently charged Ms. Williams and Ms. McToy with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Only Ms. Williams stood trial, the court having released upon certain conditions Ms. McToy who promptly absconded from the jurisdiction. Ms. Williams' second attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized on the train and the statements she made coincident to the seizure and her arrest. Although the court granted the motion in part, suppressing the government's use of her statements, it rejected her contention the train encounter was nonconsensual and concluded, based upon both defendants' statements to Agent Small, the suitcase was abandoned property.

Three weeks before trial, Ms. Williams fired her second attorney, and the court appointed a third, Lawrence Chacon, who moved to withdraw as counsel after the jury was seated. As her trial commenced, Ms. Williams, speaking rapidly and excitedly, bombarded the court with requests, asking to make an opening statement, to fire her attorney, to introduce a disputed tape and transcript of the train encounter, to ascertain the presence of certain witnesses, and to protest the composition of the jury. Defense counsel explained to the court his efforts to appease Ms. Williams' concerns, discounting her representations but acknowledging his difficulty reconciling her demands with his professional responsibility.

The government then interjected that Ms. Williams was taking medication and suggested the court inquire. Ms. Williams told the court she took Elavil, an antidepressant, and explained, "when you was telling me to slow down in my talking, I'm a very hyper person ... I started taking them because I'm in a situation ... I don't have anything.... They put me on medication because, when they released my co-defendant and held me--and I have heart murmur also. And the doctors sent me up to the hospital. When I went out to the hospital, they examined my heart and stuff like that. They felt that it was necessary for them to put me on some kind of antibiotics." She told the court the medication did not interfere with her ability to understand. Asked if it interfered with her ability to communicate with her attorney, she responded:

Ms. Williams: Well, sir, my attorney right now--

The Court: Can you answer the question?

Ms. Williams: No. I mean, yes, sir. My ability to deal with my attorney, my attorney is not for me. So yes, sir.

After a recess, 2 the court ruled,

[W]hile the defendant is excitable and prone to making outbursts and interrupting the proceedings, that she is otherwise understanding the proceedings, is communicating with her attorney. She is able to cooperate and assist in her defense. And I conclude that the medication that she is on is not affecting her ability to do so.

With the jury seated, the government began its examination of Agent Small, soon prompting Mr. Chacon to inform the court Ms. Williams was "just very, very, very, very upset and she's sitting there crying and can't really control herself." The jury excused, defense counsel told the court,

I don't know if she doesn't understand the proceedings, the procedure, how court is conducted, how a trial is conducted. She is--at this point, basically what I'm doing, because I'm not out in front of the jury doing something or cross-examining at this time Mr. Small. She just wants to leave. She doesn't want to be a part of this. And she reiterates, I think, her need to, I guess, fire me, basically.

While telling Ms. Williams ("I'm not understanding you. Calm down."), the court assured her that defense counsel was adequately representing her interests although she interrupted the explanation.

The government resumed questioning Agent Small again to be interrupted by Ms. Williams who asked to leave the proceedings. The court retired the jury, and Ms. Williams announced she was firing her attorney because he wasn't representing her and she couldn't sit and "watch my rights be violated." 3 The court ordered her not to interrupt and to sit down.

Ms. Williams: Sir, I'm leaving this courtroom.

The Court: No, you're not.

Ms. Williams: Yes, I am. What you going to do, have me handcuffed to the chain? [sic]. You want me to sit here and watch you have all my rights violated?

Ending the stalemate by ordering the marshal to take Ms. Williams away, the court recessed the proceedings. These interchanges pocked the first day of Ms. Williams' two-day trial.

On the second day, the proceedings fared no better, Ms. Williams having decided to testify on her own behalf. Frustrated with the nonresponsiveness of her answers, the court advised Ms. Williams to listen carefully to counsel's questions and to talk slowly, concentrating on the question, to best communicate her case to the jury. Ms. Williams then told the court she did not take her medication, the marshal having forgotten to give it to her that morning. The court made no further inquiry, and Ms. Williams proceeded to testify, interrupting questions, her responses divagating from the questions into argumentative or self-pitying statements, disregarding the court's repeated warnings. With Ms. Williams' seeming disregard for the court's caution, the court began striking her responses, instructing the jury to disregard her nonresponsive narratives. Continuously, the court told Ms. Williams, "[S]top. Do not say anything until [counsel] has asked the question." To say that Ms. Williams was out of control during the second day of the proceeding euphemizes the record.

After the jury found Ms. Williams guilty, her fourth attorney appeared for a hearing on two motions, the first for recusal, the second for a forensic evaluation. As to the former, the court reviewed the history of the case and refused to recuse itself from further proceedings, again entertaining Ms. Williams' numerous interruptions. For the latter, new defense counsel, Ron Koch, asked the court to take note of Ms. Williams "crying, extremely upset, very animated, in my opinion, hysterical." The court then stated for the record, "[t]he defendant is hysterical. She is interrupting the proceedings. She is sobbing. What she is saying is such that I cannot understand it and my court reporter has indicated to me that what she is saying is not possible to place in the record." Counsel then told the court of his concern about Ms. Williams' competence and overall mental health. He noted Ms. Williams' long history of mental instability intertwined with her continuous interactions with the criminal justice system beginning at the age of thirteen. He informed the court that when he tried to review the presentence report with Ms. Williams, she was unable to focus. "Now, where that raises questions in my mind is the ability to assist. And I'm convinced that she wasn't able to assist Mr. Chacon at trial because Dora, in her own way, because of her mental condition, had her own agenda, and that resulted in the repeated outbursts, the interruptions, all those kind of things, and, in my mind, not a true understanding of the nature of the proceedings. I think that all stems from mental disorder." The court agreed that during trial Ms. Williams only focussed on questions for a short time and frequently interrupted. It stated, "So it did concern me that her attention span was shorter than I would have expected." The court believed, however, Ms. Williams' ability to list several issues for her appeal evidenced she understood the proceedings. Nevertheless, the court ordered a psychological evaluation to assist the court in sentencing.

Based upon an evaluation of her FBI arrest record, the Presentence Report, and other documents, as well as psychological testing and personal interviews, the forensic report noted Ms. Williams' extensive history of legal problems and drug addiction. It stated "[h]er use of Elavil is a continuation of her substance abuse pattern." The psychologists concluded Ms. Williams then displayed "adequate cognitive ability to understand and appreciate the interaction which will occur among court personnel, herself, and potential witnesses." They concluded she was competent to proceed with sentencing.

II.

Competency involves defendant's mental state at the time of trial asking whether the accused is capable of cooperating in her own defense. "The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's...

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